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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Statement of Problem 
During the period following the first World War a massive scale 
stiruggle for national liberation began to spread widely among the colonial 
and semi-colonial areas. In a number of places, these nationalist 
struggles led to the emergence of independent political units during the 
interwar period. For the most part, however, the colonial areas have 
been decolonized since the second World War; becoming Independent coun­
tries largely on the basis of their colonial heritage — without regard 
to ethnicity, language, or other aspects of cultural homogeneity. 
Since the second World War, the newly Independent countries have 
consciously tried to construct some basis for national autonomy and elim­
inate the legacy of imperialist domination. While some of these new 
states took to the path of socialist reconstruction, others have been shap­
ing their economies and social structures on the basis of "free market 
economies". These newly ladependsnt countries are described popularly as 
the "Third World" (Horowitz, 1966; Worsley, 1964), or simply as the "new 
states" (Shils, 1966). They are also characterized as "underdeveloped 
countries" and have been recently, in a more diplomatic sense, called 
"developing countries" or "less developed countries" (bfyrdal, 1968: 
Appendix I). In this study, however, all these terms will be used 
synonymously. 
Those underdeveloped countries based on market economies consist of 
Central and Latin America, Africa, and Asia (excluding the socialist 
countries, Japan, and Israel), and Oceania (excluding Australia and New 
2 
Zealand). These underdeveloped countries, constituting more than two-
thirds of the world population, exhibit certain characteristics which 
distinguish them from developed countries. These characteristics, as 
described by a number of scholars, are: (1) technologically — a pre­
dominance of human and animal power over Inanimate power (such as steam 
power, electricity, or other sources) as a means of production; (Levy, 
1972); (2) economically — low levels of labor productivity and per capita 
Income, a predominance of the primary sector over the manufacturing 
sector and relatively low development of organized large-scale machine-
based industry; (3) ecologically — a low level of urbanization; (4) 
soclo-demographlcally — low levels of living standard for the mass of 
people as is manifested in specific deficiencies (insufficient food-intake, 
bad housing conditions. Inadequate public and private provisions for 
hygiene and medical care, and inefficient educational and cultural facil­
ities, massive Illiteracy, low level of health and nutrition, and rapid 
population growth due to high fertility rates) (tardai, 1968:1862); (5) 
socio-culturally and psychologically — a prevalence of low levels of 
work discipline, a lack of punctuality and orderliness (Inkeles, 1966), 
superstitious beliefs and irrational attitudes, and fatalism. In the 
words of Hoselltz (I960); the indices of underdevelopment are "particular­
ism, ascription- and functional dlffuseness". 
These underdeveloped countries are now trying to reshape such under­
developed characteristics and to overcome their backward economies. It 
is on an unprecedented scale that these underdeveloped countries are con­
sciously making a sustained effort to develop their economic, political. 
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social, and cultural contexts. The purposive change of national develop­
ment planning (which Is characterized by a conscious and deliberate ef­
fort to overcome poverty and backwardness by the massive mobilization of 
natural and human resources on the basis of plans and directions, and 
in terms of elaborated goals) is. Indeed, a novel feature of our time. 
Efforts to bring about accelerated economic growth through national 
planning have met with mixed results among the Third World countries. 
Some of these countries have been, in part, successful in bringing about 
the desired transformation, but there have also been many unsuccessful 
attempts at national planning. Many of these newly independent countries 
have been unable to achieve the overall objectives of their national 
plans. Not only have some countries failed to ensure sustained growth, 
but they also have been unable to develop and maintain the viable modem 
institutional structures which are necessary to absorb contiaucuê change 
and deal with newly emergent problems. There seems to be a general agree­
ment as to the failure of the development planning programs (Angelopoulous, 
1972; Asher, 1970, Evans, et , 1966). As a result, the optimism and 
enthusiasm which marked the beginning of the I960's as the decade of Third 
World development has degenerated into pessimism end frustration (Said, 
1971:1). 
This study is concerned with the new dynamism of development planning 
and the major causes and related problems of undegdevelvpment in the nearly 
independent Third World countries. As was pointed out above, the recent 
general failures to effectively promote development has cast serious doubts 
about the validity of the current theories of development upon which Third 
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World development plans were based. From a particular point of view, 
the possible reasons for the recent failure of Instigated social changes 
In these countries may be broadly assessed in terms of: (1) unfavorable 
Initial conditions at the starting point of development planning, (2) the 
theoretical Inadequacy of the conventional theoretical approaches which 
were applied In development planning, and (3) the lack of verification of 
these theories as based on current predominant methods of Inquiry* 
1. Unfavorable Initial conditions 
As Myrdal (1968:673-706) enqihatically pointed out, the initial con­
ditions for development In the less developed new nations are quite dif­
ferent from those In which the now developed countries initially found 
themselves. With regard to general social conditions, factors such as 
inhibitive ruling classes and attltudinal obstacles among the masses, and 
other factors operate as much stronger barriers to developmental change 
than was the case in the developed countries. These attitudes are rein­
forced by existing social institutions, acting ss both causes and affects 
of the attitudes. With regard to political institutions, the developed 
countries were politically independent, established as civil societies and 
had become fairly consolidated nation-states, able to pursue national 
policies, well before their industrial revolutions. By contrast, most of 
the underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa, with the exception of the 
Latin American countries, have only recently become independent and have 
yet to become consolidated nation-states, capable of pursuing national 
policies effectively. 
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In addition to* generally poor endowment of natural resources, the 
less developed countries are characterised by a severe lack of supporting 
Industrial Infrastructures and a shortage of skilled labor and trained 
human resources. Moreover, some underdeveloped countries — as was the 
case, for Instance, with South and East Asian countries — must initiate 
their development efforts with a considerably higher man/land ratio than 
did the Western countries. In addition, the recent population explosion 
in most underdeveloped countries is unprecedented and has become a most 
serious obstacle to development. International migration played a sig­
nificant role in the reduction of the burden of any population increases 
in the European countries. 
Finally, in regard to international relations, the trading position 
of most underdeveloped countries has been deteriorating. Since the 
colonial era, most of the underdeveloped countries have been exporting 
some specialized primary products but the demands for their exports have 
been shrinking relative to the marked expansion of world trade. These 
shrinkages have partially been due to substantial cutbacks in the amount 
of raw materials used in industrial use (because technological progress 
has developed Industrial substitutes), and partially because the increase 
In the production of export products has generally been slow. Besides, 
discriminatory tariffs in the developed countries hamper the development of 
export industries in the underdeveloped countries. All these unfavorable 
initial conditions make economic development of underdeveloped countries 
more difficult today than it once was for the now developed countries. 
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2. Theoretical Inadequacy 
Despite divergent forms and differing emphasis In their national de­
velopment planning, the Third World countries have widely employed the 
principle of so-called "democratic planning"; largely based on the freedom 
of enterprises In market economies and the Incentives of Individuals 
rather than collectivization of the human and nonhuman factors in produc­
tion and distribution. This type of development planning rests largely 
upon conventional Western theories of development rather than a pure 
socialist approach to development. These conventional development ap­
proaches» as have been applied in the Third World countries, are thought 
to be theoretically Inadequate for the following reasons. First, the 
initial assumptions in these theories are either unrealistic or irrelevant 
to the realities of the underdeveloped countries. This is because most 
of the conventional theories were coastructed on the basis of unique 
Western development experiences, or they were deductively derived in terms 
of ideal-types abstracted from time, space, and historical context. 
As already noted, the current internal conditions» as well as the 
external settings, of the underdeveloped countries are different from those 
which the Western countries experienced. These conditions need to be taken 
into account In terms of their Implications for development planning and 
induced social change. Models are needed that more adequately reflect the 
unique conditions of the Third World ccuntriss. 
Secondly, some concepts of the development theories which were ap­
plied in the less developed countries are believed to be either misleading 
or inappropriate to the realities of these countries. The concepts of a 
7 
theory are as Important as its initial assumptions because concepts are 
building blocks of theory. From a development viewpoint, for instance, 
the implication of the concept of "consumption" for the understanding of 
the people in the developed countries is different from that drawn con­
cerning the undernourished people of underdeveloped countries. When ap­
plied in different social structures and cultural contexts, the concepts 
used may be redefined relevant to the contents of their referents. In 
many cases, however, the models were not relevantly revised. Nor were 
the concepts of the models redefined in a manner relevant to the realities 
of the underdeveloped countries. 
Thirdly, there has been a tendency toward a Western bias in the social 
studies of underdevelopment. The sources of potential Western bias may 
be found in the following: (1) a natural ethnocentric impulse of the 
Western scholars, particularly during the colonial era; (2) the western 
political and military interest in winning the underdeveloped new nations 
as allies against the communist expansion (especially during the cold war 
perio<$ (Myrdal, I960); (3) the intentions of securing the economic inter­
ests of the developed countries (vested in the form of foreign private 
investment or public loan, and the like); and (4) the fact that the de­
veloped countries, as providers of advisors (or consultants) and foreign 
aid, have exerted strong influences on the economic development planning 
of the recipient countries (Johnson, 1967:137-141). Thus, in the analysis 
of underdeveloped countries, such biases are likely to obscure the real 
causes of underdevelopment, and contribute ineffective development plan­
ning. Based on this biased viewpoint, these development approaches (with 
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Irrelevant assumptions and with Inappropriate concepts) have resulted In 
the failure of development efforts and often even hamper development. 
3. Insufficient methods of research Inquiry 
Postwar analyses of the social changes of the new states were char­
acterized by the Increasing use of comparative analysis techniques, and 
of Interdisciplinary approaches. More recently, functional and behavioral 
theories have been popular among social scientists. These functionalists 
and behavlorlsts have sought to Integrate the Ideas of system, culture, 
function, structure, and action In a conceptual scheme particularly 
designed for comparative analysis. 
Resting on the assumption that a significant relationship exists 
between social, economic, and political development, many behavioral 
scientists advocate empirical analyses using a wide range of operation-
alized quantitative data. These studies generalize about the existence 
of an association of econmnic backwardness with social and political 
factors, using extensively soclodemographic indices such as per capita 
Income, literacy rates, indices of levels of living, and various other 
demographic variables. Because of their more elaborated analytical frame­
work, modem research methods have provided a strengthened conceptual 
unity in these social studies, and the operationallzed concepts yield 
quantitative data which have provided a sesns for testing hypotheses. 
Despite such improvement in analytical methods and techniques, the 
problems of modernization are often approached with unconsciously implied 
value-laden definitions. In particular, the conventional Western ap­
proaches are based on the assumptions : that democracy is a characteristic 
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of modernity, that it is the ideal form of political development* and that 
it is a prerequisite of development. Furthermore, other sources of bias 
enter into the study of modernization, in the selection of subject areas 
for research, and In the interpretation of findings (often being restricted 
by research funding agencies of the developed countries). Under such 
circumstances even empirical research cannot contribute to valid gen­
eralizations about the problems of development and current situations of 
underdeveloped countries. 
Next, In the studies of modernization, the research methods of both 
the functionalists and behaviorallsts are largely reliant on cross-
sectional analysis using quantitative data — without regard to cultural 
backgrounds, historical process, or the geographical peculiarities of 
underdeveloped countries. These contemporary approaches seek to explain 
underdevelopment and change solely in terms of theoretical characteristics 
of a society; characteristics generated within the theories and Ignorant 
of the historical and external factors which have shaped life in the de­
veloping countries. 
The main concern of this study is the correction of deficiencies 
operative in the current theories of development. In order to make de­
velopment plans effective, in order that these plans be used to Induce 
desired social change, an alternative, inclusive model for the valid 
analysis of the underdeveloped societies and their changes is called for. 
It is desired that the alternative analytic framework should be theoreti­
cally adequate and empirically supported; on the basis of valid research 
on the underdevelopment. 
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B. The Objectives and Limitations of this Study 
The main purpose of this study is to offer an inclusive, generalized 
model which identifies the major historical, Internationa] and societal 
forces, and processes which collectively define the sociocultural context 
in which development planning takes place in the new states of the Third 
World. This model will then be utilized as a heuristic device to guide 
a systematic analysis of the major causes and current conditions of under­
development, and to suggest areas of valid development strategies for the 
underdeveloped new nations. The determining causes of underdevelopment 
and related problems will be identified and analyzed in terms of the inclu­
sive analytical model to be formulated. The model is a general one In 
that it is concerned with the general conditions of underdevelopment and 
problems common to development efforts in the new states. The model is 
Inclusive in that it Includes not only historical processes but also the 
international relationships within which the underdeveloped countries 
operate. The model is analytical because It offers a framework for a 
valid analysis of the underdeveloped societies and their changes. By 
providing a basis for a valid analysis of the underdeveloped nations, 
guided by the analytical framework, it is hoped that some viable ingredients 
for policy consideration might be isolated. 
Since the real world problems of underdevelopment vary in their 
manifestations and complexity from one country to another, the analysis 
will be limited to some selective aspects of underdevelopment common to 
the Third World countries. At the same time, the discussion will remain 
at a broad and general level because its primary concern is the overall 
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conditions of underdevelopment and those problems of national development 
common to the underdeveloped nations of the Third World. As a result, the 
development strategies drawn from a guided analysis of current conditions 
of underdevelopment will be suggestive and remain to be specified in terms 
of their practical Implementation. 
C. The Approach of this Study 
As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, the current change 
taking place in the Third World countries is not only unprecedented in 
terms of its quality but also because it is a comprehensive process of 
change which is more than the sum of many small changes, i.e., changes 
occurring in individual attitudes, in social behavior, in economics, and 
in politics. Thus, the analysis ^ IH, indeed, be based on an Inter­
disciplinary approach. More specifically, the analysis of this study will 
Include: (1) regional comparison, (2) historical considerations, and (3) 
an "insider's viewpoint" as suggested by Myrdal (1957, 1975). The regional 
comparative approach will be used to analyze the patterns of underdevelop­
ment among the less developed countries, as well as the differences between 
the more developed countries and the less developed countries (especially 
in the analysis of demographic conditions and international relations). 
Historical considerations will be emphasized in the analysis of the 
determining causes and social conditions of underdevelopment. Host of 
the underdeveloped new states are, in fact, the products of historical 
process, and these historical consequences become the initial conditions 
for current development planning in those countries. Analogously, what 
happened yesterday partially determines today's conditions. 
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Finally1 consistent with Myrdal's discussion of the need for Inten­
sified research by indigenous young scholars of the underdeveloped 
societies (Myrdal, 1957; 1975), the "Insider's view" will be emphasized 
In the Interpretation of the Internal social problems and Issues of the 
underdeveloped countries. Merton (1971) Is correct when he points out 
that the "Insider's view" in social studies may also be biased In Inter­
pretation of their own problems. However, the author's firm conviction 
Is that the "Insiders" are In a better position than the "outsiders" to 
develop a coherent understanding of the nature and meaning of the internal 
social problems which plague less developed countries. What is called an 
"insider's view" should not be regarded as based solely on subjective 
judgments, but should rather be understood as a particular, yet valid, 
type of subjective interpretation of both the insider's social needs and 
their Ideals for development. 
This study analyzes the determining causes and current conditions of 
underdevelopment and discusses related problems of underdevelopment In 
terms of both quality of life and development planning. But the nature 
of this study is basically theoretical; beginning with formulation of an 
alternative analytical model of the social changes occurring in the Third 
World> The analysis includes some statistical data concerning the inter­
national relationships and existing sociodemographlc conditions, but these 
statistics, which are obtained from secondary sources and existing publi­
cations, will be used for illustrative purposes rather than inferentially. 
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D. The Organization of this Study 
The body of this study is composed of seven chapters, including 
chapters of Introduction and summary. Chapter two will review current 
development theories and formulate an analytical model for the analysis 
of changes taking place in the Third World. In this chapter, with the 
introduction of general theories of social change, major theories of de­
velopment will be reviewed in terms of their theoretical adequacy and 
applicability to the Third World countries. Following review of the 
major theories of development, an alternative generalized model which 
identifies major causes of usderdevalcpment and forces of development 
in the Third World countries will be presented. 
Chapter three will be concerned with the products of the historical 
process of colonialism and the contemporary external constraints on de­
velopment efforts in the less developed countries. This chapter will 
describe the "widening gap" between the income levels in developed rich 
countries and in underdeveloped poor countries. In chapter four, atten­
tion will be given to the internal dynamics of change. I.e., factors con­
cerning national development planning in the new states. More specifically, 
the nature and role of the new nationalism will be discussed in relation 
to national development planning. On the basis of analysis of nationalism, 
social valuaticûs underlying national development objectives will b® 
elaborated in the second section of this chapter. In connection with 
national development planning, the role of the agents of change will be 
discussed. The agents of change refer to the "modernizing elites" and 
public administrations. 
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Chapter five will deal with the general conditions of underdevelop­
ment In the areas of demography, of the quality of life» and of social 
institutions. Population problems mainly concern the impacts of rapid 
population growth in less developed countries. The quality of life will 
be discussed in terms of the educational, nutritional, and health aspects 
of the general population. Finally, social conditions will include the 
effect of political corruption, social Inequalities within individual 
countries, and traditional land ownership systems. The model to be formu­
lated will be utilized to envelop the above three chapters (chapter three, 
chapter four, and chapter five) in ens package, es an analytical guide. 
In chapter six, an effort will be made to discuss the general 
characteristics of modernization as achieved in the developed countries 
and formulation of comprehensive national development planning for the 
Third World countries. The third section of this chapter will present a 
discussion of the utility of "social indicators" for planning purpose, 
and the final section will be devoted to proposing a general strategy for 
the formulation of comprehensive development planning in an individual 
country. Finally, a brief summary will be made in chapter seven. 
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II. REVIEW OF THE mORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND 
FORMULATION OF AN ALTEBKATIVE INCLUSIVE MODEL OF CHANGE 
The purpose of this chapter Is: (1) to examine the major theories 
which have predominated in the application of development planning to less 
developed countries, and (2) to formulate aR alternative, Inclusive model 
which identifies the major factors and mechcoism associated with social 
changes occurring in parts of the Third World. Modernization is gen­
erally viewed as a specific form of development. The first section of 
this chapter will present an overview? of the theories of social change in 
order to provide a context for the discussion of modernization ^ ich 
follows in the second section* 
The second section attempts to examine six major development ap­
proaches (which are believed to have been predominant) in terms of their 
theoretical adequacy and empirical validity, and relate their application 
in less developed countries. Finally, the third section will be devoted 
to the formulation of an alternative model for systematic analysis of the 
major causes and current facets o£ uadetdevslsjsssnt, The model forssulated 
will then be utilized as a heuristic scheme and guide for a discussion of 
contemporary social changes taking place is the l$8s developed countries. 
A, Overview of the Theories of Social Change 
While the general theories of social change have been closely as­
sociated with somewhat philosophical laterpretations of history, e 
sociological analysis of social change requires a model which makes pos­
sible the formulation of feeal problems and the systematic analysis of the 
problems of change. Gerth and Mills (1953;377-3: ) have outlined such a 
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model with six major questions about social change: (1) what Is It that 
changes? (2) how does It change? (3) what la the direction of change? 
(4) what is the rate of change? (5) why does change occur or why is It 
possible? And (6) what are the principal factors In social change? 
The first question in the above requires a clear definition of social 
change and a delineation of the appropriate units of analysis. Distin­
guishing social change from cultural change, Ryan (1969) regards the former 
as a significant alteration in the social relations among the social 
members and patterns of their social activities, while regarding the latter 
as embracing broader ranges such as changes in values, ideas, technology, 
artifacts, and other various aspects of life. However, the distinction 
between social and cultural changes is only analytical, and they are 
closely linked and often fuzzy in their distinction* In the real world, 
changes can and dc take place sisiultsseously both in social and cultural 
aspects. 
The next three questions concerning the manner, direction, and tempo 
of change are usually answered in the historical description and inter­
pretation of change. In sociological literature, comparative statics 
or analogies, particularly organic analogies, have often been employed in 
the analysis of the process of change. The unit of analysis varies in 
its scope and scale, ranging from characteristics of the individual, of 
the family unit, through organizational, and institutional aspects, up to 
the societal level. Contemporary sociological studies, oriented to middle 
range theories, pay more attention to "small-scale changes" than to large-
scale changes or comprehensive wholes. According to Moore (1963:46-47) 
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"small-scale changes" can be roughly categorized Into four areas: (1) 
repetitive cycles of social action, (2) cumulative structural changes of 
groups, (3) normative change In values and rules of conduct, and (A) Inter-
group dynamics. 
Often, much attention Is paid to such variables as Individual per­
sonality, value orientations, attitudes, and role changes at the individual 
level. At the group level, sociologists usually deal with such variables 
as the group (or organizational) size, duration, mode of recruiting mem­
bers, Interpersonal relations, role relationships, communication patterns, 
leadership characteristics, and the like. Fundamentally, the studies on 
small-scale change rely on observation of short-term variations which are 
assumed to have long-term cumulative consequences. 
Most existing sociological theories dealing with large-scale change 
relating the comprehensive whole of society can be seen as: (1) histor­
ical, insofar as s (me historical situations or the present situations are 
thought to be representative, particularly in terms of the unique charac­
teristics of Western experiences after the Industrial Revolution; (2) 
theoretical. Insofar as an inner consistency exists in the conceptual 
elements of theoretical models, whether based on analogies, comparative 
statics, or ideal type taxonomies; and (3) methodological« Insofar as the 
construction of ideal types of overall societies is based on some selec­
tive traits of human society (Ponsioen, 1969). Such characteristics are 
seen in the well known worka of Tonnles, Weber, and Durkheim by way of 
posing a dichotomy, and in those of Comte, îîzrx, Mannheim, and, recently, 
Rl#sman and Rostow by formulating certain stages in the historical process 
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of change. Apparently, referring to his own German society at the end 
of the nineteenth century, Tonnles compared the traditional countryside 
with the Industrial urban centers, characterizing them as gemelnschaft 
and Resellschaft, respectively. In terms of the underlying value orienta­
tion In the patterns of social organizations, Weber differentiated between 
a communal type of society, whose members belonged by wesenwille 
(natural will), and an associational type of society organized by kurwille 
(rational will), based on individualism. In a similar vein, Durkhelm 
claims that society changes from a mechanic to an organic type of solidar­
ity when division of labor inerea##» % result of population expansion. 
Although their criteria differed, these three theories (Tonnles, Durkhelm, 
and Weber) were developed on the basis of the unique transitional 
phenomena in nineteenth century Western societies. And simple comparative 
statics of dichotomy were used to look at the present compared ïTith the 
past. 
All the stage theories imply that the series of stages in social 
change are Irreversible and Inevitable in the sense that every society 
must follow such stages. Methodologically, stage theorists explain or 
describe social change by constructing typologies embodied in the concept 
of "ideal types", which, by definition, are not found in reality. Often, 
the validity of selecting some traits for constructing the ideal types 
must be subject to empirical generalization and ssslysisc However• most 
of these theoretical models either display only selected characteristics 
of relevance to Western society, or remain as only philosophical or in­
tellectual speculation. Moreover, as Ponsioen (1969:26) has pointed out 
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"all authors are really thinking about the Western world even when speak­
ing about mankind In general". 
The earlier theories of social change can be divided Into linear and 
cyclical theories. The linear theories, most of which are evolutionary, 
delineate in one form or another, a number of significant cumulative 
changes in human history, from lower to higher levels. Cyclical theories 
of social change depict other aspects of human history, expressed in 
terms of the conception of growth, maturity, and the decay of civiliza­
tions. In cyclical theories, an emphasis is placed on a rhythm of fluctua­
tion similar to that of the life-cycle of sn organism. Speogler, Sorokin, 
and Toynbee are the leading representatives of cyclical theorists. 
The problem of why change occurs is closely related to the principal 
factors in social change as can be seen in the questions formulated by 
Gerth and Mills (1953). This subject is the central concern of inquiries 
into social change, and is also the most controversial. No consensus ... 
exists among the theorists. Gerth and Mills have briefly discussed the 
role of Individuals in bringing about social change, particularly in re­
lation to the Influence of material (objective) factors and Ideas 
(subj active). 
In his recent article, "Conflicting theories of social change", James 
S. Cclsasr. (1973) makes some distinction between theories of change and 
divides them into two broad categories, theories that stare with changes 
in the social conditions versus those that start with changes in individ­
uals. The first group of theories Is again subdivided into those labeled 
"lawyer's theory" and "economist's theory", on the one hand, while the 
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latter group Is labeled "psychologist's theory" and "revolutionary's 
theory". (See Chart A). 
Max Weber, Everett Hagen, and David McClelland may represent the 
"psychologist's theory", while Lenin, Mao Tse-Tung, and Franz Fanon may 
represent the "revolutionary's theory". Despite the radical differences 
between these two schools of thought, one common similarity does exist 
and rests on the view that change Is predicated upon changes In the per­
sonalities or beliefs and motivations of individuals. For Weber, the 
capitalist spirit, as both the value and practice of individualism, is 
rooted in the Protestant ethic. For Hagen and McClelland, the early 
socialization process in children forms the need for achievement which 
is essential for social and economic development. In other words, the 
"psychologist's theories" are based on the Idea that, "the personality 
change that preceded the rise of capitalism lay in the ideals and values 
embodied in the new religious belief of Protestantism" (Coleman, 1973:68). 
But Weber avoided touching upon the reason for the formation of the new 
religious belief of Protestantism in terms of his "psychologist's theory". 
Both Hagen and McClelland emphasize the role of the entrepreneur, char­
acterized by a strong profit motivation and risk-taking adventurism in 
the competitive capitalist system. In this case, rapid expansion in the 
economy In a laissez-faire capitalist system may be possible under the 
entrepreneur's aggressive activities^ The qualitative- distributive as­
pects of human life are mostly shunned by these theorists. 
Both Pareto and Mosca, who view social change as dependent on the 
leadership of elites, may be regarded as the "individualist's theorists" 
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in Coleman's classification. In relation to the group of the "individ­
ualist's theories", an innovative minority, usually standing on the margin 
of the existing society, may be one of the crucial factors of social change. 
This theory was developed from the notion of Everett V. Stonequlst's "The 
Marginal Man" (1937). The theoretical Justification of the marginal man 
(or Innovative minority) may be found in references made to the Jews in 
Europe and the Indian or Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia. 
Although it shares the idea of psychological change in individuals, 
the thesis of "revolutionary's theories" has a different origin from that 
of the above "Individualist's theories". The "individualist's theorists" 
conceive the changes in the individual's beliefs and motivations as being 
the main source in social change. The "revolutionary theorists" think 
that it is the revolutionary action itself which brings change (Coleman, 
1973:09). Since the "revolutionary theorist" ssçshasizes the effect of 
action in changing beliefs, the mechanism of transformation is precisely 
the opposite of that of the individualists. The revolutionary approach 
Is characterized by the total commitment of the individual to the collec­
tivity through the revolutionary movement. To the "revolutionary 
theorists", the collectivity is viewed as the "single-minded instrument 
of change". And the "revolutionary theorists" believe that the social 
change comes about "by the collective force of the revolutionary group", 
not by ân aggregate of changes in the individuals (Coleman. 1973:69). 
In terms of the validation of these theories, it should be noted 
that these two groups of theories have often been applied to different 
situations of social change. The "individualist theories" have been 
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applied more often to social change In relatively open societies, on the 
one hand. On the other hand, the "revolutionary theories" have been more 
often applied to describe changes In more rigid social structures. 
Although various factors may simultaneously operate in social change, 
the earlier theories of social change tended to emphasize a single factor 
In the causation of change. For the most part, however, they were not 
entirely monocausal theories, nor were they strictly deterministic. Among 
the principal factors singled out as the prime movers of social change, 
technological advancement is widely accepted among soclohlstorlans. This 
view is supported by the experience of Western societies after the 
Industrial Revolution. Ogburn focused his attention on the discrepancies 
between technological advancement and Its subsequent changes in social 
institutions and various aspects of life. His hypothesis of "cultural 
lag" says that changes in social instituCloûS, cultural spheres, and 
moral aspects of life always lag behind the rapid advancement of 
technology. 
Marx posits class antagonism as the prime source of historical 
change. He conceives the "forces of production" as being the determining 
element of material and economic factors by which two antagonistic classes 
arc formed » The elaae struggle inevitably results in a new synthesized 
stage. To Marxian theorists, material and economic factors are the 
determinants of social change and the dialectic»! process cf class strug­
gle provides the dynamic of social change. Thus, human history is viewed 
as continuous class struggles. 
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Diametrically opposed to the dialectical materialism, the proponents 
of social idealism (including Hegel, Weber, and Mannheim) view ideas as 
the ultimate core and prime mover in social change. In other words, the 
idealist's view emphasizes the role of ideas and the development of 
rationality in human history rather than material factors. They regard 
human history as a sequence of ideas. 
Smelser (1959) presented a seven stage paradigm of sequential patterns 
operative in the maintenance of the stability of social systems and con­
tinuity in social processes. Change occurs through time by means of the 
equillbrlating forces of four specific functions: adaptation, goal-
attainment, integration, and tension-management. The essential portions 
of the seven stages proceed with: (1) an initial dissatisfaction or a 
sense of uneasiness with present conditions ; (2) the dissatisfaction be­
comes a manifest unrest in regard to the persisting situations; (3) the 
unrest turns into the search for and assessment of solutions, and this 
stage is frequently a stage of trial and error in search of new patterns; 
(4) patterns are formalized which are capable of achieving public ac­
ceptance; and (5) finally, the new patterns become legitimate and in­
stitutionalized parts of the social order, thus completing one episode of 
social change. From a critical point of view, however, Smelser's model 
of sequential change fundamentally pays attention to the continuity of 
the persisting social order by means of minor scdificsticn rather than 
structural alteration. This theory cannot avoid the criticism of teleo-
loglcal fallacy, since Smelaar regards the end result of change as always 
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good and legitimate, while the initial stage of change is bad and un­
satisfactory. 
From a different point of view, Ryan (1969) asserts that social and 
cultural change occurs when novel patterns of thought and action arise in 
the organization of a group or its culture. Thus, Innovation is regarded 
as an origin of change and its diffusion of innovation as the main 
mechanism of change. By Innovation Ryan meant the appearance of novelty, 
such as inventions (or "the arrangement of existing ideas into novel and 
meaningful patterns") referring to a source of immanent change or en­
dogenous change (1969:11). These innovations do not remain long with 
their originations, but diffuse to others through communication. The 
recipient parties, whether individuals or societies, Integrate the dif­
fused innovations into their own way of social change and internalize them 
as parts of social conultlona and structures. According to Ryan, the 
social system and its structures have the immanent conditions conducive 
to change for the following reasons: (1) an internal, imperfect integra­
tion of the social system, (2) an Imperfect integration of the external 
social system, (3) an imperfect integration of the ecological system, (4) 
imperfections in processes of social replacement and succession in member­
ships, and (5) quantitative difference in membership, etc. (1969:73). 
In sum, this section reviewed some general theories of social change 
in terms of: (1) the scope of Changs considered — small-scale change 
versus change of comprehensive wholes, (2) direction of change — evolu­
tionary versus cyclical, (3) the prime movers in change — objective 
versus subjective factors, and (4) process of change — the process of 
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sequential equilibrium versus diffusion process of Innovation. Based on 
these criteria, the process of modernization with which we are concerned 
can be regarded as a specific form of social change with the following 
characteristics: Although the principal factors in social change are 
controversial among the theories, (1) modernization has to do with the 
entire fabric of social life, of comprehensive wholes, in its scope; (2) 
it may be seen as evolutionary moving upward to higher levels of develop­
ment; and (3) its process is characterized by higher structural differen­
tiation and specialization. Most of the prevailing modernization theories 
are largely based upon the unique development exemplified as the Western 
experiences. Despite the fact that some major features of modernization 
processes more or less converge with Western experiences, the current 
change taking place in the non-Westem countries is viewed as a unique 
form of development, utilizing state plaaalag Co accelerate social and 
economic transformation in desired directions (usually seen in the effort 
to bridge the gap between the level of a given society and a modem form 
achieved in other advanced societies). We now turn to specific theories 
of modernization in the next section. 
B. Review of Modernization Theories 
After reviewing some general theories of social change, modernization 
has been viewed as a mpecific form of development, particularly as seen 
in the reference made to the uniquely Western experiences. Modernization 
is a comprehensive total transformation of a traditional or premodern 
society into some types of "modem" industrial society through a series 
of interconnected social dianges in the entire fabric of social life. Each 
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social science discipline has focused on different elements of the modern­
ization process. Economists see modernization primarily In terms of In­
creased productivity and efficiency by means of man's application of tech­
nologies to control of production. 
Political scientists have focused primarily on the problems of natlon-
bulldlng and changes In the political systems. Thus, the political 
scientists concerned with development are Interested, not only in who 
exercises power, but also in how governments Increase their capacity to 
innovate, respond to demands for change, and to manage social conflict 
and economic backwardness. Sociologists have been primarily concerned 
with the process of structural differentiations and the functional 
specialization that characterizes modem societies. They have given atten­
tion to the differentiations occurring within social structures as new 
occupations emerge, new types of social organizations form, new legal and 
educational institutions develop, and new types of communities (urbaniza­
tion) appear. Sociologists have also emphasized some of the disruptive 
features of the modernization process, such as rising tensions, mental 
illnesses, violence, divorce, delinquency, class conflict, and other 
forms of social conflict. 
None of these views is sufficiently general to encompass all the 
features of a society in mcdsmisation. In defining modernization, some 
scholars emphasize, not in the character of the society, but in the 
character of individuals. On the basis of cross-national study, Alex 
Inkeles emphasizes rationality in individual attitudes and behaviors in 
modern societies, irrespective of cultural differences (Inkeles, 1966). 
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David McClelland (1961) underlies achievement orientations as essential 
qualities of modern man. Cyril Black (1966) characterized modem men by 
their Increased capacity to apply new knowledge to dally life. Arnold 
Anderson (1966) stresses the development of skills and creativity shared 
by men In modern societies and as developed through expanded educational 
opportunities. In short, all the above authors emphasize that it Is new 
ways of thinking, attitudes, and the behaviors of Individuals which make 
It possible to make the transformation from the traditional types into 
"modern" societies. 
In this study, the tenns "modernization" and "development" are used 
interchangeably and are defined as a comprehensive progressive process 
of interconnected social changes leading to national autonomy and individ­
ual well-being. In recent years, most of the less developed new nations 
have adopted, in one form or another, national devélopmeaC plans la order 
to accelerate economic growth and to bring about social change in the 
desired directions. A number of development approaches have emerged, 
each providing a set of philosophical presuppositions within which the 
underdevelopment problems may be viewed and in terms of which the formula­
tion of specific development policies may proee*d. Many of these develop­
ment theories have been, whether implicitly or explicitly, translated into 
guidelines for policy-making in national development planning. 
Among the theoretical schools of thought oa davelcpssnt, the follow­
ing six theoretical approaches seem to be dominant: (1) the ideal-typical 
index approach, (2) the diffuslonlst approach, (3) the psychological 
approach, (4) the historical-critical approach, (5) the Marxist approach, 
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and (6) the general systems approach. The first three approaches have 
been popular in the advanced capitalist countries. These approaches have 
provided the major conceptual frameworks used to specify policies by the 
developed capitalist countries for the purpose of modernizing the under­
developed societies. The fourth approach emerged in the late 1960*s among 
a group of radical indigenous social scientists in Latin America and Asia 
as a challenge to the first three views. The Marxist approach to modern­
ization in the underdeveloped countries, is diametrically opposed to the 
first four approaches in its major postulates and policy formulations. 
The general systems approach has been developed recently and It is re­
garded as a methodological tool rather than a substantial theory. 
Manning Nash (1963:5) briefly summarized the central ideas of the 
first three approaches to modernization in the following manner. The 
ideal-typical index method is characterized by its tendent^ £ô view de­
velopment as a transformation of one lower type into another higher type. 
The dlffusionist approach, on the other hand, views development as the 
process of acculturation, particularly in terms of the adoption of elements 
of Western civilization — Including values, knowledge, organizations, 
technology, and capital — into the indigenous societies of the under­
developed non-Western areas. Finally, the psychological approach, which 
is mainly based on "smaller-scale hypotheses" tests, is essentially identi­
cal with what Coleman has labeled as the "luuiviu-aalist thgcrlss", 
mentioned In the previous section. 
These development approaches, which have largely shaped contemporary 
Euro-American policies as well as attitudes toward less developed 
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countries, are interrelated to each other as Frank indicated: 
The first mode is ideal typical in that it sets up supposedly 
typical characteristics of development. The second mode 
concerns itself with how these characteristics of the first 
mode are supposedly diffused from the developed countries 
to underdeveloped ones. Finally, the third mode, and herein 
lies its pioneering service, tells us how the typical 
characteristics that are identified in the first and dif­
fused according to the second mode are to be acculturated 
by the underdeveloped countries if they wish to develop. 
(Frank, 1969b:76) 
1. The ideal-typical index approach 
This approach is based on the construction of polar ideal-types 
called developed and underdeveloped; resting on the basis of certain ideal-
typical indices which elaborate the consequential attributes of develop­
ment and underdevelopment. It usually has two major variants. First, 
the "pattern variable" approach, which was systemized by Parsons (1954), 
Identifies similarities and differences between societies in tersis of Max 
Weber's notion of "ideal types". This pattern variable approach is, in 
fact, nothing but a taxonomic generalization of the consequential char­
acteristics of premodem (or traditional) and modem societies in terms 
of Western experience. Second, the historical stage approach is usually 
a simple expansion of the polar type approach into a specification of 
intermediate stages, as is exemplified in Rostow's (1962) "stages of 
economic growth". 
These âppcôâcheâ have been criticized on three criteria employed by 
Frank: (1) empirical validity, (2) theoretical adequacy, and (3) policy-
wise effectiveness (1969b). It aeema worthwhile to review Frank's 
critical examination of the three conventional development theories. As 
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was mentioned above, the application of "pattern variables" to the char­
acteristics of development and underdevelopment Is one type of the Ideal-
typical Index approach. One of the "pattern variables" approaches Is seen 
In Hoselltz's thesis (1960). Hoselltz characterizes the social relation­
ships in developed countries as normatlvely unlversallstlc, functionally 
specific, and achievement oriented. On the contrary, the dominant social 
values and social relationships in the underdeveloped countries are char­
acterized as particularistic, diffuse, and ascriptlve. These distinctive 
attributes of development and underdevelopment are developed on the basis 
of ideal-types whose validity is assumed a priori. and with the primary 
goal of providing abstract conceptual frameworks within which any society 
may be reviewed. They are not designed about the needs of developing 
countries. In terms of eiiq>lrlcal validity, Hoselltz's pattern variables 
approach falls to correspond to the realities of both developed and under­
developed countries. 
Hoselltz views development as an increasing number of role-changes 
from one pattern to the other — from particularistic, ascriptlve, and dif­
fuse to unlversallstlc, achievement oriented, and functionally specific 
regardless of the significance of the roles in change (Frank, 1969b:32-33). 
In reality, some roles (at the top or at the bottom) are more relevant to 
development than Just roles in general. In this regard, Hoselltz's thesis 
is theoretically inadequate. The pattern variables approach usually 
neglects the structural aspects in the analysls of underdevelopment. In 
other words, this school of theorists tries to explain the existence of 
the underdeveloped characteristics of the parts, or "merely to demonstrate 
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the relations among them, but not to analyze or account for the existence 
of the social structure as a whole" (Frank, 1969b:36). Consequently, 
These theorists, who pretend to analyze economic development 
and cultural change, fall to direct theoretical analysis to 
the past origins, the present transformations, or the future 
prospects of the existing social system as a system. 
(Frank, 1969b:36) 
On the basis of the characteristics of developed capitalist coun­
tries, these theorists regard the rise of middle class as the indicator 
of development. Thus, they maintain that development policies should be 
in favor of upper and middle classes rather than larger masses at the 
bottom strata. Throughout the underdeveloped countries, it Is common 
that the middle classes do not rise from the economic development. The 
upper and middle classes represent only a small proportion of population; 
leaving an increasing number of masses in extreme poverty. The tendency 
is toward a widening gap between the upper classes and the bottom straEa 
in most of the less developed countries. This acute problem of in­
equalities is not only a characteristic of underdevelopment, but also a 
strong disincentive in social mobilization for development. Therefore, 
this conventional development approach is thought to be policy-wise in­
effective in developing the underdeveloped countries. 
Stage theory is another type of the ideal-typical Index approach. 
Rostov's (1962) thesis of "the stages of economic growth" may be considered 
as representative of current stage theories. In terms of economic grs^fth, 
Rostow identifies all societies by fitting into into one of the five 
stages: (1) the traditional, (2) the preconditions of take-off, (3) the 
take-off, (4) the drive to maturity, and (5) the age of mass consumption. 
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Rostow's model of developmental stages, like other conventional develop­
ment theories, Is also largely derived from the unique historical ex­
periences of economic development in the West. When applied to the hori­
zontal (contemporary) characteristics of the less developed countries in 
search of historical attributes of the West, the thesis of Rostow's stage 
theory is empirically Invalid in terms of the realities of the less de­
veloped countries. Rostov regards the contemporary underdevelopment as 
the original conditions of traditional societies as the Western societies 
were. Many critical scholars (Brett, 1973; Desai, 1971; and Frank, 1969b) 
have reached an agreement that the presently developed Western countries 
were once undeveloped but not underdeveloped, as the newly independent 
countries are. The industrialized capitalist countries attempted to 
expand their capitalist systems on a global scale by incorporating the 
lands and peoples of their colonies. As a result of the product of both 
this historical (colonial) process and current market-forces in the global 
capitalist system, the undeveloped original conditions of traditional non-
Western societies have now been transformed into the present state of 
underdevelopment. In this regard, Rostow's initial two stages, which re­
gard current underdevelopment as the undeveloped original conditions of 
traditional societies, are incorrectly conceived. In fact, Rostow's 
theoretical formulation rests on the particularistic character of Western 
capitalist development and a faulty characterization of development by 
ignoring the realities of the underdeveloped countries. 
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2. The dlffuslonlst approach 
This school of thought views development as the process occurring 
through the diffusion of cultural elements from the developed to the under­
developed countries. The underlying assumption of diffusionist theorists 
is that underdeveloped countries cannot overcome their baclo/ardness with­
out assistance from the developed countries. The diffusionist theorists 
emphasize that the inability of underdeveloped societies to utilize ad­
vanced technology and knowledge is essentially attributed to obstacles 
such as traditional beliefs and values, various Institutions, and un­
favorable demographic factors In the recipient countries. These theorists 
advocate that capitals, technologies, and institutional principles be 
diffused from developed industrial countries to underdeveloped countries. 
In reality, the proposition of the capital-flow from developed countries 
to less developed countries seems to be empirically refuted in terms of 
the amount of various forms of repatriation of foreign investment and the 
current trade deficit in the less developed countries. 
The diffusion of innovations and advanced technologies is, indeed, 
an essential process for development. But the kinds of technologies and 
innovations have not always diffused for the benefit of the recipient 
countries. The thesis of this diffusionist approach is generally true in 
terms of the transfer of technologies and innovations, but it is empiri­
cally invalid in terms of the faot of recent %rmln drains" from many 
developing countries. 
In social and cultural aspects, it is true that cultural elements, 
including principles of institutions, methods of organization, and even 
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fads and fashions, have been extensively diffused and penetrated into 
the underdeveloped countries through the networks of mass media and trans­
portation. In the process of social change, these new elements of dif­
fusion have operated to disorganize the traditional social Institutions, 
and, at the same time, they have largely contributed to the transformation 
of old traditional institutions into modem forms of institutions in the 
recipient countries. The factual reality, however, is that a great many 
of the diffused Western ideas, in both political and social form, often 
represent the expression of the particular interests of those who dif­
fused them. For example, some underdeveloped countries have been imposed 
on by alien political ideologies, which have constraining effects on 
economic development and political change. Some of these diffused ideas 
often serve as the theoretical premises for, or practical justification 
of, the status quo of the reactionary privileged classes, who stand in 
the way of vital social reform and national development; in alliance with 
external forces. 
3. The psychological approach 
The psychological approach, to which Nash (1963) and Frank (1969b) 
refer, has been maintained by McClelland (1961), Hagen (1962), Kunkel 
(1970), and others. The central hypothesis of this approach is that 
"a society with a generally high level of achievement will produce more 
energetic entrepreneurs who, in turn, produce more rapid economic develop­
ment ..." and not the social structure "but only a high degree of 
Individual motivation or need for achievement Is the alpha and omega of 
economic development and cultural change" (Frank, 1969b:68). It is true 
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that entrepreneurs played an important role in bringing about economic 
growth in the capitalist West. According to this approach, the generation 
of motivation and n-achievement is the crucial problem of development. 
Only such a psychological state can enable the underdeveloped societies 
to overcome their present backwardness. 
The psychological approach is believed to be insufficient to estab­
lish an inclusive causal model with the supposedly causative psychological 
factors and with the supposedly resultant economic development. These 
psychological theorists usually do not take account of the consequences 
of hiatorlcal process, nor of the external constraints operative in under­
developed countries. Despite the close relationship between the nature of 
social structure (institutions) and the psychological traits of individ­
uals, these theorists not only ignore structural aspects, but they also 
have confused côncmûltaat correlation with the caueal relationship between 
the psychological states and economic development. 
On the basis of Frank's critical examination of thèse three con­
ventional theories of development, the common shortcomings of these de­
velopment approaches can be summed up as: these three approaches are 
empirically invalid when observed in the context of the realities of less 
developed countries. They are theoretically Inadequate: 
Because they cannot identify the determinant social whole, 
because It takes account neither of the history o£ the 
uaderdeveloped part nor of its relations with the de­
veloped part, and least of «11 the world as a whole, and 
because it does not conform to the structure of that 
world's social system. (Frank, 1969b:76) 
These theorists are policy-wise ineffective in pursuing the proclaimed 
Intentions of promoting the modernization and development of underdeveloped 
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countries. From a radical point of view» the policies proposed by these 
conventional approaches are conservative supporting the status quo and 
often operate as obstacles to needed social reforms. 
4. The historical-critical approach 
The theorists of this approach are severely critical of the major as­
sumptions, approaches to analysis, and policy prescriptions of the above 
three approaches. In fact, this approach has emerged as a response to 
the abstact, formal, and ahlstorlcal approach of the first three theories 
of development. This approach focuses on concrete historical inquiries 
into both developed and underdeveloped countries. It also assumes that 
the relations between developed countries and underdeveloped countries 
aie not necessarily mutually beneficial. Rather, it asserts that the de­
veloped countries are in sharp conflict, economic and political, with 
underdeveloped countries. On the basis of the recognition of the conflicts 
between them, a realistic theory of development should be elaborated. 
Ihlû school of thought Is scsstisss characterised as "radical 
sociology" or "conflict sociology" with its key focus shifted from 
equilibrium to change. Mills (1959), Frank (1969b), and Desal (1971) are 
the advocates of this school of thought. These scholars differ from the 
Marxist theorists. They do not consider that the production relation is 
the axis ia social relations. While thay recognize the significance of 
conflict, they do not consider class conflict as the central conflict in 
society. They presume that the ruling group in contemporary society is 
the "power elite", and not the capitalist class. These theorists empha­
size the historical dimension and concrete evidences. Thus, they endeavor 
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to provide factual evidences and policy propositions on the basis of their 
concrete findings. Due to the emphasis on historical dimension and 
external relationship, however, this approach is likely to obscure many 
internal conditions associated with societal change, such as current 
population problems, which. Irrespective of both historical dimension and 
external relations, has become one of the most serious social problems 
of many underdeveloped countries and an obstacle to economic development. 
5. The Marxist development approach 
This approach accepts Marx's philosophical and sociological postu­
lates and its strategy for social change. It shares an emphasis on his­
torical process and external relationship with the fourth approach. The 
Marxists consider that the cause of underdevelopment, and the problems 
arising out of this underdevelopment, can be properly understood only if 
it is fully understood in the context of the growth of the worldwide 
capitalist system from its mercantilist and industrial phases, to its 
latest Imperialist phase of development. They claim that the present 
underdevelopment of the "Third World" is rooted in the fact that the newly 
independent countries were kept backward as colonial appendages of the 
present advanced capitalist, imperialist countries. This backwardness 
was simultaneously generated by the very process of development in the 
Imperialist countries and the growth of the modern capitalist systsn on 
a global scale. The Marxists take the view that the underdeveloped new 
nations, having taken to the path of development along capitalist lines, 
are interlocked with the advanced capitalist countries. Thus, these 
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new states become economically and culturally subordinate to the developed 
countries. 
According to this approach, the developed countries are not assist­
ing the underdeveloped countries in overcoming their backwardness. On 
the contrary, they are elaborating a new and more subtle form of exploita­
tion of the underdeveloped countries under the guise of "aid". They are 
transforming underdeveloped countries into their neo-colonial dependencies. 
The image of "aid", "assistance", and the transfer of skills, techniques, 
and capital is deceptive. In fact, the pattern of aid itself is a basic 
constraining factor which retards the economic development of the under­
developed countries. In development policy, this approach prescribes 
the path for development in a socialistic way, based fundamentally on 
distinctive and qualitatively new forms of property relations and objectives 
of production. This school of thought is pursuing a fundamentally dif­
ferent goal and path of development from those of the above four major 
theories. 
6. The general systems approach 
This approach has a recent origin and has gradually appealed to the 
economic and social planning experts. This approach views a social system 
In terms of "open system" and shifts the notion of conventional causal 
relationships into the relationship of "input", "throughput", and "out­
put". And this systems approach sees societal development in terms of 
growing systemsness. Chodack regards modernization as "a specific form of 
development which consists of bridging the gap between the level of 
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development of a given society, or some sphere of Its life, and a more 
perfect and modern for achieved In other societies" (Chodack, 1973:12). 
The characteristics of this approach may be summarized as follows: 
First, this approach Is extensively employed among "experts" or "social 
engineers" for the purpose of management, program evaluation, and the 
like. This approach does not usually provide the desired goals of de­
velopment nor Identify the problems of underdevelopment. It Is technically 
applied to development planning on the basis of the goals and problem 
areas identified. Secondly, this approach heavily depends upon quantita­
tive diagnosis and prognosis. Most of the statements commonly made about 
the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries depend on how de­
velopment is measured; even though the measurement employed is often 
Inadequate for development purposes in terms of validity, reliability, 
and accuracy. Quantification has the merits of Introducing both certainty 
and objectivity into development planning and it makes the planning more 
tangible and technical. However, the cost of quantification is the 
omission of the analysis of everything that is not quantifiable» Thus, 
this approach naturally neglects important noneconomlc variables which are 
not taken into account. 
Thirdly, although this approach has practical value in the applica­
tion of development planning, it is thought to lack explanatory power to 
identify detersltilng causES of underdevelopment and related problesis of 
development. It also lacks fundamental philosophical presuppositions in 
terms of ontologlcal and eplstemologlcal grounds. In this regard, the 
general systems approach is methodological rather than theoretical. 
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The six major approaches to the development of underdeveloped coun­
tries have been reviewed in the above. In terms of how modernization 
occurs, the first three approaches view change in certain values and 
attitudes as a precondition to development. The latter approaches associate 
present underdevelopment with historical and external relationship of 
social wholes. The first three approaches are generally ahistorical and 
abstract. Their strategy of understanding is based on a body of deductive 
theory, abstracted from the unique experience of Euro-American development. 
These approaches are often biased in their interpretation of the current 
underdevelopment of non-Westem countries by forcing realities into 
abstract models which are derived deductively. Consequently, they tend 
to obscure determining causes of underdevelopment — historical and 
external influences. 
Though both the uistorlcal-criticsl approach and the Marxist approach 
emphasize the historical and external causations of underdevelopment, 
they have weaknesses in that they underestimate the problems of internal 
aspects, such as population problems, which are considered to be especially 
Important in development planning. The general systems approach is also 
deficient in understanding the historical and external aspects of under­
development. Thus, each of the major approaches to modernization of 
underdeveloped societies is considered, one way or another, empirically 
invalid lu terms of the realities of present underdevelopment and it is 
also inadequate In the understanding of the determinants of underdevelop­
ment. In the next section, an alternative, inclusive model of change 
42 
will be attempted to be formulated In terms of historical, relational, 
and internal aspects. 
C. Formulation of an 
Alternative Model of Change 
This section attempts to formulate an alternative, generalized model 
which Identifies the major causes and dynamics of the changes which are 
now taking place In the Third World countries. The formulation of a valid 
model of change Is the main purpose of this study. It Is hoped that the 
model will be viable enough to serve as a basic analytical framework for 
understanding recent societal changes In underdeveloped countries, and to 
guide future, instigated, change. 
As reviewed, the six major approaches to development and current 
social changes all have some shortcomings, either on theoretical and 
empirical grounds, or in their application to development policy prescrip­
tions for underdeveloped countries. These approaches have. In general, 
failed to adequately explain the unique phenomena characterizing the 
actual recent changes in the underdeveloped countries. Further, they 
fail as guides for achieving the objectives of development planning, i.e., 
in their application to the development of underdeveloped countries. Such 
shortcomings may be attributed to the universal application of the Western 
models to the unique phentxnena of current social changes of the Third 
World countries. In order to formulate a valid model of chenge. the 
uniquenesses of current changes In the less developed countries must be 
properly taken into account in terms of determining factors, current con­
ditions and related problems, and the Internal dynamics of change. 
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As already noted, the nature and pattern of current changes taking 
place In the less developed countries are considered to be fundamentally 
different from those of the Western experiences in several aspects. First, 
the historical processes which served as the initial conditions for the 
current change in the underdeveloped countries are fundamentally different 
from those of the Western Industrial countries. Secondly, while the 
change of modernization in Western societies largely began within those 
areas, causes of current changes in the less developed countries have 
generally originated from outside these societies. Thirdly, national 
development planning, as a way of promoting purposive change, has been 
emphasized by the less developed countries, while many of the developed, 
industrialized countries have largely relied upon laissez-faire policies 
relating to social change and development. 
Each of the three fundamental differences in the explanation of cur­
rent social changes has been stressed by one or more social change or de­
velopment approaches. For instance, both the diffusionlst and the 
historical-critical development schools of thought have emphasized the 
theme of exogenous change, while both the historical-critical and the 
Marxist development theorists put emphasis on the consequences of his­
torical processes. Recently, many developmentallsts, either in economic 
sciences or in international agencies such as the organizations of the 
United Nations and domestic policy-making bodies, have emphasized national 
development planning by state-intervention. However, each of these 
theories and development approaches seems to be insufficient in the empha­
sis of the three unique aspects of changes in the Third World countries. 
44 
Tlie theories and approaches are narrow In scope; none able to relate in 
a unified fashion, to the three distinctive features of developing 
countries. What is required is a single Integrated perspective on under­
development and programs for development. 
The model to be developed is based upon observations of the charac­
teristics of the current changes taking place in the less developed coun­
tries (rather than _a priori theoretical grounds) as well as upon the re­
sults of the critique of existing theories and approaches. The gen­
eralized model is composed of four major components: (1) the Incipient 
structural conditions of nation-building> (2) the external forces in 
international relationships, (3) the current internal dynamics of national 
development, and (4) the current internal conditions and related problems 
of underdevelopment. The major components of the model are outlined in 
Table 1. 
1. The Incipient structural conditions of nation-building 
The first prcssise is that the historical consequences of initial con­
ditions may profoundly influence the course and process of social change. 
For Instance, it cannot be assumed that the formation of nation-states 
and national development of different regions occurred in the same ways, 
or can be accounted for in terms of a single generalization. Indeed, 
industrialization, as a particular process of change, is a different 
process in Africa (as tribal societies), in Asia and the Middle East (as 
the societies of ancient civilization), and in the North Atlantic region 
(as modern states). Thus, the Indigenous traditional bases of a nation 
become important initial conditions for later changes. 
Table 1. Major components of a generalized model of current changes In the less developed 
countries. 
Basic Premises Major Aspects Basic Elements 
Selected 
Subj ects 
Initial conditions 
of historical con­
sequences emphaislzed 
Incipient con­
ditions of 
natlon-
bulldlng 
Colonial effects* 
Traditional bases 
Colonialism 
Exogenous chang;es 
emphasized 
External fac­
tors in inter­
national, 
relationships 
Political* (ideologi­
cal military) 
Economic* 
Technologlcal 
Cultural 
Foreign aid 
Trade 
Purposive changes 
emphasized 
Current 
internal 
dynamical 
Nationalism* 
Rising expectations 
Agents of change* 
Nationalism 
Elites 
Public admin­
istration 
Current 
internal con­
ditions and 
problem!: 
Demographic* 
Social® 
Population growth, 
structure and 
distribution 
Health, education. 
Political corrup­
tion, inequali-
ties and land 
tenure systems 
^Indicates m.3jor emphasis In the discussion In the study» 
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Shils (1960:329) has used the term "new states" to refer to the fact 
that most of the less developed countries of Asia and Africa have been 
Independent new states since World War II. These dependent new states 
are the historical products of a recent colonial era. Thus, their capac­
ities for nation-building are largely based upon the former colonial 
administrative frontiers; frontiers established irrespective of the 
natural communities of indigenous people inhabiting the areas. In this 
regard, the initial conditions for development of these countries started 
with immanent structural weaknesses in their nation-building potentials. 
Such immanent weaknesses are manifested broadly in two aspects — 
(1) in the plural characteristics of the populations of the countries, as 
determined by ethnicity or tribal groups, linguistic criteria, cultural 
backgrounds, and the like, and (2) in terms of the built-in dependence on 
the economies of developed industrial countries as suppliers of raw 
materials and markets for the industrial goods from the industrialized 
countries. From a particular point of view, the present underdevelopment 
in the less developed countries can not be confused with the original 
state of underdevelopment. Rather it is the product of a historical 
process Involving relations with the developed industrial countries. In 
this study, the effects of colonialism on the nation-building endeavors of 
the less developed new states are discussed with respect to the component 
of the initial conditions for development. 
2. External factors in the current international relationships 
The necessity of considering sources of exogenous change in develops 
ing countries is based upon the observation that transformations in one 
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part of the globe often Influence profoundly the course of events else­
where. This Is especially true at the present time. Every country Is 
Involved In a general process of rapid change, which requires mutual ad­
justments In other countries that are linked by Interdependent networks 
of political and economic Interrelationships. 
Some sociologists have been well aware of the Importance of such 
external factors In the patterns of social change In current non-Westem 
societies (Bottomore, 1972; deVrles, 1961). DeVrles viewed the external 
Influences as the Impetus of changes In less developed non-Western coun­
tries (though the Intensity of the Impacts of the exogenous Influences and 
the patterns of responses vary from country to country). In the same way, 
Bottomore (1972) Indicates that the recent social changes of the non-
Western countries have largely originated from sources outside those 
countries; particularly from the developed countries of the North Atlantic 
regions. The external Influences employed by both Bottomore and deVrles 
refer to those cultural and technological influences (including technology, 
scientific knowledge, information, political ideologies, and religion) 
which have originated in the West. Though the intensity of and accessi­
bility to these external influences has not been diffused equally from 
country to country, all these external factors have in some manner af­
fected spheres of indigenous social life in the less developed countries. 
As reviewed in the previous section. both Latin American scholars 
and the Marxist theorists have expressed theoretical concern about such 
external Influences; particularly as manifested in the political and 
economic relations which obtain between the less developed countries and 
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the developed Industrial countries. These groups of theorists view cur­
rent international relationships as important determinants of the 
present underdevelopment in the less developed countries. For instance, 
mutual defense treaties and tied foreign aid are most likely to accompany 
economically dependent relations between the developed industrial countries 
and the less developed countries; often weakening the national autonomy 
of the less developed countries involved. During the Cold War era, 
especially, such military and political alignments with one ideological 
camp meant overall embargo from another ideological camp. Thus, the less 
developed countries find themselves in a position dependent upon the allied 
developed countries, with a narrow choice of freedom in economic, tech­
nological, and cultural exchanges. 
Trade, as another example of external relations, is one of the most 
important sources of foreign exchange earning; desperately needed for 
national development planning. Many less developed countries export only 
a few limited items of raw materials. The international prices of such 
raw materials in general are unstable at international markets. Needless 
to say, countries whose major source of income is raw material exports 
are having difficulties in establishing realistic budgets for national 
development planning. Confounding this is the fact that some raw materials, 
such as rubber, have substantially reduced export value due to their 
substitution by synthetic products in developed countries. 
The political and economic influences in international relationships 
can, then, become severe external constraints on the economic development 
of the less developed countries. Such dependent relations have historically 
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resulted In sharp conflicts of Interests between the countries, rather 
than international cooperation between them. With respect to the external 
factors affecting current changes, the nature of current foreign aid 
and the current trends of trade terms will be discussed in this study. 
3. Internal societal dynamics of development 
As was discussed in previous sections, development is viewed as a 
particular type of change. Development planning means a conscious, delib­
erate attempt to change society in desired directions. Thus, development 
planning is characterized as a purposive change. In one sense, almost all 
social change may be considered purposive, i.e., to the degree that they 
result from the purposive acts of individual men. But such acts may have 
unintended consequences, because the individual actions are not perfectly 
coordinated and may Impede each other as, for example, in situations of 
conflict. In such situations, change may be causally determined, but it 
is not purposive in the sense that it achieves the purposes of all the 
individuals who are involved^ Change may more properly be termed purposive 
when a common purpose emerges and may be realized by degrees through a 
process of planned social change. 
In the Marxist theory of social change, for example, the internal 
dynamics of social change have to do with the dialectical conflict of 
class struggle, as is determined by material and economic factors. In 
this study, the internal dynamics of planned change specifically refers to 
development policies and the agents of change. The development policies 
are thought to be largely grounded upon a growing nationalism and are 
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thought to be designed to meet the social needs and rising expectations 
of the masses of people. 
The masses, liberated from colonialism and In contact with material 
and technological developments from the Industrialized countries, have 
heightened expectations about Individual well-being. Consistent with 
the rising expectations of the masses, the new nationalism, largely 
based on antl-colonlallsm, has grown among the elites and Intellectuals 
In these areas. Thus, the new nationalism has become a powerful emotional 
Impetus for national development and for national autonomy. 
National autonomy Includes: (1) economic self-sufficiency, (2) a 
national sovereignity In its own domestic decisions, (3) dlpolomatlc 
recognition in international affairs, and (4) a national identity in terms 
of Internal cohesion and differentiation from other nation's character­
istics (Goulet, 1975:121); Development objectives are assumed to include 
the Improvement of overall individual well-being and the promotion of 
national autonony. Thus, the new nationalism which is expressed as a 
common purpose in social change is a basic element of the current internal 
dynamics of development. 
In the implementation of development policies, development planning 
programs may be organized and carried out by agents of change. In this 
regard, agents of change are also Important elements of the internal 
dynamics of current social change. The agents of change refer to those who 
articulate development ideals in nationalism, who initiate development 
policies through political processes, who organize development planning, 
and who formulate and carry out the development programs. Elites and 
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public administrators are thought to be among the most Important agents 
of change In development planning. 
Some traditional elites may become Inhibitors for social change but 
other new elites, as bearers of new nationalism, serve as catalysts for 
Induced social change (deVrles, 1961). These catalyst elites are usually 
recruited from Intellectuals or often military officials in the less 
developed countries (Pye, 1962). They have also been referred to as 
"modernizing elites" (Shlls, 1960). The modernizing elites are usually 
Involved in the political process and attenq)t to translate the Ideals of 
the new nationalism into specific development policies. 
Based on development policies, public administrations set specific 
development goals, formulate a comprehensive development planning, organize 
its specific programs, and carry them out. Thus, public administrations 
are thought to be largely responsible for the achievement of development 
planning. However, public administrations are, in the implementation of 
development policies, subject to various limitations including time and 
budget, or they are often under political pressures. In many cases, the 
public administrations of the less developed countries have internal 
shortcomings in terms of the quality of administrative persosaal as well 
as the organizational structures. In this case, the nature of elites and 
the roles and characteristics of public administrations will be discussed. 
4. Internal conditions and related problems of underdevelopment 
It has been stated that both historical consequences and contemporary 
international relationships may profoundly Influence the course and process 
of current social changes. Recent development planning movement has been 
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emphasized to be an important aspect of internal dynamics of social and 
economic development. In addition to these three major aspects, the inter­
nal societal conditions are thought to be an important factor of social 
change. Moreover, it is regarded as the substance of social change, i.e., 
what is changed. Some of these societal conditions in less developed 
countries are the manifestations of problems of underdevelopment, and at 
the same time, they function as constraining effects in social and economic 
development. These internal societal conditions Include both demographic 
and social conditions. 
Concerning social conditions in many less developed countries, the 
existing attitudes and institutional structures are thought to be rigid 
and inflexible In nature, and thus, are often barriers to development 
planning. In one sense, underdevelopment refers to undesirable social con­
ditions that are largely detrimental and inconducive to overall develop­
ment. Thus, attention has to be directed toward identifying unfavorable 
social conditions in development planning. Efforts should be made to 
transform these unfavorable conditions into favorable ones for further 
development, or to remove the causes of their related problems of under­
development. In this study, political corruption, social inequalities, 
and traditional land tenure systems are specifically selected as unfavorable 
social conditions for development. 
In recent years, the subject of population problems have received 
considerable attention in the literature. Attention has been given to the 
causal relationships between economic development and population growth. 
Indeed, the population explosion, which is a new social phenomenon in many 
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less developed countries, has become one of the most pressing problems re­
lated to development planning. This Is because the population explosion 
Is Immediately related to the problems of hunger and unemployment, and 
the levels of living standards. The additional population growth Is the 
direct cause In the reduction of per capita Income and domestic capital 
formation; Increasing the demands for food, and for deteriorating the quality 
of human resources due to decreased social overhead capital. Thus, 
population growth control Is thought to be one of the basic preconditions 
for development planning. 
This study will focus on some selected population problems in less 
developed countries. The demographic conditions will be discussed both 
in terms of their quantitative and qualitative aspects. First, in terms 
of their quantitative aspects, population growth (and its impact), popula­
tion composition by age and sex, and population distribution are selected 
to be discussed. Secondly, nutrition and health, and education are 
selected in the qualitative aspect of population. 
5. A schematic outline of the major componenta and their process of 
current changes in less developed countries 
Social change in less developed countries has been discussed in terms 
of the three basic premises, and four related major causes, and conditions. 
Planners may not be able to control or change a society simply by under­
standing the factors discussed, but the model may be useful for uader-
standing the nature of social change in less developed countries. The 
model presented in Chart B, is the result of the attempt to Incorporate 
the factors discussed within an analytic framework in order to understand 
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Chart B. A scheiiuitic diagram of a generalized model of current changes in a less developed country. 
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better the path of societal change in the presently less developed 
countries. 
As discussed, the course and tempo of current social change may 
largely be decided by the Internal societal dynamics. It was emphasized, 
however, that the nature and course of changes are also profoundly In­
fluenced by historically given initial conditions and current inter­
national relationships. The discussion also Indicated that constraining 
internal factors affect, in large degree, the path of recent changes In 
less developed countries. 
In Chart B, the horizontal axis represents the time dimension in 
change, specifying the past, the present, and the future. The Initial 
conditions may be regarded as the antecedent factors which are Irrevers­
ible (or given) In the process of change in a country. This implies that 
the course and process of current changes may largely be determined by 
the historical Initial conditions of a country if there are no fundamental 
structural reforms. 
The current international relationships are viewed as contemporary 
causes and, in principle, as reciprocal interactions between the outer 
world and any given less developed country. The external influences, 
especially in political, economic, and military relations, are thought 
to be beyond the control of a less developed country. Thus, a less de­
veloped country essentially needs valid international cooperation for Its 
development. 
The internal conditions, Including demographic and social conditions, 
generally become constraining factors for development planning. In other 
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words, the current Internal conditions in less developed countries are 
assumed to be generally unfavorable, or as barriers to the development 
planning. In addition to the direct efforts to accelerate economic 
growth, development efforts are usually made to remove undesirable social 
conditions and to control pressing demographic conditions. 
From the above integrated point of view, valid development planning 
in less developed countries has to be made on the basis of an overall as­
sessment of the four major components and their relationships as discussed. 
At the same time, valid development strategies have to be sought accord­
ingly and in terms of development objectives. This study is designed to 
analyze the general characteristics of underdevelopment and problems of 
development in terms of the framework of the major components discussed 
in this section. Chapter three discusses colonial impacts on nation-
building related to the historically given initial conditions and current 
international relationships; especially in the areas of trade and foreign 
aid. In chapter four, the nature of nationalism and the roles of elites 
and the public administrations will be discussed with respect to the 
internal societal dynamics of current change. Chapter five will analyze 
the demographic conditions and social conditions in terms of the internal 
conditions of the framework. On the basis of these discussions, finally, 
chapter six will attempt to propose some general directions of development 
strategies in less developed countries. 
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III. PRODUCTS OF HISTORICAL PROCESS AND 
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
As already indicated, a main purpose of this study is to offer an in­
clusive alternative model to analyze current changes which are now taking 
place in the less developed countries. With the exception of the countries 
of Latin America, most of these less developed countries have only recently 
gained their independence. Less developed countries are newly independent 
countries, this change in political status occurring primarily during the 
period between the two World Wars in the Middle East, and after the second 
World War in most of Southeast Asia and Africa. 
Most of the new governments in the less developed countries are now 
committed to the idea of overcoming the mass poverty of their peoples and 
of achieving national autonomy through development policies coordinated by 
national development planning. As discussed in the model formulated in 
chapter two, the development policies and their implementation in develop­
ment plans are new social phenomena and are thought to be the sources of 
the internal dynamics of current social changes occurring In Che less 
developed countries. It is therefore appropriate to begin inquiry into 
the present underdevelopment and the problems of development by considering 
the nature of the governmental institutions which have come to play so 
central a role in the economic and social development of the newly inde­
pendent countries. Hew did these states com# into being? What were their 
colonial situations? How were the initial conditions of nation building 
affected by the legacy of colonial rule? And what external forces are now 
working on the national development plans of these new states? 
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Using the model formulated in chapter two, this chapter will present 
an analysis of factors which have had consequences for the effectiveness 
of the nation building activities of the less developed countries. Cor­
responding to the two analytical components of the model (initial condi­
tions and externalities) two factors will be examined: (1) the impact of 
previous colonial status, and (2) the impact of the international context 
within which less developed countries are likely to be found. The first 
section of this chapter will discuss the nature of colonialism, its legacy, 
and the resulting initial conditions for nation building. The second 
section will analyze the income disparities between the developed indus­
trial countries and the less developed countries, and the trends of the 
income gaps between them. Finally, the third section will analyze the 
trends of current trade between the developed and the less developed 
countries, and the nature of foreign aid policies. 
Â. The Historical Consequences of Colonialism 
1. Colonialism and underdevelopment 
In relation to the analysis of the general process of social change, 
the term "development" in this study Is used to denote a particular change 
process characterized by increased productivity, equalization in the dis­
tribution of social products, and increased national autonomy both in 
domestic decisions and In international affairs. Agalast this notion of 
"development" are contrasted "undevelopment" and "underdevelopment". 
"Undevelopment" and "underdevelopment" are extensively used in the liter­
ature dealing with modernization and economic development, etc., but in 
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general without adequate explanation of the distinction made between 
them. 
In recent works of the radical theorists of development (Frank, 1969a; 
Johnson, 1972), the term "undevelopment" Is used to relate to situations 
Isolated from the system of International exchange — Implying the original 
conditions of the non-European Indigenous societies in pre-colonlallzatlon. 
"underdevelopment", on the other hand, relates to a condition of dependence 
In which the activities of a given society are subjected to the overriding 
control of an alien external power. In this sense, Frank claims specif­
ically that present "underdevelopment" in most parts of the Third World Is 
the product of its relationship with the West. In recent analysis of this 
historical relationship, colonialism has been accused of propagating 
"the development of underdevelopment" (Brett, 1973:18; Frank, 1969a; 
Johnson, 1972). 
Consistent with Frank's claim, Myrdal previously expressed that "most 
of very poor countries now called 'underdeveloped' were until recently not 
countries at all, but colonial dependencies" (Myrdal, 1968:1839). Since 
obtaining formal Independence after the second World War, the areas which 
were formerly referred to as "backward regions" are now called "under­
developed countries". "Underdevelopment" implies, as again Myrdal pointed 
out, political connotations, and the underdeveloped countries are "not 
static but anxious to rise out of their poverty" (Myrdal, 1308;1839). The 
dynamics in the underdeveloped countries may be Interpreted as the mani­
festations of recent national development planning. The root of this 
dynamics may be understood in the study of the nature of colonialism. 
60 
2. Patterns of colonialism and nature of colonialism 
A colony may be defined as a political dependency. Depending upon 
colonial policy and practice, colonies differ in type. According to Ram, 
(1926), there are roughly two kinds of colonies — settlement and exploita­
tion colonies. The "settlement" colonies are situated in the temperate 
region or in the moderate zone in which the original population has been 
largely displaced by emigrants from the mother country as in North America 
and Oceania. The settlement colonies may be viewed as one type of massive 
migratory movement. The major factors in such settlement colonies are 
considered to be the population pressures in the mother countries, various 
other causes such as religious discord as in the case of the migration of 
the Puritans to New England, and dissatisfaction with social and economic 
conditions as in the case of the Irish. 
"Exploitation" colonies are found in the tropics- It is with this type 
of colony that we are here concerned. Instead of the factor of population 
pressure in the mother country, the exploitative colonialization was ani­
mated by the missionary motive and the desire for exploration and adventure. 
Such colonialization was further intensified by the commercial motive and 
increased speed and efficiency of the means of communication and transporta­
tion (Ram, 1926:1-27). Ram explains that the missionary has tended to 
precede the merchant and the magistrates, often preparing the way for them 
and making their operations easy and possible. For example, it was primarily 
through the work of the missionary that the British Empire obtained its 
first foothold in countries such as Australia, Fiji, South and Central 
Africa (by David Livingstone), Burma, and Guinea (Ram, 1926:6). Among 
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others, however, the desire for the establishment of commercial relations 
is thought to have been the most Important motive In colonlallzatlon by the 
European nations. This vas particularly true during the latter half of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, wherein a primary object of 
colonlallzatlon was to search for markets. I.e., to find ways of disposing 
of the surplus products created by European industries. Such commercial 
expansion was supported by the rapid development of means of communication 
and transportation also witnessed during this period. 
Depending upon the colonial motives and policies, the exploitative 
colonies can also be categorized into three types — commercial, plantation, 
and Industrial (Ram, 1926). The original activities of the Dutch, the 
Portugese, and the British provided examples of the commercial type of 
colonlallzatlon in Java, Indo-China, and Africa. In the "plantation" 
colonies, capital was usually supplied by the white men and labor by the 
natives; as in Ceylon, West Indies, and the colonies of tropical Africa. 
Finally, the "Industrial" colonies are found in such countries as Egypt, 
India, China, etc. In these industrial colonies, with their rich cultural 
heritage, the natives were sufficiently civilized to supply both labor and 
capital. 
The economic policies of the colonial systems were in general charac­
terized by monopolistic capitalism which seeks to limit the foreign markets 
to trade with the mother country in colonial produce and with the colony ia 
home produce. Such trade patterns, binding colonies to the economy of the 
mother country, was shaped and reinforced by heavy duties imposed on both 
products of foreign origin and exports to countries other than the mother 
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country. At the same time, the colonial policies restrained the colonies 
from establishing Industries for the manufacture of raw material and basic 
Industries (Papl, 1938:1-14). The economy of the colonies gradually took 
the form of appendices to the economy of the mother country, and ultimately 
resulted In economic dependence on the Industrial countries; both during 
the colonial period and after political Independence has been achieved. 
Aside from these aspects of economic dependency, the real nature of 
colonialism may be understood by considering the kinds of structures Im­
posed upon the colonial situation. The Interactive activities In colonial 
administrations were generally determined by the dominance of the colonial 
agents. New administrative, economic, religious, and educational Institu­
tions were extended over the Indigenous structures. But the pre-colonlal 
formations were not entirely Incorporated Into the new colonial system. 
They were required to change only up to the point required for the purpose 
of the colonial political economy but no further than that. For example, 
the colonial authorities usually encouraged the perpetuation of traditional 
values and power structures, these being seen as fundamental to the main­
tenance of the "traditional" or "tribal" social order. In this sense, the 
administrative changes imposed by colonialism were only partial. At the 
same time, they may be considered fundamental because they undermined the 
old structures at their most critical and vulnerable points. 
As initially stated by Boeke (1953), colonialism began by creating a 
dualistlc situation based upon the juxtaposition of dominant colonial and 
dependent indigenous structures. As Boeke exemplified by his analysis of 
Indonesia, a dual economy means the presence within a subsistence economy 
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of the host society; of a highly capitalistic "enclave" economy which Is 
solely export-oriented. Though Boeke's thesis Is Increasingly discredited 
by such writers as Frank (1969b), the Idea of social dualism seems to have 
some elements of truth In describing the colonial system of exploitation. 
The nature of colonialism Is well summarized In Brookfleld's definition 
of colonialism. He defines colonialism as 
A thoroughgoing, comprehensive and deliberate penetration 
of a local or "residentiary" system by the agents of an 
external system, who aim to restructure the patterns of 
organization, resource use, circulation and outlook so as 
to bring these Into a linked relationship with their own 
system. (Brookfleld, 1972:1-2) 
As already Indicated, however, the linked relationship of the colonies 
with the colonial power was characterized by dependence and great In­
equality. 
The restructuring of the Indigenous society through colonial rule 
Included not only a cultural and social structural aspect but also Involve 
the pecularltles of the colonial population Itself. Balandler has called 
attention to the arbitrary nature of the coloaial boundaries and admin­
istrative divisions between and within colonies. This has resulted in — 
or aimed at — "fragmenting important ethnic groups" (Balandler, 1951:44). 
These arbitrary colonial boundaries of the former colonies led to the 
current, nonintegrated plural societies with the attendent rivalries among 
major ethnic or tribal groups. This is particularly the case in the new 
states of Southeast Asia and Africa. The term "plural society" refers to 
a state of affairs in which factors such as language, ethnic differences, 
and disparate value systems mark the presence of significant sub-populations 
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within a single "society". Operating at the economic, political, and social 
levels, such factors are likely to be highly unfavorable to the achievement 
of the national unity and consolidation which will be required for develop­
ment. 
3. Decolonlallzatlon and Independence 
Liquidation of the colonial system meant the liberation of the 
colonial peoples from colonial rule and the coming of political indepen­
dence. The causes of "decolonlallzatlon" can be found, not only in the 
nationalist's aspirations and their struggle for Independence, but also in 
the domestic conditions of the colonial power and changing world conditions. 
The colonial powers themselves had created a limited number of edu­
cated class of the indigenous people to provide administrative and profes­
sional services in the colonies — particularly in the colonies under in­
direct rule as in British India, Ceylon, the Philippines, etc. (Myrdal, 
1968). This Indigenous elite was primarily the product of the legal, 
administrative, and educational structures created as instruments for 
ruling the colonies according to the interests of the colonial powers. 
This class posited themselves in the upper stratum, often possessing 
immediate social and economic interests convergent with those of the 
colonial governments, and divergent with the best interests of their 
peoples. As Fanon explained, it is not unusual that national bourgeoise 
were completely incorporated into the International power structure (Fanon, 
1967). As elites grew in number, however, they began to represent a new 
social force — the nationalist liberation front or anticoloniallsm — 
and they became the new leaders of the new states. 
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Outside the colonies, the world opinions concerning the colonialism 
and domestic situations of the colonial powers changed. First, the first 
World War became a turning point in colonial expansion and the colonial 
system, because the colonial powers could not reinsure the idea of 
Imperialism among the increasing radical intellectuals at home and abroad. 
Secondly, the Soviet Union vigorously denounced colonialism and supported 
the nationalist's demands for political independence. Later Russia's 
success in transforming a backward country into Industrial power would in­
spire the nationalist elites with the possibilities of political and 
economic autonomy of the backward colonies. At the same time, the 
socialist thought was increasingly appealing to the European radicals, as 
well as to the nationalist elites, as a doctrine of social justice based 
on the equality of all. 
Thirdly, the emergence of the United States as a world power 
was yet an additional factor to weaken the European colonial powers at 
world affairs. The principle of national self-determination, which was 
proposed as a basis of peace settlement by President Wilson during the first 
World War, was appealing to the nationalists and European Intellectuals 
alike (Albertlnl, 1971). To European radicals and the socialists, the 
liberation of the colonial peoples were viewed as part of their own struggle 
against the upper class state (Hyrdal, 1968:140). 
Fourthly, the second World War was spread to the colonial territories. 
During the war, the European colonial, systems were virtually brought to a 
total collapse in Southeast Asia and North and Central Africa. A new 
generation of nationalists was appearing in the colonial territories 
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Involved In the war. These young and radical elites led the emancipation 
movement In either collaboration with or reslstent to the occupying power 
(Albertlnl, 1971:20-21). Fifth, after the second World War, the financial 
as well as the moral burden of colonial rule was to become an overwhelming 
one due to domestic rehabilitation of European countries from the war, 
and due to the mounting pressures from an anticolonial block including the 
Soviet Union and the United States. By all estimations, the second World 
War was of decisive Importance in the dissolution of the European colonial 
systems and was similarly decisive in bringing about the end of the 
Japanese imperialism in the Far East. 
Finally, with the emergence of Communist China and the outbreak of 
the Korean War, the United States was caught in conflict between its pro­
nounced anticolonialism and its own strategic and economic interests to 
defend against ecrnnttnlsa» Thus, the colonial issue was shifted into the 
"East-West" conflict and brought about the advent of the "Cold War" era. 
For exaiq>le, it has been stated that the United States granted the French 
massive military and financial aid by reinterpreting the "colonial war" 
In Indochina as a way of defense against communism (Albertlnl, 1971:25). 
Nonetheless, decolonialization was speeded up by the East-West conflict 
because both the communist and capitalist bloc declared their anticolonialism 
and at the same time competed for political and economic influence in the 
"Third World", 
In conclusion, the political Independence in the new states is not 
thought to have been achieved solely because of the nationalist's struggle 
for independence. Rather, most of the new states were bom largely because 
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of the colonial power's domestic problems and the mounting pressures from 
the changing world situations. This also Implies that the colonial powers 
did not decolonize voluntarily because of their generosity, but rather be­
cause "they felt they had no other reasonable choice" (Hyrdal, 1968:146). 
As a result, many new states were made independent on the basis of former 
colonial boundaries or colonial administrative units, which were fortu­
itously determined by the historical interplay of imperial policies and 
rivalries In the colonial era. The general result in these new states 
was either the artificial maintenance of inherently plural societies or 
else a partitioning of formerly unitary nations. Consequently, most new 
states had to face the fact that independence did not automatically bring 
about a condition of national consolidation or national unity. 
( 
4. The initial conditions of nation building 
In the above, the nature of colonialism and the process of decolonial-
izatlon have been discussed. The "exploitative" colonlallzation was 
characterized by the transformation of the entire social fabric of peoples 
in the colonies — economic dependence was created, traditional social 
structures modified, and existing political authorities subordinated (or 
deprived) to the foreign invader. After the second World War, political 
independence was given to the peoples in many parts of the colonies under 
the mounting pressure of world opinion and the domestic problems of the 
colonial powers. 
Based on the legacy of the colonial situations and the arbitrary 
bases of independence, the new states are thought to have inherited two 
immanent structural weaknesses for national development — built-in 
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economic dependence and deficient Incipient conditions for nation building. 
First, while many of the former colonies obtained their political indepen­
dence as a result of the decoloniallzatlon process, their economies re­
mained heavily dependent on those of the industrialized developed countries. 
This was the legacy of their colonial economic policies. Colonial economic 
policies were largely designed to maintain the colonies as supplier of 
various raw materials and as markets for the manufactured goods of the 
mother countries by means of discriminatory tariff barriers. And, in many 
cases, the colonies were restrained from establishing heavy industries and 
manufacture of raw materials (Fapi, 1938:5). In general, the economic 
infrastructures of the present new states were originally built as economic 
appendices to the economies of the industrialized colonial powers. As a 
consequence, these built-in, structural economic dependencies on the 
industrial countries have contributed to the present economic backwardness 
of the newly independent countries (Brett, 1973). 
Secondly, many of these newly independent countries are thought to 
inherit Immanently deficient initial conditions for their nation building. 
These deficient conditions may be seen in the two aspects — the lack of 
adequate preparation for the task of nation building and the arbitrary bases 
of independence. In the areas under direct colonial rule and most parts of 
Africa, political independence was generally granted without adequate 
preparation for self-governing (mainly because the colonial powers largely 
neglected higher education for the indigenous and allowed the natives very 
little say in political and administrative affairs) (Albertini, 1971). 
These can be seen in the presently severe lack of qualified administrators 
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and personnel, particularly In African nations. In addition, many new states 
adopted the legal and institutional arrangements of former colonial ad­
ministrations without adequate restructuring or reorganization for the new 
needs of autonomous development. Examples can be found in the pressing 
needs for administrative reforms and other social reforms for national 
development efforts. 
It is also true that most postwar new states have been faced with 
serious difficulties in creating national unity and national consolidation, 
mainly due to the released plural divisive forces within the new states. 
The divisive forces working against national consolidation and unity are 
largely the historical products of colonialism. As indicated earlier, 
major ethnic groups In some colonial areas were fragmented by the arbitrary 
nature of the colonial boundaries between and within colonies, which were 
fortuitously determined by the interplay of the imperial policies and 
rivalries. These colonial boundaries, in fact, became the present national 
borders of the new states. In many cases, colonial domination resulted in 
the creation of larger political entitles than those which existed in pre-
colonlal times, as in British India, Indonesia, and elsewhere. In thirty-
four independent African nations as of 1970, for example, two or more major 
languages are spoken in all thirty-three countries with the exception of 
Algeria. Table 2 demonstrates the consequences of the arbitrary establish­
ment of territorial boundaries without adequate regard for ethnic composition 
in the newly independent countries. Twenty-two (73.3 percent) of the thirty 
developed countries are composed of only one major ethnic group. In 
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Table 2. Major ethnic composition of 79 LDC's and 30 MDC's.* 
No. of Ethnic LDC's MDC's 
Groups No. Percent No. Percent 
One 24 30.4 22 73.3 
Two 3 3.8 2 6.7 
Three 9 11.4 1 3.3 
Four 13 16.5 2 6.7 
Five and over 30 37.9 _3 10.0 
Total 79 100.0 30 100.0 
^Source : See Appendix. 
comparison, the populations of only twenty-four (30.4 percent) out of 
seventy-nine less developed countries are composed of one major ethnic (or 
racial) group. And the populations of the remaining less developed 
countries (more than two-thirds of the 79 LDG's), Including the countries 
with five or more ethnic groups, are composed of two or more major ethnic 
groups. 
This arbitrariness In the incipient conditions for nation building 
has resulted In two undesirable facts. First, it often brought border 
disputes between the new states as manifested In the border conflicts 
between India and China, China and Burma, Afghanistan and Pakistan, etc. 
(Myrdal, 1968). 
Second, it is likely that it has contributed unfavorably to the 
national integration of the new states. Under such circumstances, many 
less developed new states have experienced a series of social disturbances 
and political upheavals. As an example, types of transfer of power have 
been cross-tabulated with colonial experience of countries in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Transition of power from Independence until 1970 by colonial 
experience.* 
Colonial Experience 
Transition No Experience"»*^ Colonized Total 
of Power No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
Regular 24 82.8 41 51.3 65 59.6 
Irregular^ _5 17.2 39 48.7 44 40.4 
Total 29 100.0 80 100.0 109 100.0 
^Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix. 
^Includes former colonial rulers and independent buffer states. 
*^3tes covered not given. 
*^Irregular transfers include military coups, place revolutions, and 
the like from Independence until 1970. 
Irregular transfer of power means unconstitutional (or illegitimate) ways 
of transfer of power such as military coups, the countercoups, palace 
revolution, revolutionary provieionary governments, etc. In other words, 
all these Incidents represent political instability. Out of a total of 109 
countries (in the data compiled), SO counccles «ere, in their recent history, 
colonized with varying duration and only 29 countries were not colonized. 
The 29 countries were either Western colonial rulers or noncolonlzed 
sovereign nations. Table 3 shows that about half of the 80 new states have, 
since their Independence, experienced some form of political upheaval in 
transferring power. On the other hand, the old countries» with about 83 
percent of regular transfer, show a higher tendency toward domestic politi­
cal stability compared with 51 percent of that of the new states. 
As discussed earlier, coloniallzatlon is thought to have affected the 
economic growth of the new states. As the crude measuring device in 
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Table 4. Distribution of 1971 GNP per capita by colonial experience in 
109 countries.® 
GNP Per Colonial Experience 
Capita 
(Unit: $) 
No Experience^ Colonized Total 
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
Under 150 1 3.5 23 28.8 24 22 .0 
150 - 250 1 3.5 13 16.2 14 12 .8 
250 - 1,000 7 24.1 32 40.0 39 35 .8 
1,000 - 2,000 5 17.2 6 7.5 11 10 .1 
Over 2,000 15 51.7 j6 7.5 21 19 .3 
Total 29 100.0 80 100.0 109 100 .0 
^Source: See the secondary sources listed In Appendix. 
^Dates covered not given. 
comparing rich and poor nations, gross national product per capita of the 
nations in 1971 has been cross-tabulated with the experience of colonlall-
zatlon as shown in Table 4. According to Table 4, the highest bracket of 
Income per capita in 1971 was skewedly concentrated In the 15 noncoIonized 
countries (with 51.7 percent of 29 noncoIonized countries and with 71 per­
cent of 21 highest Income countries). On the other hand, the new states 
having colonial experience were heavily distributed in the lower bracket 
of income per capita. More specifically, 85 percent of 80 new states had 
less than $1,000 GNP per capita in 1971 and about half (45 percent) of the 
new states were concentrated in the lowest income groups with less than 
$250 GNP per capita in the same year. In general, noncoIonized old countries 
are characterized by higher economic growth compared with the new states. 
Though many factors such as colonial types, the nature of colonial econotnic 
policies, and colonial period should be considered in the explanation of the 
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colonial influence on the economic growth of the new states. It may be said 
that the colonial experience has affected unfavorably the economic develop­
ment of the new states. 
In conclusion, the consequences of colonialism were profound on the 
Initial conditions of the less developed new states. Colonialism was 
designed to establish dependent economic relations of the colonies In favor 
of the Industrial countries. The results In the creation of (raw material) 
export-oriented economies In the new states of the former colonies at the 
expense of present economic backwardness. 
The legacy of colonialism affected the initial conditions of the new 
states. The initial conditions were deficient and unfavorable for the 
activities of nation building and national development, largely because of 
the lack of adequate preparation gotten for self-government in the areas of 
qualified personnel, administrative organizations, end other social in­
stitutional arrangements. The deficient initial conditions are also 
manifested in the arbitrary nature of the territorial boundaries of the 
new states; boundaries established without respect for ethnicity, language, 
cultural heritage, historical experience, and the like. All these deficient 
initial conditions are thought to remain as unfavorable factors in national 
consolidation and national development. It is, however, the legacy of the 
colonial economic policies which seems to especially contribute to the 
maintenance or economic backwardness in the new states. The next section 
will examine the Income gap between the developed industrial countries and 
the less developed new states, and the economic dependence of the new states 
in relation to the legacy of colonialism. 
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B. International Relationship 
1. Widening gap 
Currently, the major problems and Issues confronting mankind are chang­
ing from ideological disputes and confrontations between the divided super 
power axis to the problem of the increasing economic discrepancy between 
the rich, industrialized countries and the poor, less developed countries. 
Both in relative and absolute terms, today's human conditions present an 
appalling contrast between the developed and the underdeveloped countries. 
There is affluence and development on the one side, and poverty and chronic 
underdevelopment on the other. Among the aspects of the present world 
crisis, the ever-widening gap between the rich industrial countries and 
the hungry underdeveloped countries la most disturbing and serious, both 
for the survival of the people of the proletariat hungry countries and, in 
a world spectrum, to the prospect of world peace. 
The gross national product, as a single measure of economic growth, 
hss ccaceptual dsflciencies and methodological difficulties, especially 
when an attempt is made to arrive at a uniform estimate of the world gross 
national product. These are related to the differences between the Soviet 
concept of the gross national product, as adopted by all the centrally 
planned economies, and the Western concept applied in the market economies. 
The difference is that the Soviet concept of gross national product ex­
cludes all income of the tertiary production or the service sector. The 
role of the service sector in the formation of gross national product is 
of prime importance In the market economies (Ângelopoulous, 1972:Appendix). 
Despite these conceptual deficiencies and methodological differences, the 
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figures in Table 5 show that the developing countries account for about 69 
percent of the world's population and produce only about 15.4 percent of 
the world's gross national product. The developed countries, with only 31 
percent of the world's population, account for 84.6 percent of the world's 
gross national product. The major social economic statistics computed by 
the geographical country groups of the non-Western world and the North 
Atlantic region (including Australia, New Zealand, and excluding Soviet 
Russia and the United States) show an alarming discrepancy between the 
developed and the less developed countries. 
The disparatles are even more striking in the distribution of the 
world's gross national product at an Individual country level, particularly 
within the free enterprise economy group. The United States alone, with 
only 8.5 percent of the total population of the market economies, produces 
44 percent of the total gross national product of the noncommunist world 
and 53 percent of the total gross national product of the Industrially 
advanced countries of the West. The significance of the Immense disparity 
in the distribution of the world's gross national product can be fully 
understood when it is noted that a gross national product per capita of 
$4,750 in the United States in 1970 was about 50 times greater than that of 
India. 
Even more distressing than the size of the gap between the rich and 
poor nations is that the gap continues to increase, not only in total amount 
but in percentage. In underdeveloped countries from 1960 to 1970, the 
average per capita income increased by 27 percent, compared to 43 percent 
in developed countries (Simon and Simon, 1973:71-77). Narrowing the gap 
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Table 5. Distribution of world 6NP and population, 1970. 
Millions 
Population 
Percent 
GNP 
Billions Percent 
DEVELOPED COUNIRIES 
Market economies 
United States 
Canada 
Western Europe 
Japan ^ 
Other countries 
Total 
Centrally planned economies 
U.S.S.R. 
Eastern Europe 
Total 
Total (developed countries) 
DEVELOPING COUMIRIIES 
Market economies 
Asia, Âfi:lc», and Latin America 
Centrally piLaniied economies 
People's Republic of China 
Other countries 
Total 
Total (developing countries) 
WORLD TOTAL 
205 
21 
358 
103 
58 
745 
242 
128 
370 
1,115 
1,664 
760 
45 
805 
2,.489 
3,584 
6.0  
. 6  
10.0 
3.0 
1.0 
20.6 
7.0 
3.4 
10.4 
31.0 
46.7 
21.0 
1.3 
22.3 
69.0 
100.0 
978 
76 
723 
188 
60 
2,025 
425 
150 
575 
2,600 
335 
125 
12 
137 
472 
3,072 
31.8 
2.4 
23.6 
6 . 2  
1.9 
65.9 
13.8 
4.9 
18.7 
84.6 
10.9 
4.1 
.4 
4.5 
15.4 
100.0 
'^Source: An;;elopoulous (JA%%22). 
^Australia,, South Africa, New Zealand, and Israel. 
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In terms of total amounts Is not mathematically possible for many years to 
come without virtually stopping growth In the rich countries. For Instance, 
a one percent per capita growth In the United States means an annual 
Increase of roughly $48 per person. The same growth rate In India In 1970 
would only Increase income by about $1 per person. 
Suppose that from now on (1970) India with per capita Income of $100 
sustained a per capita annual growth rate (10 percent) twice that (annual 
growth rate of 5 percent) of the United States with per capita Income of 
$4,750, it would take 83 years for the Income gap to disappear between 
India and the United States^. This kind of hypothetical assumption, however, 
is highly unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future under the 
present circumstances. In reality^ the Income disparities between the 
rich and the poor countries are widening, and human conditions are worsen­
ing in many parts of the poor, less developed countries^ 
These income inequalities become even more meaningful when one examines 
the distribution of gross national product within each country of the non-
communist world. This widening gap is taking place within the less 
^ $100 % (1 + .1)® - $4,750 (1 +-05)® 
log (100 11.0®) - log (4750 g •05]'^^ 
n log 1.1 + log 100 • n log 1/05 + log 4750 
n log 1.047 = log 47.50 
n (.01010) - 1.67669 
n • 83=0 
Where: n - the years to come when the GNP per capita in 
India catches up to that of the United States 
$100 " GNP per capita of India in 1970 
$4,750 " GNP per capita of the United States 
.1 - annual per capita growth rate of India 
.05 " annual per capita growth rate of the United 
States. 
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developed countries as well. These internal Inequalities within a country 
are one of the major characteristics of underdevelopment in the sense that 
underdeveloped structures manifest themselves in the discrepancies between 
urban areas and rural peripheries, between ethnic or racial groups, and 
between social strata. 
In the less developed new states, poverty and hunger are not new, but 
these chronic problems are more aggravated than ever before in history. 
These aggravations are caused by such factors as: unfavorable trade with 
the developed countries and, internally, by the outstripping of economic 
growth by the current population explosion. Population explosions have 
resulted from the lag between rapid mortality reduction and the relatively 
slow reduction in fertility rates. Currently, nearly half a billion 
people are reportedly suffering from some form of hunger. It has been 
estimated that ten thousand persons died of stervarion each week in 1974 
somewhere in the world (Newsweek:November 11, 1974). 
From a demographic point of view, the old Malthusian nightmare is now 
becoming a reality in the less developed regions of the world. Misery and 
poverty are becoming widespread all over the world due to the fact that too 
many share too little and too few possess too much in the world income 
distribution. The underdeveloped countries remain poor while the few rich 
industrial countries get richer. 
2. The nature of dependent relation 
In the historical perspective, the now underdeveloped new nations 
share a common past of colonial experiences and a linked history to struggle 
for Independence. Looking at the current situation, they also share. 
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Internally, a common presence of poverty, unemployment, and other under­
developed characteristics. Externally, they share dependent relations with 
the developed industrial countries. As already discussed, the course and 
process of the recent changes of the less developed new nations have been 
determined largely by external forces. Let us examine the degree to which 
underdevelopment In the newly Independent countries are related to the 
external relationships with the developed Industrial countries. 
Peter Morsley views the present relationship of economic dependence of 
the Third World countries upon the industrialized capitalist countries as 
being the result of colonial origins, saying, "the most serious legacy of 
colonialism, thus, is in economic sphere, in the form of backwardness, mono-
cultural economies, foreign ownership of major resources, poverty, ..." 
(Worsley, 1964:235). And a group of Latin American scholars (Frank, 1969a, 
1972; Johnson, 1972; Cockcroft, 1968) see undardevelopment as causally 
related to the pattern of evaluation of developed industrialized societies. 
They Interpret the underdevelopment in Latin American countries as highly 
conditioned or aggravated by the region's relation with international 
factors. 
The term "dependence-relation", as used by Johnson (1972), refers to 
situations that result from the colonial history and that are maintained 
by the developed industrial countries. Johnson defines the concept of 
dependence as "a situation in which a certain group of countries have their 
economy by the development and expansion of another economy, to which the 
former is subject" (Johnson, 1972:71). Thus, dependence-relation may have 
a profound influence in shaping the internal conditions of both economic 
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and social structures in the less developed new nations. In its final 
form, considering the dependent relation, the newly independent countries 
are nothing but ^  facto colonies of the developed industrial countries 
(Johnson, 1972). 
In addition to the constraining effect of the dependent relation on 
the internal mechanism of the less developed countries, it is necessary 
to examine the trade situation and the nature of foreign aid as major 
external causes of economic underdevelopment, or as external constraints to 
development in the less developed countries. In the less developed 
countries foreign trade policy is thought to be a major Instrument in 
national economic development. For these countries, exports constitute a 
chief source of foreign exchange earnings with which, in turn, they must 
finance a steady growth in indispensable Imports such as industrial equip­
ment and machines, and other industrial maEezlals needed for development 
planning. Since independence, however, the trading position of the less 
developed countries has been weakened and deteriorated. The next section 
will examine the trends of current trade. 
3. Trade situation of less developed countries 
Before independence, the colonial powers had an interest in protecting 
the dependent country as a market for the products of their own industry. 
Likewise, they had an intereat in procuring primary goods, in Investing to 
produce them in quantity, and at lowering the product cost. However, the 
industrialized countries in the post colonial period have often felt less 
responsible for the welfare of their former colonies, once they were on 
their own. 
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The present economic structure of the newly Independent countries, 
which is largely inherited from the legacy of colonial economic policies, 
is characterized by the dependent economies oriented toward the export of 
a few specialized primary products usually under the control and ownership 
of foreign Investors. The developed industrial countries relied upon the 
commercial advantage of the market forces and, at the same time, they 
substantially reduced demand for the primary products for industrial use 
by replacing them with synthetic substitutes (Myrdal, 1970). Aside from 
the substantial reduction in the demand of some raw materials, the indus­
trialized countries set various forms of trade barriers discriminating 
against the primary products of the exporting countries. On the other 
hand, actual imports as well as import needs of the less developed countries 
have sharply been increased due to the various reasons such as: the 
industrialization purpose through economic dsvelopaent plannings rapid 
population growth, rising demand of higher living standards among the masses 
of population, the commercial penetration from the advanced economies by 
lowering product costs through mass production, etc. 
Taken all together, there has been a steady decline in the share of 
primary products in the composition of International trade, with the ex­
ception of oil. Exports of raw materials accounted for about 15 percent 
of the world exports as of 1960. But even that figure has dropped to 12.9 
percent by 1968 (Aagelopoulous, 1972:79)i Table 6 shows that the share of 
the advanced market economies in world exports rose from 60.8 percent in 
1950s to 72,1 percent in 1969. The share of the less developed countries 
declined from 31.2 percent to 17.9 percent during the same period. The 
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Table 6. Distribution of world exports for selected years, 1950-1969.^ 
Market Economies 1950 
Percentages 
1960 1969 
Value (Millions of 
U.S. $ at 1969 Prices) 
Developed 60.8 66.8 71.2 193.4 
Developing 31.2 21.3 17.9 38.7 
Centrally planned 8.0 11.9 10.9 29.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
^Source; Angelopculous (1972:76). 
unfavorable trends of the last two decades are expected to continue unless 
the trade barriers are removed and the structural changes are made in the 
composition of exports from less developed countries. 
Like most of the less developed countries, for example, Latin American 
economies have become conspicuously oriented toward the export of primary 
products, largely under the control of foreign capital, and are constituted 
as markets for imported manufactures of the Industrialized countries. 
Naticsal governments or private national businessmen of the less developed 
countries have had no control over international markets for primary products, 
the prices of which are unstable and often subject to unfavorable terms of 
trade in relation to imports. Currently, the Latin American countries are 
losing control of their manufacturing sectors to so-called multinational 
corporations. These manufacturing sectors (as engaged in Import-Bubstitu-
tion) are usually protected by the national government and require huge 
amounts of foreign exchange earnings to purchase machinery, maintenance 
spare parts, and essential raw materials for processing; usually from 
industrialized countries (Johnson, 1972; Frank 1969a: 1972). 
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Whereas the commercial middlemen, as parasitic Intermediaries, have 
been created by the foreign capitalists, national businessmen grew up with 
and benefited from the nation's dependence on foreign industrial capital. 
They are Interlocked in a symbiotic relationship with foreign capital 
(Johnson, 1972). This dependent relation keeps the internal social struc­
ture of the new states in perpetual underdevelopment, impedes economic 
growth, and endangers the national economy by widening the trade gap between 
import needs or actual imports and actual exports in foreign trade. 
Table 7 shows the balance of gains and loses in three selected years. 
According to the figures in Table 7, during the period 1965-1967 developing 
countries suffered an aggregate loss of annual average in foreign exchange 
earnings of $1.3 billion as a result of adverse movement in their terms of 
trade with developed countries. The widening gap between exports and im­
ports of developing countries is generally due to the rapid rise In import 
Table 7. Balance of gains and losses of developing countries, 1965-1967 
(millions of U.S. dollars).* 
Gains Losses 
Through Through Total 
Year Exports Imports Balance 
1965 156 1,038 - 882 
1966 442 1,407 - 965 
1967 175 2,243 -2,065 
Annual average 258 1,563 -1,305 
^Source: United Nations (196?:Table 23). 
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needs and actual Imports to meet the essential demands from unprecedented 
population growth and development efforts. This significant trade deficit 
is also largely attributable to the faster rise in the prices of the im­
ported commodities and the slower rate of increase in the prices of exports 
of less developed countries. Consequently, less developed countries com­
plain that postwar unfavorable and ever-deteriorating trends work against 
the less developed countries in the world trade, and that these are pri­
marily determined by the interests of the major industrial nations. The 
mounting losses in foreign exchange earnings thereby retard economic de­
velopment of the less developed countries. 
4. The nature of foreign aid policy 
For developing countries, economic development is a chief objective in 
the national development effort to raise the extremely low living stan­
dards of the population, reduce unemployment rates, and the like. To this 
end, many of these countries inq>lement long-term development plans designed 
to scbilize the unutilized material resources and the underutilized human 
resources to increase productivity and to assure full employment. During 
the initial stages of the development effort, the success of these develop­
ment plans depends largely on a favorable climate of international co­
operation and an adequate flow of financial aid. The efficacy of the aid, 
assuming genuine international cooperation, will still depend primarily on 
the nature of the efforts of the aid receiving countries themselves. Thus, 
national efforts and international cooperation become a precondition for 
the solution of the problem of underdevelopment and self=sustaln@d growth. 
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In recent years, the developing countries have needed more funds than 
ever before In order to adopt the advanced technological Innovations In 
Industrial development, in modernizing and expanding the infrastructure of 
the economy, in the mechanization of agriculture for economic development, 
and increasing aggregate funds to feed the additional mouths due to the 
current population growth. International cooperation, both financial and 
technical. Is Indispensible for overcoming the major obstacles to socio­
economic progress and for accelerating growth rates. 
Throughout the last two decades, the developing countries have re­
ceived large amounts of assistance from the industrialized world. Since 
1950 the number of countries and international agencies providing assis­
tance has Increased. According to the Pearson Report, the aid resources 
so far have still been a small fraction, amounting to only about two per­
cent of the total income of the developing countries « The report Indicates, 
at the same time, that foreign aid has financed only about ten percent of 
Investment in developing countries. On the average, only twenty percent 
of the imports from developed countries has been aid financed (Pearson, 
1969:48-49). 
The Pearson Report, in assessing the contribution of foreign aid, 
found a very weak correlation between the amount of aid received and the 
growth performance. According to the Pearson Report, the major factors 
regponsiulB for the lew correlation are? (I) politically considered alloca­
tion in the use of a sizeable portion of the aid, (2) aid donor's general 
lack of knowledge about the receiving countries or inexperience in pro­
moting receiving country's economic growth, and (3) the irrelevant direction 
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of aid to development objectives In receiving countries (Pearson, 1969: 
50). 
According to the statistics In Table 8, the aggregate flow of financial 
resources from Development Assistance Committee member countries, and multi­
lateral agencies, increased in absolute terms during the 1960's. The 
total development assistance rose from $8.1 billion in 1960 to $10.4 billion 
in 1965 and $14.7 billion In 1970. The amount of grants in official de­
velopment assistance has declined from $3.7 billion in 1960 to $3.3 billion 
in 1970 in absolute terms. The private direct investment has almost tripled 
during the same period and export credits (commercial credits for short-
term and at high Interest rates) have almost quadrupled during a decade. 
The Pearson Commission found that the flow of direct, private Invest­
ment is heavily concentrated In (1) those developing countries which have 
already demonstrated their capacity for sustained and rapid growth, and (2) 
within countries, in extractive industry. One effect has been the neglect 
of the really needy and economically stagnant countries. In addition to the 
stagnation of official development assistance, the terms and conditions of 
aid have hardened. Since I960 aid has been gradually tied to purchases 
from the donor country. In 1967 only sixteen percent of official aid flew 
remained untied (Pearson, 1969:77). 
The decline in official aid, its increased costs, and the growing 
complexity of the regulations» tends to increase the external constraints, 
thus impeding development efforts. The system of aid tying inhibits the 
expansion of trade among developing nations and has serious effects on their 
price structure and, ultimately, on their capacity to export to world markets. 
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Table 8. Flow of financial resources from Development Assistance 
Committee countries, 1960-1970.® 
Millions of U.S. Dollars 
Net Disbursement 1960 1965 1970 
Total official and private 8,115 10,413 14,712 
Official development assistance 4,703 5,963 6,813 
Bilateral grants 3,716 3,770 3,298 
Bilateral loans 452 1,723 2,400 
Contribution to multilateral 
agencies 535 443. 1,115 
Other official assistance 262 302 1,135 
Bilateral 195 297 864 
Multilateral 67 5 271 
Private investment and credit 3,150 4,174 6,764 
Direct Investment 1,767 2,489 3,412 
Bilateral portfolio Investment 633 687 837 
Multilateral portfolio 
investment 204 248 343 
Export credits 546 750 2,172 
Total official and private 4,965 6,238 7,948 
^Source; Ângeloooulous (1972:102). 
In îfyrdal's terms, "tying aid to exports implies a curtailment of the 
aid receiving underdeveloped country's freedom to buy the most suitable 
commodities and at the most favorable prices" (Myrdal, 1970:349). In this 
context, aid does not cost the donor country. Rather» aid is good for 
business and is to serve in the best of the alleged national interest of 
the giving country. 
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In the case of the United States, for instance, an article in the 
Department of State Bulletin explicitly pointed out directions in the use 
of foreign aid. According to this bulletin, as much as "ninety-three per­
cent of AID (Agency for International Development) funds are spent directly 
in the United States" (Gaud, 1968:603). In defense of their foreign aid 
policy, the British Government also clearly pointed out Its long term 
interest as well as the trade advantages from her foreign aid (Myrdal, 
1970:357-358). 
It seems true that one of the primary objectives In the aid program 
is to help the donor countries themselves rather than to help the low in­
come countries. The implication in the foreign aid program is to retard 
modernization of the developing countries and to keep them in perpetual 
underdevelopment by supporting the reactionary regimes of their ruling 
elites in order to suppress any opposition by the indigenous progressive 
elites in the aid-receiving countries, and by making them postpone the 
opportunities for needed social reforms. An earlier President of the World 
Bank, Eugene Black, indicated long ago the underlying fact of the reactionary 
nature of foreign aid, especially in bilateral lending. The criticism of 
bilateral aid programs is their susceptibility to political influences. Aid 
is often offered as a price in political bargaining that takes no account 
of the actual economic requirements of the recipients, or that may mls-
uireet development aid in the sense that the objectives of aid are irrele­
vant to the real needs. Thus, the "ill-judged offers of aid" in bilateral 
relationships have made it possible for the receiving countries to postpone 
some essential reforms (Myrdal, 1970:8). 
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The recent trends in the composition of the flow of foreign capital 
shows that a large portion of official development assistance has been 
replaced by private direct investment and export credits. The private 
direct investment is not only expansive but also selective in the choice 
of host countries and sectors in the best interest of the foreign investors. 
From the beginning, the overseas direct Investment to developing 
countries is made to link it to the Investor's mother company in the de­
veloped countries and to establish dependent relationships. Myrdal explains 
the adverse effects of direct investment on the host countries by saying, 
"the investing concern often delivers to its foreign branch machinery, 
spare parts, and other production materials and makes available patent 
rights and other licenses" (Myrdal, 1970:328). It is also well recognized 
that the capital value of private investments is calculated in a somewhat 
arbitrary manner and at high cost because the transactions take place 
without much outside competition. When the transaction of private invest­
ment is once made, it is the Industrial countries that receive the strongest 
benefits in the end. The private investors not only repatriate their 
profits and dividends, but also the other advantages in regard to licensing, 
taxation, and the like. Thus, the private direct investments result in a 
greater outflow of capital in both tangible and Intangible forms. They 
ultimately contribute to paralyzed dependence-relations and a worsening 
underdeveloped structure. 
According to the statistics in Table 8, export credit, as one form of 
private lending for development purposes» has sharply increased, both in 
volume and in the proportion of total flow of financial resources. Export 
90 
credit Increased from $546 million in 1960 to $2,172 million in 1970. When 
a transaction is made between developed countries, the export credits, in 
strict commercial terms, are hardly called development assistance. The use 
of export credits, and their sharp rise in volume, creates serious problems 
to the developing countries. The Pearson Commission warned of the dangers 
involved in the excessive use of the export credits: the developing 
countries are experiencing serious balance-of-payment problems because they 
have relied upon such short-term borrowings as the export credits to 
finance long-term investments. This phenomenon was seen in a number of 
countries, notably Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, and Turkey 
(Pearson, 1969:119). 
Nonetheless, the notorious export credits are frequently used to 
finance investment in the social and economic infrastructure and in indus­
trial projects in the public sector. In general, official aid, both bi­
lateral and multilateral, is not used to finance public sectors. Given 
the present financial access, private direct investment is simply not 
available to them. 
As already stated, the greater part of the contributions made by the 
donor countries comes from the private sectors. Such contributions are 
normal financing on strictly commercial terms, while the official aid flows 
do not exceed four tenths of one percent of the gross national product of 
the donor countries (Pearson, 1969:120). Even the declining official "id 
has been turned into tied aid — to purchase commodities from the aid-giving 
countries, inhibiting the expansion of trade among developing countries and 
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ultimately having adverse effects on their capacity to export to world 
markets. 
As a result of all the drawbacks, and of the direct and indirect 
costs involved for the aid-receiving countries, the effectiveness of de­
velopment assistance is reduced and the foreign debt has been growing much 
faster than expansion in export earnings. Now, developing nations transfer 
large amounts of funds to aid-giving countries each year in payment of inte­
rest and amortization on their foreign debts. According to Table 9, during 
1965-1967, Latin America transferred to foreign credits five percent more 
than it received form them. The seven oil-exporting countries paid back 
five times more than they received. In the near future, clearly, the out­
flow of financial funds from the less developed countries will exceed the 
level of foreign aggregate gross lending which is coming into them. 
Table 9. Average annual percentage of debt service payments to gross 
lending, 1965-67.® 
Percent 
of Gross 
Group of Countries Lending 
Developing countries (48, exclusive of oil-exporting 49.3 
countries) 
Latin America (20 countries) 104.9 
Africa (13 countries) 57.0 
Asia (12 countries) 25.2 
Oil-exporting countries (7 countries) 521.2 
^Source; Angelopoulous (1972:121). 
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It is one of today's paradoxical situations that the poor nations will 
be paying the rich countries more than they receive from them in develop­
ment assistance. In a statement made to President Nixon at the White 
House on June 12, 1969, Gabriel Valdes, ex-Foreign Minister of Chile, 
clearly expressed this paradoxical situation of development assistance. 
His statement can be summarized as: (1) in terms of real financial flow, 
Latin America is contributing to finance the development of the United 
States and of other industrialized countries; (2) the multinational corpo­
rations in Latin America repatriate several times higher than what they 
invested, (3) foreign aids have only made a contribution to markets and 
greater development for the developed countries; (4) as a result, Latin 
America is left in payment of external debt; and (5) inter-American soli­
darity or any stable cooperation is not possible under the current situa­
tion (Frank, 1969-:1). 
Valdes' outspoken statement is true of the current situation in Latin 
America and of most of the aid-receiving developing countries elsewhere. 
However, it does not always mean that all of the aid-receiving countries 
have been underdeveloped or all the aid programs have failed. Earlier, 
the Marshall Plan in Europe was, in general, successful in its outcome. 
But the nature of aid and the initial conditions were not the same as those 
of current aid to the developing countries. In the first place, the 
Marshall Plan was essentially a repair job; which Involved the rehabilita­
tion of modern and highly productive societies temporarily damaged by war. 
In the second place, the conditions and nature of aid were those of gifts 
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or grants in large volume, which differ from those of. the foreign aid 
to the underdeveloped countries. 
The rationale of the Marshall Plan demonstrates the Interplay of 
American generosity and interests; generosity because most of the United 
States citizens trace their backgrounds to Europe. Millions of them still 
had close relatives there after the war. The Marshall Plan was in the 
Interest of America because, economically, aid helped ease domestic economic 
stability by giving away surpluses. Strategically, aid helped to protect 
the international capitalist system from the threat of the Russian commun­
ist expansion in the postwar era by rehabilitating, through aid. Western 
economic strength. Around the 1950's, all other developed countries, 
along with the United States, made regular donations to the less developed 
countries for one reason or another. Foreign aid policy in the cold war 
period was mainly political and ytrateglc under the mette of anti-communism. 
rather than development assistance. 
It is also true that all other donor nations initiated aid programs, 
partly with some mixed feelings of guilt and moral obligation, to their 
former colonies. For the former colonial powers of Britain, France, and 
Holland, however, their principal preoccupation was the preservation of 
their long-established economic, political, and cultural ties by means of 
foreign assistance. When Germany and Japan reemerged as formidable 
economic and trading powers, both also entered the assistance field with 
purely commercial and financial considerations rather than as development 
assistance. 
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With the passage of time, the United States has gradually reduced Its 
contribution of foreign aid. At the same time, the reasons behind foreign 
assistance manifest themselves as political, strategic, and economic, 
rather than as the so-called American generosity and humanltarianism, 
characteristics of the initial stage, under the semantic ambiguity of the 
term "foreign aid" (Mende, 1973). It may be at least partly true that both 
economic and military assistance programs were shaped so as to be in the 
best interests of the United States, not in the interests of humanltarianlsm 
or in the best interests of the recipients. 
George Woods, former President of the World Bank, remarked that 
"some countries have made it clear that they see development finance as 
nothing more than a disguised subsidy for their exports" (Mende, 1973:68). 
For example, in terms of British official aid, about two-thirds of all aid 
was actually spent in Britain, thus providing orders and employment for 
British Industry. For French official aid, practically all of it came back 
as remittances or in the form of export orders. In the case of Japan, about 
eighty percent of Japan's bilateral official loans are tied to the purchase 
of Japanese goods and services, and repayment terms and Interest rates are 
particularly severe. The Japanese aid program "is little more than tsade 
promotion" (Mende, 1973:68-70). 
On the basis of the analysis of the facts and nature of the current 
foreign aid, it can be concluded that, seen from the perspective of under­
development, an aid program is apparently an alternative form of neo-
imperialism. The industrialized, donor countries have found aid to be the 
most convenient Instrument to maintain and strengthen their economic 
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benefits and political influence over the developing countries. That Is, 
aid is an alternative to armed conflict in the pursuit of power and In­
fluence. It is an improvement over more destructive methods. Thus, 
foreign aid programs helped establish and maintain the dependent relations 
between less developed countries and developed metropolitan countries. 
In other words, aid programs helped to maintain the underdevelopment of the 
recipient countries. 
C. Summary and Conclusion 
Development policies through state planning were regarded as one of 
the significant and new social phenomena in the less developed countries. 
The role of states was recognized as central In the economic and social 
development of the less developed countries. In fact, most of these less 
developed countries are newly independent countries from colonialism. Thus, 
the study started with the analysis of the nature of colonialism and its 
legacy on the Initial conditions of the new states with respect to the 
model foraulstsd in chapter two. The Initial conditions of the new states 
were discussed In terms of economic development aspect and national consoli­
dation and Its unity. As a result of the economic aspect of their colonial 
legacy, most of the newly Independent nations Inherited structural economic 
dependence on the industrial countries as detezmlned by the colonial 
economic policies. The process of decoloniâlisaticû, together with colonial 
policies, affected profoundly the initial conditions of nation building in 
the new states. In general, the new states started with structurally 
deficient incipient conditions of nation building due to the lack of 
adequate preparation for self-governing (in terms of qualified personnel 
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and adequate structural reorganizations of administrations and other social 
institutional arrangements), and due to the arbitrary nature of their 
territorial boundaries irrespective of ethnicity, cultural heritages, etc. 
Thus, many newly independent countries have difficulties in nation building 
which is essential for social mobilization for development efforts. 
The second section discussed the widening gap between the industrial 
countries and the less developed new states. And it also analyzed the 
trends of trade and the nature of foreign aid with respect to the exter­
nalities of the model formulated earlier. From the analysis of the economic 
and political Influences from the developed world, it may be concluded 
that the trends of current trade have been unfavorable for the economic 
development of the less developed countries, and that the foreign aid from 
the rich countries has, in reality, become a new means of neo-lmperiallsm 
to the leas developed countries. Without true International cooperation, 
thus, the economic development of the presently less developed countries 
may not be optimistic. 
In relation to the nationalist's struggle for independence under 
colonialism and the desire for overcoming the economic dependence, the next 
chapter will deal with the ideals and realities of the growing nationalism 
in the new states. This nationalism is regarded as an important internal 
dynamics of current social changes in the new states and it is virtually 
the driving force for national development efforts. 
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IV. INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF CURRENT CHANGES 
This chapter deals with the Internal dynamics of national development 
planning in the less developed states. These internal dynamics are pro­
vided by a new spirit of purposive change; a spirit rooted in nationalism 
and promoted by agents of change. These factors were initially elaborated 
in the model formulated in chapter two. With respect to the first of 
these factors, the first section of this chapter will discuss the ideals 
and realities of new nationalism in the Third World countries. Nationalism 
is essentially a political expression, and it is considered to be the 
driving force behind national development planning. In the second section, 
those development objectives which seem to be common to the new states 
will be delineated. The third and fourth sections deal with the factor of 
the agents of change in the model formulated. More specifically, the 
third section is mainly concerned with the nature of national elite and 
their role in development planning. The fourth section will, similarly, 
discuss the characteristics and role of the public administrations in the 
national development planning. 
A. Ideals and Realities of New Nationalism 
In formulating an effective development plan, it is essential to be 
able to realistically formulate the long-term objectives of the nation and, 
at the same time, to specify detailed and immediate targets. The goals 
of development planning must be set on the basis of the problems identified 
and in terms of these overall national objectives. Development planning, 
unlike an episodic action program, transcends being a solution to any 
immediate problem in question and aims at achieving the national 
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objectives for the betterment of human conditions. In other words, de­
velopment planning may be said to be a deliberately calculated, collective 
human endeavor to change the present socioeconomic conditions in desired 
directions. The desired social objectives are derived from the modern­
ization ideals of the society. These modernization ideals are expressed 
in the nationalism. Nationalism, in turn, is Implanted in these ideals. 
Ideals cannot be achieved, but remains to be realized. Objectives, 
on the other hand, can be achieved. In terms of the relationship between 
ideals and objectives, ideals can be regarded as the value premises which 
serve in the delineation and elaboration of socially desired objectives. 
Some value premises common to contemporary nationalism in developing 
countries will be briefly explored. These modernization ideals are not 
necessarily based on rational grounds. Rather, they are what the people 
of the developing countries would desire to realize» 
The concept of nationalism originated in Europe and has taken its 
meanings from the national (or collective) consciousness which began to 
grow during the French Revolution and spread throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe during the following 150 years. Later the doctrine of 
self-determination added fuel to the burning nationalistic movements. 
From this European experience, nationalism may be defined as "an ideology 
and a movement striving to unite all people with the loyalty and emotional 
attachment to existing govemssent and state?'(Kautsky. 1962:32). 
Nationalism has spread all over the globe until the whole of mankind 
accepted its dominant political attitudes. Naturally, nationalism has 
varied in form and function through time. Although all kinds of 
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nationalism have certain characteristics in common, they can be divided 
into several logically and empirically distinct categories. With a primary 
reference to the ideology of nationalism in its historical viewpoint, 
Snyder has provided the following taxonomy: (1) integrative nationalism 
(1815-1871) as the unifying force which helped to consolidate feudal 
divisions and other factions into the states of Central Europe; (2) 
disruptive nationalism (1871-1890), which stimulated subjected and minority 
nationalities to seek to break out of their oppression; (3) aggressive 
nationalism (1900-1945), which became almost identical with the imperialism 
which appeared in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Japan; and (4) the 
contemporary nationalism (1945- ), which has been diffused worldwide, 
partly as a result of the anticolonial movement against the Western 
colonial powers (Snyder, 1968:48). 
This is the age of nationalism and, since 1945, nationalism has been 
accepted universally throughout the newly Independent countries. Nation­
alism has been an outstanding force in the shaping of human history 
and has decisively Influenced the political, economic, and cultural life 
of all mankind. However, nationalism differs in each country according 
to its unique historical conditions and social structures. Broadlys 
nationalism in the developing countries is characteristically different 
from European nationalism along a variety of dimensions. 
First, in Europe, linguistic and cultural homogeneity was a key 
element in the growth of nationalism as the loyalty to an already exist­
ing state. Here government was based upon a common historical or cultural 
background. The nationalism of underdeveloped areas seeks to create such 
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a state and build a government where there was none before. In general, 
the boundaries established by the colonial powers have been retained as 
the territorial base of the new states In most of Africa and Asia. 
Second, In Europe nationalism was Initiated and supported by the 
middle class. Including the Industrial and commercial bourgeois. In the 
developing countries the educated class, with the Intellectual elites, 
has become the prime vehicle for the articulation of the nationalist 
strivings. These Intellectual elites are usually composed of professionals 
and administrators who are Ideologically oriented to rely on the state, 
planning, and state interference. Businessmen in industry and commerce, 
on the other hand, rely upon the foreign masters for protection and fi­
nancial security; embedded as they are in the international economic set­
ting (see chapter three). Nationalism in the less developed countries 
began among the Intellectual elites and only later did it become a more 
popular movement downward. 
Third, nationalism In developing countries essentially began as an 
Independent movement against foreign domination and sought emancipation 
from economic exploitation. European development began to establish self-
government as a means of outward expansion» 
Finally, in terms of process, nationalism in Europe took place rela­
tively gradually and remained secular with growing rational attitudes. 
Nationalism in less developed countries, on the other hand, tends to be 
radical and ultra-national, without any firm social grounding in economic 
progress, social equality, and political democratization with universal 
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adult sufferage. Often the nationalists have sought to construct and 
justify a program for revolutionary change. 
Because of differences in historical experiences, socio-cultural 
contexts, perceptions of the present conditions and the problems of 
society, and aspirations for the future, the Individual patterns of 
nationalism vary throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin 
America. In terms of major regional differences in nationalism, Snyder 
(1968) categorizes the Third World nationalism into four types: Black 
nationalism in Africa, anticolonialism in Asia, politico-religious nation­
alism in the Middle East, and populist nationalism in Latin America. The 
outstanding characteristic of African nationalism was its ethnic or racial 
quality; but it was essentially a xenophobic angry protest against the 
White man. As a result, the spirit of African nationalism was oriented 
toward African fraternity and toward development of Pan-African socialism 
(despite the multitudes of tribal and ethnic fragmentations). 
In Asia, as elsewhere, nationalism appeared in a variety of forms, 
but there was some common ground. First, Asian nationalism was distin­
guished by a highly emotional quality. Second, Asian nationalism was be­
set by endemic communal clashes and hostility because of a long history 
of deep-rooted differences of ethnic, class, and religious antagonism. 
Asian nationalism was tempered by religious feuds — Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Islam, and an Implanted minority of Christians. Third, Asian nationalism 
took on the characteristics of linguistic rivalries. The boundaries of 
the Asian countries were dictated by geographical, strategic, and political 
interests of foreign countries rather than by national, religious, and 
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XlnKulHtlc ones. Partly as a result of colonial policies, such as large-
scale plantations in Southeast Asia, there are many alien enclaves in such 
countries as Ceylon, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the countries in Indochina. 
In Southeast Asia, these minority problems are grave. Although the details 
vary, however, the overwhelming characteristic of Asian nationalism is 
anti-colonialism. 
In the Middle East, nationalism has also expressed Itself in a number 
of political, economic, and cultural forms. Yet, there is a common denom­
inator to be found in religion. Islam was the binding force in the Arab 
world during the centuries of political and cultural decline and, in modern 
times, in the struggle against European colonialism. The relationship 
between religion and nationalism in the area is exceedingly complex. On 
the surface, the rivalry between Arabs and Jews is politically and ter­
ritorially complex, but at its root it Is a religious impulse. 
Snyder (1968) characterizes Latin American nationalism as derivative. 
Latin American countries borrowed their culture from Europe. There was 
a direct connection with the Iberian peninsula in terms of language, 
religion, traditions, customs, and ethnical ideals. Thus, Latin American 
attitudes toward their motherland are characterised as ambivalent — with 
a love-hate attitude. Since obtaining political independence (earlier 
than on other continents) internal class tensions and struggles between 
wealthy capitalists and urban proletariats. landowners and landless 
peasants, foreign investors and awakened Intellectuals, have been grave. 
Above all, Latin American nationalism is strongly against foreign economic 
exploitation. 
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From the overall assessment of the varied forms of nationalism in the 
Third World, some general conclusions can be drawn. First, the new 
nationalism of the less developed countries is not clear in content and, 
in practice, it takes a variety of forms, although it is different from 
European nationalism. Second, the main thrust of nationalism in less 
developed countries has been flavored with a distrust and hatred of other 
nations (particularly colonial powers) rather than a loyalty to government 
and a concern for the integration of their diverse populations. Anti-
colonialism is a common denominator in the nationalism of the newly inde­
pendent countries in Asia and Africa. These less advanced nations are 
tending to adopt a nationalism of their own as a defense against exploita­
tion by foreigners and seek to prepare themselves for economical self-
reliance. 
Third, nationalisa in these countries is used to eatablish the polit­
ical framework for the nation-state; through which the instruments of 
power could be exercised. The first requirement on the road to modern­
ization is the achievement of political power. The fundamental need is 
to obtain control of the authoritative instruments of the state, whether 
this takes the form of an independence movement against a colonial power 
or the overthrow of an existing conservative, or reactionary, government. 
Fourth, one of the major objectives in the new nationalism is oriented 
to integration of multitudes of ethnie- religious, and linguistic divisions 
as well as consolidation of the nation-state. Since decolonialization, 
these internal divisive forces have been more freely released in the new 
states. The development of a common feeling of identification with, and 
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loyalty to, a territorially defined state remains a major problem In many 
areas. Nationalist leaders attempt to replace the presently divided 
loyalties with a new sense of national community — nationhood. Yet, the 
traditional primary identification with ethnic, tribal, or other more 
limited groups has not disappeared among wide segments of many populations. 
Under these circumstances, and for reasons of national internal solidarity, 
enemies of the state are sometimes created or identified — frequently 
the former colonial powers or counterpart of Ideological groups. To 
overcome these enemies, whether internal or external, nationalist leaders 
may attempt to rally their followers through emotionally charged campaigns 
to bring about national unity. 
Fifth, nationalism is not mutually exclusive with socialism but they 
may go together. Laissez-faire capitalism is rejected by many nationalist 
leaders on both Intellectual and moral grounds. They believe that the com­
petitive aspects of capitalism are wasteful of human and natural resources, 
that development through capitalism is inefficient, and that capitalism 
promotes undesirable social and economic inequalities within a society. 
Sixth, the nationalist leaders strongly believe in comprehensive 
central planning by the government. The central plan la viewed as a means 
of achieving the most efficient utilization of the limited resources avail­
able to development and for the mobilization of the human resources, 
essential for national consolidation as well as sôciûecoaomic dsvslopment. 
Socialistic nationalism is also regarded as conducive to national unity 
in that the economic policies to be pursued ignore ethnic and cultural 
differences within the state. 
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Seventh, by creating a sense of national community, with a common 
fate within the world community, nationalism seeks to provide an essential 
motive for the national cohesion of nationhood, and the emotional identi­
fication of the people with the state. 
Eighth, nationalism contributes to the awakening of a collective con­
sciousness among the masses and enlightens them to the modern ways of 
life and thinking through education and the mass communication media. In 
order to create (or restore) a national identity, and to teach rational 
attitudes, education stresses the unique features of the national 
society — such as its history and origin, symbols, geography, religion, 
and modem sciences. 
Finally, the political doctrine of nationalism in developing countries 
is inclined toward nonalignment in international affairs; out of the pres­
sures or ties of the super powers^ This doctrine, especially prominent 
in Asia and Africa, is based on the assumption that close alignment with 
one of the major power blocs is detrimental to political Independence, 
economic independence, and self-determination. This nonalignment doctrine 
may be a result of the fear, arising out of past colonial experiences and 
present politico-economic dependent relation#, that a close alignment 
with either bloc may put the developing countries under the pressure of 
the super powers in their foreign and domestic policies. However, non-
alignment does not imply nonlnvolvement in International affairs. A large 
number of the developing countries play a prominent role in world politics. 
These developing countries, with a growing involvement in the international 
scene, seek to play their diplomatic roles outside the orbit of the great 
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power blocs, and, moreover, mobilize among themselves as a moral influence 
on world politics, as the so-called Third World groups. 
Thus, nationalism in new and developing countries is complex in nature 
and indefinite in its possibility. Nationalism, as Illustrated above, is 
a political Ideology but, at the same time, it has an economic program. 
With regard to the economic aspects of nationalism, Johnson (1965, 1967) 
critically pointed out some prevalent characteristics of nationalistic 
economic policy: First, nationalist economic policy tends to foster 
activities selected for their symbolic value, in terms of the concepts of 
national Identity and the economic content of nationhood. It favors man­
ufacturing and, within manufacturing, emphasis is put on certain (heavy 
or strategic) Industries symbolic of industrial competence. Second, 
nationalist economic policy fosters activities offering prestigious jobs 
for the middle class and/or the educated (favoring bureaucratic jobs). 
Third, economic nationalism will tend to favor both extensive state con­
trol and extensive public ownership of economic enterprises. 
Fourth, the bias in economic policy in new states attributable co 
nationalism is the preference for economic planning. Concerning economic 
planning, Johnson indicates that the preference for economic planning in­
volves some psychological motivations rather than any rational basis. 
Johnson says that one element of the motivation is imitation of what was 
believed to be the superiority of the Russians over their capitalist com­
petitors. Another is in establishing moral superiority over the capitalist 
systems by adopting the policies recommended by their own social critics. 
Fifth, Johnson's criticism on the specific bias in economic policy is 
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focused on the Indiscriminate hostility toward the large multinational 
corporations. He explains that these corporations tend to be regarded as 
agencies of colonialism and imperialism and are seen as a threat to 
national Independence and identity (Johnson, 1965; 1967). However, behind 
this criticism, there seems to be a fear of the possibility of the nation­
alization of foreign investments, or other governmental measures. 
Finally, the redistributlve economic policy of the nationalist may 
be criticized from the neo-classical viewpoint of economic growth — 
maintaining the usual argument that income Inequality encourages more 
savings for Investment. Nationalism favors extensive state control and 
extensive public ownership, which can provide abundant employment oppor­
tunities for the educated. (Rie low classes are not likely to be gainers 
due to illiteracy. Ignorance, and other insufficient qualifications for 
the jobs offered under the public ownership. Along with the trends of 
welfare economics in developed countries, this calls for redistribution of 
income. Thus, the nationalist economic policy Is concerned with redistri­
bution of income and with the Investment in national manufacturing. Al­
though political nationalism is, In general, the outcome of foreign 
domination, there is an application of the economic aspect to the processes 
of democratic government. 
The developing countries are in a rapid process of transition. In 
this transitional stage, nationalism is a powerful driving force for the 
economic development effort. It provides an Integrative force in terms 
of which the masses of people, with heterogeneous characteristics, can be 
fit into common and unified political patterns. Nationalism works as a 
\ 
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cementing factor for political stability and economic development, which 
are based on modernization Ideals. 
Political stability is, no doubt, a necessary condition for economic 
development, and economic development becomes a sufficient condition for 
political stability and social development. Political stability and 
economic development constitute the sine qua non of the modernization of 
the developing countries. Nationalism in the developing countries is a 
powerful driving force for their modernization. Modernization ideals are 
manifested in the nationalist movement, expressed as nationalism. The 
specific nationalism of an Individual country, although it is a main fea­
ture of political ideologies, has not been clearly formulated either in 
Intellectual content or in practice. "It is, rather, a huge emotional 
reservoir which can be tapped for good or 111 depending on the kind of 
leadership which capture it" (Holland- 1953:4-5). As Roy (1952:99) puts 
it: "Nationalism cannot be defined, but everything else must be defined 
in terms of this indefinable!" 
Nationalism is similar in nature to the patterns throughout the de­
veloping countries,whether In Asia, Africa, the Middle East, or Latin 
America. "It differs in a way that can be explained best not by definition 
but by a set of characteristics" (Snyder, 1968:142-143). It is apparent 
that there exists a fundamental difference between prewar period European 
nationalism and the contemporary nationalism of new nations. By dividing 
the existing nations of the world into two classes, Bllgrami explains the 
difference between the old and new nationalism, such as: "The original 
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nations have come into being before the state, whereas the modern nations 
have just reversed the process" (Bllgraml, 1967:1). 
Discriminant colonial policies have always been a successful 
stimulant to consolidate national feelings and assert the right of the 
peoples to be free from alien domination. The new type of nationalism 
growing in the new states is characterized by a shift from an imperialis­
tic nationalism during the prewar period in the "original states" to a 
psychological and sociological nationalism of the "new states" since World 
War II "searching for identity, demanuing acceptance and insisting upon 
equality" (Bllgraml, 1967:5). 
In order to keep the spirit of nationalism aflame, nationalist move­
ments have usually searched for a hostile object — internal or external. 
Thus, to a great extent, nationalism achieved national unity, broke down 
local barriers, widened social horizons, and inculcated into the society 
a political activism and sense of revolution. These nationalist energies 
are now called upon to be positive and creative in the setting of national 
goals, and the establishment of the new institutions necessary for modern­
ization. In the words of Duchacek, "the national cohesion, which had been 
achieved by an emotional identification of the people with each other and 
with their state, failed to precede the rational and concrete agreement 
on goals and methods of achieving them" (Duchacek, 1966:40). 
In the absence of specifically artieulated Ideologies (beyond 
emotional appeal) nationalism In developing countries is suffering from 
indecision. Socialism, democracy, authoritarianism, traditionalism, 
westernization, and many other alternatives and combinations, are put 
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forward by different lines of ruling elites within a society. In addi­
tion to this confusing indecision of national leaders, there is a sub­
stantial social distance between the mass of people, who are largely 
illiterate and poverty stricken, and the small group of government leaders, 
who are westernized in their thinking and life style. The result Is a 
lack of effective communication between the elite and the masses. The 
nationalist leaders have failed to bring about change and development in 
the borrowed political institutions; ignoring the necessity of fitting 
them more coherently to the real needs of the people and the uniqueness 
of the Indigenous social systems. 
As one adverse effect, the excessive self-identification of national­
ism has seemed to amplify Internal separatisms, along with ethnic, re­
ligious, or ideological differences. Some of these adverse effects are 
ethnic minority problems in Southeast Asia: mushrooming tribalism in Black 
Africa, widening economic disparities between upper and lower strata in 
Latin America, or ideological confrontation in divided countries, includ­
ing Korea and Vietnam. These divisive tendencies are not conducive to 
administrative effectiveness or national economic development. Under Pan-
Africanism, Arab nationalism, and Asian nationalism, they share as a 
common denominator the doctrine of full self-government with aspiration 
to survive as a political, economic, and social entity. On the practical 
side, unity is essential for Hurvlval and sccncaie development in a world 
which still threatens to divide and exploit. Through unity, furthermore, 
it would be possible to overcome the arbitrariness of colonial frontiers 
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and the partitioning of tribes or ethnic groups without risking political 
decay and social anomie. 
Nationalism is a powerful driving force for economic development and 
a cradle embodying modernization ideals; despite the unintended problems 
of internal separatisms and political abuse of authoritarian dictatorships. 
Although varying in appearance and characterized by a lack of articulation 
in content, nationalism is believed to share some common valuations. 
B. Social Valuations Underlying 
Development Objectives 
Comprehensive development planning, like other specific development 
programming, must start with certain development objectives. Such de­
velopment objectives may be decided in terms of, not only specific social 
needs and available budget, but also social valuations (used here syn­
onymously as Myrdal's "modernization ideals")» The ideals of new nation­
alism are believed to be rooted in these social valuations. The new 
nationalism in the Third World states is an emotional drive for compre­
hensive national development planning* At the same time, it provides some 
fundamental development objectives. 
In the preceding section, the nature o£ new nationalism was compared 
and contrasted with the old nationalism in the West, and the characteris­
tics of new nationalism common among the new states of the Third World 
were ulscussed. This section attempts to delineate some social valuations 
common to the new states, and underlying their national development objec­
tives, from the characteristics of the new nationalism discussed, and 
the social problems commonly identified. The basic social valuations 
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concerning national development objectives may be broadly divided Into the 
areas of "national autonomy" and "Individual well-being". However, the 
demarcation between these two aspects Is analytical, and they are. In 
reality, overlapping as well as Interrelated to each other. 
The areas of "national autonomy" (Including Its political, diplomatic, 
economic, and cultural aspects) refers to these characteristics of the 
nation-state which provide individuals with national identity, internally 
keep social order, and externally protects them from foreign aggressions 
and alien domination. On the other hand, the social valuations concern­
ing "individual well-being" may include the welfare aspects of individuals 
(such as material well-being, equal opportunities for education, employ­
ment, and political participation in terms of social justice), and the 
freedom in terms of spiritual, attitudlnal, and behavioral aspects of 
human existence. The above social valuations are primarily derived from 
the Ideals manifested in the new nationalism of the Third World states. 
They are also thought to implicitly underlie the national development 
objectives of those countries. These social valuations will be elaborated 
in more detail below. 
1. Nation-building 
The new states refer to those countries which have recently obtained 
political independence from colonial rule; both through the inter war 
period, and/or as the result of postwar decoloniallzatlon process. As 
discussed in chapter three, many of these new nations were primarily built 
on the basis of their former colonial administrative boundaries, and 
without regard to the area's historical heritages, cultural backgrounds. 
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ethnic compositions, social structures, or economic functions (see "Black 
Africa" by Morrison, et al., 1972). Some of these countries were Initially, 
and remain, plural societies, composed of nonintegrated, heterogeneous 
groups, while others are divided nations where formerly there were unitary 
nations. As a consequence, it is true that many of these countries have 
yet to build the viable nation-state which must exist in order to effec­
tively Implement national policies. Nation-building is regarded as a 
prime valuation among these unfortunate countries, as a means to the re­
storation of national autonomy. 
Nation-building may be discussed in terms of (1) national consolida­
tion, (2) national unity, and (3) national identity. "National consolida­
tion", according to Myrdal, refers to 
A national system of government and administration that is 
effective, cohesive, and Internally united in purpose and 
action, with unchallenged authority over all regions and 
groups within the boundaries of the state. (Myrdal, 1968: 
63) 
In other words, national consolidation means politically stable and ad­
ministratively effective government. Thus, national consolidation is con­
sidered to be essential in nation-building and its subsequent national 
development planning. 
"National unity" refers to the unification of structurally divided 
groups of population and the integration of the socially conflicting 
classes and strata within a nation. Thus, national unity is thought to 
bring about sufficient condition for the effective consolidation of nation 
and the "social mobilization" required for development planning. "National 
identity" may include two aspects of national autonomy — diplomatic and 
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cultural. One type of national identity refers to, in the diplomatic 
context, the full recognition of a state as, legitimate sovereignty, 
Independent of other nations and capable of manifesting a discernible 
voice in international affairs. In terms of the symbolic and cultural 
aspects of national autonomy, another type of national identity is pro­
vided by establishment of a distinct original social order, differentiated 
from other cultural and national units. Thus, nation-building possesses 
a broader meaning than simply the establishment of a nation-state by 
obtaining formal independence. 
2. Economic growth and material well-being of individuals 
In recent years, the term "modernization" has been often used syn­
onymously with the term economic growth. In fact, most of the new states 
have long been economically backward. A majority of people in some of 
these countries are even now suffering from severe undernourishment and 
mass starvation. When compared with developed countries, the gap between 
levels of living in developed end leas àèvëlopêd countries has besa svsr 
widening. Along with the revolutionary "rising aspiration" amidst the 
destitute peoples of these new states, this "widening gap" contributes to 
the creation of an impatience, in the population, with the present economic 
situation. 
Besides the political, diplomatic, and cultural aspects, another im­
portant component of national autonomy is economic self-sufficiency. The 
new states are now trying to overcome their chronic economic backwardness 
and their aggravating present poverty, and to bridge the gap between de­
veloped countries and themselves through national economic development 
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planning. These new states usually focus on Industrialization and try to 
accelerate sustained economic growth by promoting the amount of exports. 
The idea about the economic growth through national development planning 
is rooted in the valuation of individual material well-being. Quantitative 
economic growth is viewed as an essential condition for the betterment of 
the levels of living for the mass of population# Indeed, poverty is one 
of the most pressing social problems in the underdeveloped countries, and 
it is critically related to the basic human needs. Thus, national economic 
development and the betterment of individual material well-being is con­
sidered to be one of the most compelling social valuations throughout the 
new states of the Third World. 
3. Equalities 
Most of the underdeveloped countries are generally characterized by 
rigid social stratification and an increasing economic polarization between 
the few upper and the mass at the bottom class. The masses of people at 
the lower strata in underdeveloped countries have long been unjustly de­
prived in both an absolute and relative sense. In the low income coun­
tries, the extremely unequal distribution of Income and wealth between 
regions, different groups of the population, and the social strata, is one 
of the common social problems. This economic inequality has been main­
tained and fortified by such social institutions as the traditional land 
tenure system, or the modem exploitive land ownership patterns. 
The opportunities for education and employment have not been equally 
and broadly provided to the masses of people in the bottom strata; espe™ 
daily including that portion of the population in the rural areas of the 
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underdeveloped countries. The same Is true of political participation. 
With the liberation from colonial domination, the idea of social equity 
has had an increasing appeal to the minds of the masses of people. The 
issue of equality is at the essence of the socialism which has been widely 
accepted among the radical intellectuals of the new states. The idea of 
social equity is also partially manifested in various welfare policies 
(including education, employment, and social welfare) which the new states 
are gradually implementing in their national development planning. How­
ever, the fundamental solution to the problems of inequality may be found 
in the structural reformulation of the existing social institutions. In­
deed, this social valuation of equalities is leading in the ultimate 
direction of development. 
4. Radicalism and new order 
The view of social change common among the indigenous people of the 
new states may be characterized by the dialectical dialogue between radi­
calism and a asw stable order; The obstructing existing social institu­
tions and attitudes of people, the staggering economic growth, the "widen­
ing gap" between the levels of living in the developed and less developed 
countries; all these factors have motivated the "modernizing elites" and 
educated classes of the less developed countries to attempt radical social 
change. An awareness of the possibilities for development has strsngthcnsd 
radicalism toward qualitative changes of the existing institutional struc­
tures which have often been found obstruct desired change. The impatience 
with the recent social and economic situation of underdeveloped societies 
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further contributes to accelerate social reforms and Induced social change 
In a short period of time. 
Radicalism referred to herein Is not necessarily destructive or 
violent. Rather, It is a source of vitality arising out of stagnation, 
and a new dynamism in the sustained development effort. Radicalism, thus, 
is an antithesis against fatalism and conservatism which obstruct or in­
hibit establishing a new social order. Indeed, radicalism is considered 
to be an important valuation, especially as appreciated by the "moderniz­
ing elites" and the intellectuals in the new states of the Third World. 
The desire for new stable order has been characteristic of the atti­
tudes of many of the ruling classes and the disturbed masses during the 
transitional period. In fact, most of these new states have, in consider­
able degree, experienced social disorganization, social unrest, and 
political upheavals throughout the process of nation-building. These un­
fortunate transitional processes have, in large degree, resulted from the 
rising radicalism by the idealistic actionists (including the elites and 
the deprived people). In responding to the realities of the social dis­
turbances and political instabilities, the social valuation of new stable 
order seems to be widely appreciated by the majority of people in the new 
states in transition. It must be understood that the essence of radicalism 
Is not contradictory with the desire for stability. Rather, the idea of 
radicalism is the new dynamism for the desired new order, 
5. Rationality; attitude and behavior 
Most social scientists, following Weberlan tradition, have reached a 
general agreement that one of the major attributes of modernity is 
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rationality, and that rational behavior is chiefly responsible for the 
success of modernization. Gunnar Myrdal (1968:44) also listed rationality 
as the first value premise in his study of Asia. Rationality certainly 
plays a critical role in modernization of societies. In underdeveloped 
countries, nonrational attitudes and behaviors of people are important 
obstacles to economic and social development. Thus, rationality is not 
an actual valuation held by the people of underdeveloped countries, but 
it is highly valued as a means to development rather than an end in itself. 
The general term "rationality" has to be defined because, for 
instance, what is rational to one society may be irrational to another, 
and what is rational in a political sense is not in the economic. In this 
regard, Mannheim (1940) indicated two types of rationality — substantial 
and functional. "Substantial rationality" defines the goals of action in 
relation to practical possibilities and based on realism^ Thus, the 
attitudes and decisions based upon substantial rationality are crucial to 
make the plan of development relevant in terms of practical limitations 
and real social needs. Another type of substantial rationality defines 
the goals of action, not in terms of practical possibilities, but in terms 
of priorities of values or hierarchical Importance in decision making. 
This substantial rationality makes the development plan meaningful, rather 
than practical or realistic. On the other hand, "functional rationality" 
takes the goals for granted and rather concerns itself with the meana-ends 
relations, effectiveness, and efficiency during the performance of action. 
From a developmental point of view, it is functional rationality that the 
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underdeveloped societies need to make their development planning more 
effective and conducive to rapid transformation. 
Reasoning is the essence of both types of rationality. Reasoning may 
be viewed as problem-solving, critical thinking, guided by logic. Logic 
is not Itself a priori. Rather, it is a social invention from the accum­
ulation of knowledge, developed out of the techniques for refuting argu­
ments. Thus, what makes man more rational is not acquaintance with logic, 
but obtaining a wide range of both scientific and normative knowledge as 
systematically verified beliefs. In this regard, wide-spread, valid 
education is considered to be a chief means for transforming nonratlonal 
attitudes and behaviors into rational ones. 
In sum, the social valuations elaborated in the above are chosen on 
the basis of the ideals of the politically alert and active part of the 
population — the intellectual elites and the felt-needs of the masses of 
the population in the new states. The priorities and emphasis are cer­
tainly subject to the unique characteristics of the individual countries, 
but these social valuations, underlying development objectives, are be­
lieved to be more or less common to the Third World countries. 
In the following two sections, we now turn to the agents of change, 
who are major carriers of the ideology of new nationalism and who are 
chiefly responsible for the deliberate instigated social change toward 
realisation of the national objectives-
C. Elites 
Dutch sociologist Ponsloen (1969:18) distinguished two types of social 
change: "change in society" and "change of society". According to him, 
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"change In society" would be a dynamic process of a society, as long as 
It identifies itself, either realistically or mythically, with the past. 
"Change of society" would be the process under the connotation that the 
present society does not Identify Itself collectively with the past. 
Development, as one type of change. Is a dynamic process used to Induce 
social change In desired directions. In this respect, development may be 
regarded as "change in society" rather than "change of society". Develop­
ment planning is a blueprint for "change in society", on the basis of a 
deliberately calculated and rationally organized human endeavor for the 
betterment of human conditions for the general population. 
Development planning must not be fictitious in its formulation, but 
must be realistic and appropriate to meet the real needs of society. In 
fact, not every development planning program in the developing countries 
has been satisfactorily successful. Not infrequently those countries have 
failed to Induce the desired social change through development planning. 
There are varying specific reasons for the failure of social planning from 
country to country. 
Aside from specific and unique reasons, several factors may account 
for the frequent failure of the development efforts in developing coun­
tries. These factors may be found in: (I) unrealistic or over-ambitious 
development goals in terms of feasibility of achievement, (2) inadequate 
theoretical models employed in the planning endeavor (in terms of empirical 
validity and theoretical relevance), and (3) inefficiencies or deficient 
qualities In the change agents. 
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Development planning Is Initiated and designed by a small number of 
social planners and policy makers. Thus, development programs require 
change agents for the effective Implementation of the policies and programs 
of development planning. These change agents may be categorized as: (1) 
catalytic elites, (2) implementing organizations or agencies, and (3) the 
staff and personnel of the organizations or agencies. An adequate develop­
ment planning model and realistic development goals are very important 
for the effectiveness of development implementation. The success or 
failure of the development program may depend upon the change agents' 
performance and support from the grass-roots level. 
The course and character of modernization tend to vary in many re­
spects, depending on the degree of economic backwardness and sociopolitical 
conditions of the given country. The variety of structural forms ac­
companying the process of iscdsmlzsticn in different countries is in­
fluenced by the available resources, the orientations of the various social 
groups and strata, and by the policies of the more active elites of the 
society — called the modernization elites. The type of governmental 
structure in the political system is especially influenced by these broad 
structural conditions of the society. To a very large degree, it is also 
Influenced by the composition and orientation of the leading elites. The 
role of elites in the developing countries has been crucial in nation-
building and in the process of overall modernization. However, different 
elites tended to develop different strategies with respect to some major 
problems of social and economic policy. 
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The term "elite" semantically means "chosen" people, but, according 
to Bottomore (1964:14), "elite" generally refers to those "functional, and 
mainly occupational, groups which have high status in society". These 
elites can be categorized into two groups: power elites and cultural 
elites. Power elites are usually composed of the military elite of the 
army, the political elite of the political parties, and the organizational 
elite in the economic sphere. People in these positions are able to Impose 
their views on given sectors of society. Cultural elites, as the bearers 
of the "substantial rationality" and unattached to Interests, comprise 
those who contribute directly to innovation, transmission, and criticism 
of ideas. They include writers, artists, scientists, social theorists, 
religious leaders, and the like (Mannheim, 1940). The cultural elites are 
the intellectual class in the underdeveloped countries. By Intellectuals 
Shils (1960:331) meant "all persona with an advanced modern education and 
the intellectual concerns and skills ordinarily associated with it". 
The professions of the intellectuals include: civil service, journal­
ism, law, teaching, and medicine. Since the occupational structure is a 
function of the level of economic development, the occupational distribu­
tion of intellectuals in the underdeveloped countries is notably different 
from that of advanced countries. Students in the colleges or universities 
have been treated as part of the Intellectual class, and they have re­
garded themselves as such. Even this small nusiber of educated elites was 
unable to find satisfying employment within the colonial regime and re­
mained unemployed or underemployed. Shils (1960) analyzed the role of in­
tellectuals in the politics of new nations. Many of the elites, unemployed 
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and dissatisfied with colonial theory and practice, were intensely politi­
cized and deeply committed to political involvement for three reasons: 
(1) a deep preoccupation with authority, (2) the scarcity of opportunities 
to acquire even a temporary sense of vocational achievement, and (3) a 
deficient tradition of civility in the underdeveloped countries. 
As a result, these elites led the revolutionary struggle against the 
colonial governments and became heirs to governmental authority after 
attaining independence. Retrospectively, the tactics and strategies em­
ployed in the independence movements were not only underground or sporadic 
guerrilla warfares, but also involved methods of noncooperatlon and the 
discrediting of the rule of law introduced by colonial powers. On the 
other hand, the rule of traditional order had already been shattered dur­
ing the colonial period. 
Charismatic leadership seems to flourish today to bridge the dis­
credited past and the uncertain future (Wiliner and Willner, 1965). By 
nature, charismatic authority rests on "devotion to the specific sanctity, 
heroism, or the exemplary character of an individual character of an 
individual person, and of the normative pattern or order revealed by him" 
(Weber, 1947:328). Meanwhile, the public at large has been divided into 
those who are predominantly tradition oriented and those oriented toward 
a new order. In many of the underdeveloped regions, further division may 
exist along with ethnic, tribal, religious^ and linguistic lines. 
Under such circumstances, a charismatic leader mobilizes the popula­
tion in opposition to the traditional and prevailing order and provides a 
vision of new order. Charismatic leadership may contribute in many ways 
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to the consolidation of the state in the earlier stages of nation-building. 
It may also be detrimental for the independent institution-building re­
quired for the concrete tasks of development. In the situation of an in­
creasing demand for rational authority — administrative bureaucracy in 
modern times — there exists a strong tendency for the charismatic 
authority to turn into an authoritarian dictatorship without providing 
orderly transfer of power. Ultimately, this absence of orderly succession 
under charismatic leadership becomes a breeding ground for political 
crisis and instability, which Impede the development of a new civil order. 
For the most part the Influence of the intellectual elites is as­
similated into the life style of the newly growing urban middle class. 
Their way of thinking and style of life brings about small and gradual 
changes in taste and manners. In such a way, the initial spirits and 
Influence of the revolutionary intellectuals are gradually weakened and 
remain unattached. Despite a growing number of intellectuals, due to the 
expansion of higher educational systems, they have largely failed to pro­
duce a self-confident intellectual class. There are several reasons 
(Internal and external) for this: (1) the intellectuals are now recruited 
from diverse social origins in a wider social strata, (2) their occupa­
tional distribution tends to be widely dispersed, and (3) the intellectuals 
are in a marginal position in a cultural context and, thus, are isolated 
from the mass of population by their Western education. However; the role 
of intellectual elites in the developing countries is decisively important 
for social development. They modernize themselves in part, and serve as 
catalysts in the modernization process. "Modernizing elites" are (1) 
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Innovators of new Ideas and Ideals, (2) transmitters of these new Ideas by 
diffusion through their professional and dally activities, (3) organizers 
to meet the needs of a mass society, and (4) the spokesmen In formulating 
the unartlculated aspirations of the masses. 
Recently, In some developing countries, the military officers have 
been the key ruling elites, often more influential than either the in­
tellectuals or the political leaders. It is evident that, in those newly 
independent countries which are politically Insecure, the military officers 
control the ultimate power of direct physical coercion and have the oppor­
tunity to play an Important part in political decision making. Because 
of modem military technology, the structure of the organization, and its 
sensitivity to advancement in military technology abroad, Pye (1962) 
asserts that the political role of the army in developing countries should 
be viewed as a contribution to socio-political development. 
Although room may exist for the positive role of the military in 
political development, the military services contributing through the 
training process to the instilling of national attitudes and discipline, 
all those countries are now suffering from serious social disturbances, 
political instability, and economic stagnation through coup d'etat and 
counter-coup d'etat. In conclusion, among the variety of elites, there 
is a widely shared commitment to development. 
D. Ihe Public Administrations 
The role of elites in the development planning is to initiate and 
stimulate interaction between those experts and social theorists whose 
Job is to create social policy and carry out policy implementation. In 
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this regard, development programs (or social planning) flow from the top 
down to the masses, rather than from the bottom to the top. In doing so, 
the development policy may be Implemented through intermediate machinery, 
such as existing administrative bureaucracy or other special independent 
institutions, and agencies as agents of social change. Although the ad­
ministrative bureaucracy is, in essence, an Instrumental organization for 
the administration of public services, the allocation of the various re­
sources, and for the maintenance of law and order, it generally develops 
its own orientations and structural patterns of activities. In other 
words, bureaucracy develops a formallstic systems framework. 
Bureaucracy, thus, is a structure of clearly defined hierarchical 
positions and a functional interrelationships among the positions. Ef­
ficiency and rlgorousness are the prime merits of bureaucratic performance 
through rational decision making according to a set of rules, specific 
procedures, and impartiality. Rationality in bureaucratic performance 
may be regarded as "functional rationality" as opposed to "substantial 
rationality". In Mannheim's (1940) terms, "functional rationality" is 
located in the means-to-ends relationship. If the means are adequate to 
the purpose, action is rational, but, if not, it is irrational. With 
this Intrinsic limitation of bureaucracy, a public administrative bureau­
cracy is normally instrumental to politics, not political although there 
exists bureaucratic (rational) authority. 
The position and role of the governmental bureaucracy are schemati­
cally delineated in Chart C, from a developmental point of view, although 
they may be more complex in reality. The simplified scheme suggests that 
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Guide or Envision 
Implemen­
tation Direct 
Change Agents 
Political Inputs: 
development 
ideals 
Elites Governmental 
Bureaucracy : 
(a) structures 
(b) procedures 
(c) personnel 
Adminls trative 
Outputs 
cooperative or 
resistance 
Mass 
I Elites Reflect Mass Needs and Aspirations i 
Chart C. The position and role of governmental bureaucracy in develop­
ment policy implementationc 
development policy is regarded as political Inputs to the governmental 
bureaucracy on the political side. The results of policy Implementation 
through the public bureaucracy are treated as administrative outputs on 
the other side. In opposition to the mass (as the object of change), both 
elites and bureaucracy are regarded as change agents because development 
planning implies incrementally induced change on the basis of calculated 
rationality rather than spontaneous fundamental change at the grass-roots 
level. 
Modern elites, including power elites and cultural elites, formulate 
development goals on the basis of identified problems and social needs, 
in terms of their foundations in the modernization ideals. These modern­
ization ideals are directed as political inputs to the governmental 
bureaucracy. The bureaucracy translates the political Inputs into spe­
cific development programs and implements them. In development planning, 
the "modernizing elites", directly and/or Indirectly, guide the mass. The 
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various sections and agencies of bureaucracy directly Implement the policy 
and enforce the program by means of legislative measures and, at the same 
time, may act indirectly through their staff and personnel in the field. 
Yet, it has long been recognized that the neat dichotomy of politics 
and administration does not correspond to reality. The nonpolitical role 
of bureaucrats is not clear in enforcing laws and exercising power. At 
the one extreme, officials may be fully controlled by the politicians. On 
the other, the government officials and administrators may be a monopoly 
at the expense of all other social groups. This Is frequently seen in the 
developing countries. Bureaucratism, then, as a direct manifestation of 
heavy bureaucratic power, is dysfunctional for administrative efficiency 
(Riggs, 1964;272-276). 
In all developing countries, bureaucracies tend to grow very rapidly, 
constantly extending their scope. Most of the post colonial new states 
took over the systems of public administration remaining from the former 
period. At the same time, the scope of their activities greatly expanded 
and new organs were created. Since, in most of these countries, the 
government plays a great role in economic and social development, the 
bureaucracies also engage significantly in dsvalopaent activities. Thus, 
the role of the governmental bureaucracy is decisively influential on the 
direction and tempo of the country's modernization. In a further step, 
the success OS failure of the development program at a final stage depends 
upon the performance of the staff and personnel as well as the effective­
ness of the bureaucratic machinery. 
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In his analysis of the "problems of emerging bureaucracies In de­
veloping areas and new states" Elsenstadt (1963) looked into the pattern 
of bureaucracies in two groups of developing nations: the post colonial 
new states (I.e., those formerly under colonial rule) and those which had 
not been under colonial rule. According to him, in most of the post 
colonial new states there existe multiple bureaucracies, or different 
layers of bureaucratic organization and structure: (1) a "predevelopment 
layer" which succeeded from the prelndependence bureaucracy, and (2) a 
second stratum of bureaucracies which have been expanded or recruited 
since independence (Elsenstadt, 1963:165). 
The first layer of "predevelopment" bureaucracies in these coun­
tries is characterized by the remaining personnel, organizational struc­
ture, and tradition from the old colonial civil service. In fact, the 
structure and orgranization of the old civil service actually provided 
the basic framework for the extension and development of the bureaucratic 
administration during post independence. These prelndependence bureau­
cracies are apolitical and limited in their activities; confining them to 
the basic administrative services under a high degree of centralization. 
The second main layer of the bureaucracies in these countries is re­
garded as a new civil service — "new in personnel, goals, departments 
and activities". These new bureaucratic organs are frequently staffed with 
new recruits, who are much more attuned to political goals and interests^ 
The new organs or bureaucratic departments have a new type of specific 
goal under the general orientation of national development, including 
socioeconomic development, and the like. 
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In a similar way, the bureaucracies In those developing countries 
which were not under colonial rule, exhibit two different elements and 
structural organizations; "A traditional bureaucracy — whether 'royal' 
as In the Middle Eastern countries or 'oligarchical-republican' as In most 
of Latin American countries" (Elsenstadt, 1963:166). The traditional 
bureaucracies were designed to preserve and protect the political power 
and maintain the status quo. "These administrations were usually concerned 
with supporting the Interests of the ruling oligarchies, and with imple­
menting rather limited social and economic objectives" (Elsenstadt, 1963: 
167). Since the second World War, within the traditional bureaucratic 
structure, the traditional elements have been mixed with more modern ones; 
frequently copies from the Western models of bureaucracies. 
As described, each part of the bureaucracy developed under somewhat 
different conditions and in response to different types of needs and pres­
sures. Thus, it Is not surprising that the overall structure of the admin­
istrative systems, trtilch should play a vital role In the development 
effort as the prime change agents, has not been well coordinated. 
Elsenstadt (1963) pointed out some specific structural problems of admin­
istrative bureaucracies in developing countries. Among the most important 
ones are: (1) they tend to be understaffed at the lower level, (2) they 
lack qualified personnel, or are deficient in the quality of their person­
nel, (3) they have overlapping interorganlzational functions, and (4) 
there exists over-centralization with lack of operational autonomy as well 
as regional autonomy, etc. (Elsenstadt, 1963:166). 
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Although there may be some minute variations. It Is generally true 
that chronically Intrinsic structural problems exist In the public bureau­
cracies of most developing countries. In terms of national development 
planning. It may be recognized that the state Is the most Important single 
agent of modernization and change. There has been an Increasing concern 
on the part of the governments of the developing countries with the task 
of natlon-bullding, particularly In the social and economic sphere. It 
Is Imperative that the traditional law-and-order administration be re­
oriented to the needs of new functions and tasks of development. Struc­
tural reforms in administration may also occur as a stimulus for develop­
ment and to provide an effective change agent for achieving development 
goals. 
Aside from the developmental perspective, the need for administrative 
reform arises from malfunctions in the structural procedures and ineffi­
cient performances of the bureaucratic personnel. Reform movements may 
begin with removing recognized obstacles and resistance to Improve the 
resulting performance. Refora is often more than a series of incremental 
changes or marginal adjustments and is frequently a rather radical process, 
departing sharply from existing arrangements and policies. Thus, "admin­
istrative reform" means "any change of principles, organizations, their 
structures, methods or procedures which are aimed at the administrative 
process" (Calden, 1969:66-67). 
Because of built-in rigidity, resistance, and opposition, administra­
tive reform by an administrative bureaucracy is unlikely to be successful. 
It is a political process and the reformers are likely to be politicians 
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with a mission. Reviewing the administrative reforms attempted In de­
veloping countries, Calden Illustrated the patterns and contents of the 
reform as follows: (1) organizational change concerned wl(A formal ar­
rangements, (2) attltudlnal and behavioral change of the staff and person­
nel of the administrative bureaucracies, (3) technical or Instrumental 
change handling the administrative processes, (4) facilitating new techni­
cal aids, and (5) reinforcing training programs of personnel and for re­
cruitment of staff and personnel of the administrative bureaucracy (Calden, 
1969:101). All these attempts may be too expensive. In view of the current 
economic conditions of the developing countries. The failure of the ad­
ministrative reform, like others, will only make things worse for national 
development. 
Administrative reform, however, is not in itself an end. It may be 
viewed as a means to national development; as one of the Important de­
velopment strategies. Since development administration is concerned with 
the Introduction of goal-directed change in a way which is desirable and 
acceptable to society, administration for development essentially has to 
be goal-oriented and action-oriented. Its structures, procedures, tech­
niques of policy-making, planning, staffing patterns, personnel, and re­
lations with citizens have to be fully conditioned to the processes and 
goals of development programs. 
As one Indian developmentallst administrator pointed out; one of the 
basic characteristics of the new development administration is its oper­
ational autonomy. Such autonomy, which is achieved by insulating the 
administrators from political pressures, should provide a framework for 
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the formulation of relevant policies and programs; as well as their Imple­
mentation (Narula, 1970:329). However, Interference by either the govern­
ment or traditional institutions is noticeable in varying degree. For 
instance, it is commonly known that, although bureaucratic recruitment 
Is formallstlcally based on examinations and the "merit system", the 
characteristic mode of selection in most of the underdeveloped countries 
is nepotism; i.e., selection through connections with high officials and 
with the politicians (Rlggs, 1964:260-285). Those recruited in such a way 
are generally characterized as unqualified, politically oriented, and 
opportunistic rather than qualified and dedicated to the job assigned. 
This obstructs the merit system by giving no opportunity for proper and 
needed personnel. 
Since development requires a new type of administrator, combining 
both effective program and efficient administrative skills, the new cadres 
would have to be recruited from a number of disciplines, possess the in­
tegrating skills of general management, and able to continuously identify 
the links and interrelations involved in the development process. In the 
context of the contemporary social and political conditions existing in 
many of the developing countries, development administrators need to 
possess a sense of professional commitment, be achievement-minded, and 
show a genuine dedication to the citizen's problems and felt-needs. In 
the developmental context, the old Weberian concepts of totally imper-
sonalized decision making and formallstic procedures does not seem to 
apply. Although national planning tends to centralize the decision making 
process, a rigid hierarchical structure is not considered to be conducive 
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to Implementation of development programs. Valid administrative reform 
must proceed so as to implement development policies effectively. At the 
same time, comprehensive national development planning calls for coordi­
nation among the agencies Including various administrative levels and 
organizations. 
In concluding the discussion of the internal dynamics of current 
change, the new nationalism is considered to provide a powerful emotional 
impetus for national development planning and, at the same time, provide 
sets of development objectives. This nationalism is, in a sense, political 
expressions of the intellectual elites on the basis of their own ideals, 
and either reflecting or articulating the felt-needs of the mass of the 
population. The social valuations, which underlie the objectives of 
national development, are more or less manifested in the characteristics 
of the new nationalism. 
The essential characteristic of national development planning is 
instigated change guided by the agents of change. Thus, the role of the 
change agent is very Important in the implementation of national develop­
ment planning, and the success or failure of the national development 
planning is largely dependent upon the change agent's performance. In 
this study, the agents of change refer to intellectual elites and the 
public administrations. Elites provide the mass with certain visions for 
the development, and they articulate development objectives reflecting the 
social valuations and the Interests of the mass of population. On the 
other hand, the public administrations (including policy-makers, social 
planners, and administrative personnel) organize development planning. 
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execute the programs, mobilize both human and natural resources, and 
thereby, take ultimate responsibility for national development planning. 
In order to organize effective development planning, the internal social 
conditions and related problems of underdevelopment need to be correctly 
analyzed and assessed. The next chapter will analyze these conditions 
and related problems of underdevelopment. 
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V. INTERNAL CONDITIONS AND RELATED 
PROBLEMS OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
Under the analytical guidelines of the model formulated in chapter 
two, chapter three was used to discuss the major determinants of current 
underdevelopment in the new nations — the consequences of the historical 
process of colonialism and the external influences of economic and politi­
cal international relationships. Chapter four was devoted to a discussion 
of the nature of the new nationalism and the role of change agents with 
respect to the current internal dynamics of the Third World countries. 
This chapter will present an analysis of internal conditions, and of 
the related problems of underdevelopment; particularly demographic and 
social conditions as was identified in the model in chapter two. More 
specifically, this chapter analyzes three different aspects of the current 
internal conditions. In the first section, the general problems of popula­
tion growth in the less developed regions will be analyzed, in comparison 
with those of the developed regions. The second section will be devoted 
to an analysis of the qualitative aspects of population, i.e., nutrition, 
health, and education. Finally, the third section will be used to discuss 
the social conditions which are thought to be generally undesirable or 
unfavorable for development. 
A. Population Problems 
From his observations on the rapid increase in population of Western 
Europe In the early nineteenth century, Maithus wrote "An Essay on the 
Principle of Population" in 1826. In this essay, Malthus warned that un­
controlled population growth would eventually become a cause of poverty 
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and other forms of human misery (e. g., massive starvation, disease, and 
war) because of the potential societal Imbalance produced by a geometric 
growth of population and an arlthmatlc Increase of food production. The 
Malthuslan nightmare Is now a reality In many of the less developed 
countries. An unprecedented acceleration of the population growth has 
become manifest In those areas, and this trend Is unlikely to be reduced 
In the near future. 
1. Factors affecting population growth 
The current population growth In the less developed countries has been 
sudden and more massive than that experienced previously in the West 
European countries. The population explosion in the less developed regions 
results mainly from the substantial lag of fertility rates behind the rapid 
reduction in mortality rates since the second World War. 
The factors directly affecting the recent reduction in mortality are: 
the increasing accessibility of modem medicine to the masses of people 
In the lesR developed regions, improvements in sanitary conditions with 
regard to water and food, and fairly wide-spread education in personal 
hygiene (United Nations, 1974a:1). In the less developed areas, the effects 
of economic development on the recent reduction in mortality seems in­
significant. The reduction is largely due, then, to improvements in 
public health and access to modern medicines. It may be reasonably con­
ceived that every possible effort will be made to continue to reduce 
mortality rates since long life and good health are universal values, 
regardless of economic differences and cultural variations. 
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The pattern of fertility behavior Is more related to the change of 
people's values and attitudes than to sanitary Improvements and medical 
advancement. Fertility rates have remained almost unchanged or have de­
clined only slightly; the reduction In fertility rates generally lagging 
behind the reduction in mortality rates. On the basis of the world, 
regional, and national population in 1950, a demographic typology by 
birth, death, and population was proposed to suggest a hypothetical demo­
graphic transition model as shown in Table 10 (United Nations, 1954). This 
classification of the areas of the world suggests a close relationship 
between the pattern of demographic transition and the pattern of economic 
development. Low income areas are in general characterized by both high 
birth rates and high death rates, areas of transitional economic develop­
ment by low death rates but still high or steadily declining birth rates, 
and high income areas by both lew birth and lew death rates. 
As indicated earlier, levels of mortality are generally related to 
food and nutrition, environmental sanitation and public health services, 
medical advancement, and levels of living standards. On the other hand, 
birth rates are more related to traditions, family institutions, and values 
that are culturally salient. Thus, the phenomena of almost unchanging or 
at best steadily declining birth rates should be assessed in relation to 
the values, aspirations concerning the desired number of children, and 
social structures, rather than the factors of modem medicine and economic 
growth. 
The rate of natural increase in population has gone up rapidly in 
most of the less developed countries, especially in those of South Asia and 
Table 10. Demographic typology, by birth, death rates, population, and percent of world 
populsttion, 1950.* 
Birth Rate Death Rate Area 
Population 
(Millions) 
Percent of 
World 
Population 
1. High High Middle Africa 141 6 
2. High Declining but 
still high 
Asia (except Japan) 
North Africa 
1,280 52 
3. High Declining but 
fairly low 
South Africa 
Middle America 
Tropical South America 
149 6 
4. Declining Fairly low Temperate South America 
Japan 
U.S.S.R. 
Balkan Peninsula 
359 15 
5. Low or 
fluctuating; 
Lciw North America 
Western Europe 
Ocenia 
523 21 
6. Undefined Pacific Islands 2.8 
^Source; Uioited Nations (195 *:288ï. 
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and East Asia. During the last decade from 1960 to 1970, the population 
has Increased 14.8 percent in South Asia, and 28.1 percent In Africa as 
shown In Table 11. As a whole, the natural Increase of the world popula­
tion has gone up to 19.2 percent in the I960's, and the world population 
is expected to Increase 1.9 percent annually from 1970 to 1975. During 
the decade of the I960's, the annual rate of natural increase in the less 
developed regions was 2.26 percent, compared with 1.02 percent in more 
developed regions. 
Table 11. Birth rates, death rates, and rates of natural increase, 1960-
1970 and 1970-1975 in the world and major area (rates per 
1,000 population).^ 
Rate of 
Natural 
Birth Rate Death Rate Increase 
1960- 1970- 1960- 1970- 1960- 1970-
Area 1970 1975 1970 1975 1970 1975 
World total 33.3 31.8 14.1 12.8 19.2 19.0 
More developed regions 19.3 17.2 9.1 9.2 10.2 8.0 
Less developed regions 39.2 37.8 16.6 14.4 22.6 23.4 
Europe 18.1 16.1 10.2 10.4 7. 9  5.7 
U.S.S.R. 19.8 17.8 7.7 7.9 12.1 9.9 
Northern America 21.0 16.5 9.3 9.3 11.7 7.2 
Oceania 25.4 24.7 10.3 9.4 15.1 15.3 
South Asia 44.6 42.7 19.8 16.8 24.8 25.9 
East Asia 28.7 26.0 11.5 9.8 17.2 16.2 
Africa 47.0 46.5 22.1 20.0 24.9 26.5 
Latin America 38.6 36.7 10.5 9.2 28.1 27.5 
^Source; United Nations (1974a:ll). 
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Table 12 shows the population density In the world major areas In 
1960 and estimates for 1975. The world's population Is unevenly distrib­
uted in relation to land resources and in this respect the less developed 
regions are at a growing disadvantage due to higher rates of natural in­
crease, Initial high density, and being primarily agricultural regions. 
Although population density per square kilometer is a very crude measure, 
in 1975 the less developed regions will have an average density of forty 
persons per square kilometer, more than twice that of the more developed 
regions combined. 
Table 12. Land area, population density In 1960 and 1975, and 1960-1975 
gain in population density, in the world and major areas.* 
Area 
Land Area 
(Thousand 
km ) 
Inhabitants 
per km 
1960 1975 
Gain in 
Density, 
1960-
1975 
World total 135,779^ 22.1 29.4 7.3 
More developed regions 60,097 16.0 18.6 2.6 
Less developed regions 74,872 27.0 39.5 12.5 
Europe 4,936 86.1 96.0 9.9 
U.S.S.R. 22,402 9.6 11.4 1.8 
Northern America 21,515 9.2 11.0 1.8 
Oceania 8,509 1.9 2.5 .6 
South Asia 15,775 54.9 80.4 25.5 
East Asia 11,756 67.0 85.5 18.5 
Africa 30,320 9.0 13.2 4.2 
Latin America 20,568 10.5 15.8 5.3 
"Source: United Nations (1974a:5). 
^Not including the Antarctic continent. 
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In terms of major regions, the 1960-1975 gains in population density 
are greatest In South Asia and East Asia. In Africa and Latin America, 
the density gains are comparatively moderate since these areas are initially 
more sparsely populated than Asia. Despite the crude measure of popula­
tion density, it is evident that the pressure of population growth is un­
equal among different parts of the world. In some countries in South and 
East Asia, the current population growth is one of the most pressing prob­
lems. The population growth has outstripped gains made in gross national 
product and presents an awesome problem. 
It has been fashionable to describe excess fertility as one of the 
fundamental causes of poverty, whether among individuals or societies. In 
a sense, though, fertility is autonomous and imprecisely connected with 
any preceding, or concomitant, economic characteristics, as mortality 
has been. For obvious humanitarian reasons, however, any attempt to 
depress population pressure is restricted to work on the fertility factor, 
either by national policy measures or population education. 
With respect to the serious effects of population growth on other 
sectors of life, population problems should be viewed and understood as 
one of the key problems. Socioeconomic development is hampered in the 
densely populated underdeveloped countries. 
2. Population growth and its iatsact on oroduetlylty 
The agricultural output per worker has risen by improving farming 
technology, cultivating high-yielding crops, and expanding irrigation 
systems, etc. In fact, according to a United Nations report, a given unit 
of land (unit square kilometers) of the world agricultural land could feed 
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five persons In 1970 as compared with four persons in 1950 (United Nations, 
197Aa:9). However, unequal conditions between developed and less developed 
countries still exist, and as a result of population growth agricultural 
lands in less developed countries are becoming more crowded. As an in­
evitable result of the current population situation, the average size of 
land holdings per agricultural worker continues to diminish. Between 1950 
and 1970 the agricultural population of the developed regions apparently 
diminished from 299 million to 206 million according to Table 13. In the 
less developed regions it increased from 1,282 million to 1,656 million. 
The consequence was a decline in the agricultural density of the more de­
veloped regions from 46 to 31 while in the less developed regions there 
was a rise from 221 to 226. 
The statistics in Table 13 show that in 1970 an agricultural density 
of 453 in East Asia, 235 in South Asia, IS in Oceania, and only 5 in North 
America. The density in the less developed areas was 226 per square kilo­
meter of agricultural land. This Is almost seven times greater than the 
agricultural density of 31 obtained of the more developed countries. Thlm 
tremendous discrepancy, in the ratio of agricultural labor to land, between 
the developed and the less developed regions is, in part, conditioned by 
the limited employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector. 
There arc few secondary industries and tertiary industries in the economic 
structure to provide such opportunities. 
Table 14 shows projections for the agricultural and nonagricultural 
population according to the Food and Agriculture Organization. The data 
include the economically active population, whether in agriculture or in 
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Table 13. Agricultural population, agricultural land area, and agricultural 
density, 1950 and 1970, in the world and major areas.* 
Agricultural 
Population 
Agricultural Agricultural per km of 
Population Land Area ^ Agricultural 
(Millions (Thousand km ) Land 
Area 1950 1970 1950 1970 1950 1970 
World total 1,580 1,862 12,290 14,010 129 132 
More developed regions 299 206 6,500 6,690 46 31 
Less developed regions 1,281 1,656 5,790 7,320 221 226 
Europe 128 89 1,470 1,480 87 60 
U.S.S.R. 101 77 2,250 2,330 45 33 
North America 22 10 2,210 2,200 10 5 
Oceania 4 4 190 240 19 18 
South Asia 545 763 2,400 3,250 227 235 
East Asia 523 561 1,060 1,240 493 453 
Africa 171 239 1,870 2,040 92 117 
Latin America 87 118 840 1,230 104 96 
^Source: United Nations (1974a:8). 
industry and services, and their dependents. The agricultural population 
in the more developed regions is expected to decline, not only in relative 
terms, but also in absolute numbers from about 207 million to 181 million 
from 1970 to 1975. In South Asia and Africa about two-thirds of the popu­
lation in 1970 were still dependent on agriculture. There was about the 
same degree of dependence on agriculture in East Asia and Latin America. 
In all these less developed areas, the relative ratio^of the agricultural 
to the nonagricultural population are still steadily rising. Overall the 
rapid relative decline in the agricultural sector is expected to continue 
in all regions. In the developed regions the percent of agricultural 
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Table 14. Population of agricultural population, nonagricultural popula­
tion, and percent of agricultural in total population, in the 
world and major areas, 1970 and 1975, according to 
Percent of 
Total Pop-
Agricultural Nonagricul- ulation 
Population tural Popula- Dependent on 
(Millions) tlon (Millions) Agriculture 
Area 1970 1975 1970 1975 1970 1975 
World total 1,860 1,943 1,775 2,079 51.2 48.3 
More developed regions 207 181 884 967 19.0 15.7 
Less developed regions 1,653 1,762 891 1,112 65.0 61.3 
Europe 89 78 373 401 19.3 16.3 
U.S.S.R. 77 68 165 188 31.9 26.5 
Northern America 10 8 218 235 4.7 3.4 
Oceania 4 4 15 17 22.1 20.5 
South Asia 763 830 363 466 67.8 64.0 
East Asia 561 571 369 441 60.4 56.4 
Africa 239 263 105 132 69.5 66.6 
Latin America 118 125 165 202 41.6 38.1 
^Source: United Nations (1374a:31). 
^Note; These projections are still in conformity with earlier popu­
lation projections of the United Nations. 
population to total population is expected to dwindle to less than sixteen 
percent by 1975. The dominant role of agriculture in the economic struc­
ture of less developed countries today, is so great that agriculture is 
expected to continue to be the main source of livelihood of the growing 
population. In the majority of the less developed countrless where short­
ages in land and capital Impede the absorption of additional agricultural 
population, an even greater pressure will be exerted on the limited employ 
ment opportunities in nonagricultural sectors. Developing high-yielding 
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crops and using labor-intensive methods in agriculture are considered to 
be more appropriate for absorbing underemployed surplus labor force in the 
densely populated developing countries rather than using large-scale 
capital-intensive methods or sheer mechanization in agriculture for export­
ing agricultural goods. 
It should be noted that many of the densely populated low-income 
countries, especially in Southeast Asia, are now faced with a severe food 
shortage. In order to feed the growing additional population it is neces­
sary to Import foodstuffs, and this requires enormous precious foreign 
expenditures which are badly needed for development planning. A large pro­
portion of the people, for instance in India, Bangladesh, and other regions, 
have inadequate diets and suffer from chronic starvation. Another social 
Implication of the population pressures is prevalent and increasing under­
employment in rural areas due to the additional surplus population. In 
general, the growing underemployed may be characterized as economically 
landless, living in poverty and misery, lacking education, undernourished, 
socially and politically deprived, lacking in psychological achievement 
motivation, and fatalistic. 
3. Population composition 
In the previous section the general effects of population growth were 
examined in terms of the socloecpnomic aspects of life. As generally 
stated, the population growth that now jeopardizes economic development, 
and aggravates the problems of hunger and poverty, is the product of the 
unchanging birth rate and declining death rate of the last half century. 
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This section will deal with the characteristics of population composition, 
that Is, the age structure and Its implications for the cumulative process. 
Changes in fertility and mortality ultimately produce changes in the 
age structure of a population. A number of measures are available for the 
analysis of mortality conditions. These measures include crude death rate, 
infant mortality rate, late infant mortality rate (ages 1-5), life expec­
tancy, and other various composite indices. Historically, the earliest and 
greatest gains in improved mortality conditions were manifest in the 
relatively great reductions in death rate in the less developed areas of 
the world. This is similar to the past experience of the developed areas. 
However, as shown in Table 15, the less developed regions are experiencing 
relatively higher infant mortality rates compared with those of the de­
veloped areas of Europe and North America. Many of these less developed 
Table 15. Differentials in Infant mortality rates by major regions, 1972.* 
Regions Minimum Mean Maximum 
Black Africa (29)" 97.0 163.6 204.0 
Middle East^ (13) 37.0 112.1 152.0 
Asia'^ (16) 13.0 72.4 182.0 
Latin America (22) 29.0 75.3 150.0 
Europe, North America, Oceania (28) 11.0 21.5 49.0 
World Total (108) 11.0 89.1 204.0 
^Source; See the secondary sources listed in Appendix. 
^Numbers in parentheses is number of countries in the region, 
^Includes Israel. 
^Includes Japan. 
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regions have substantially reduced their crude death rates by reducing 
their Infant mortality rates. The impact of this reduction upon the age 
structure should be apparent, as well as Its consequences for the qualita­
tive aspects of population. Further, the less developed countries have a 
relatively high or unchanging birth rate while the more developed areas 
have already reduced both birth and death rates. 
Table 16 shows the age composition of major areas in 1965, as assessed 
by the United Nations. The more developed areas have 9.5 percent of the 
age group 0-4 and 63 percent for the economically active age group of 15-
64. The less developed areas, on the other hand, have almost 16 percent 
in the 0-4 age group and 55.1 percent for the 15-64 age group. 
Table 16. Percent of age composition of major areas, 1965.* 
Major Area 
Years of Age 
0-4 5-14 15-64 
World 13.9 23.4 57.6 5.1 
More developed countries 9.5 18.6 63.0 8.9 
LÊSS developed countries 15,9 25.7 55.1 3.3 
Europe 8.7 16.7 64.1 10.5 
U.S.S.R. 10.2 20.4 62.1 7.4 
North America 10.6 20.4 59.8 9.2 
Oceania 11.8 21.0 59.9 7.3 
South Asia 16.9 26.1 54.0 3.0 
East Asia 12.9 24.0 59.0 4.1 
Africa 17.7 25.8 53.7 2.8 
Latin America 16.5 26.0 53.8 3.7 
^Source; United Nations (1973a:16). 
The measure of "dependency" in a population is afforded by the pro­
portion of that population that is under 15, or 65 and over. It is 
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generally accepted, In an historical context, that the younger population 
proportion is Inversely related, while the proportion of the old age group 
Is directly related, to the level of living standards and economic develop­
ment. The United Nations has classified the nations of the world into three 
categories: the "aged", the "mature", and the "young" (United Nations, 
1956:7). The "aged" nations, those with over 7 percent of their population 
65 and over, are the more economically developed areas. As shown in Table 
16, the more developed countries had an average of 8.9 percent of the age 
group 65 and older in 1965; Including 10.5 percent of Europe, 9.2 percent 
of North America, 7.4 percent of the Soviet Union, and 7.3 percent of 
Oceania. The "mature" countries, with 4-7 percent of their population 65 
or older, are primarily countries undergoing industrial transition. In 
the findings of Table 16, East Asia is the only region classified as a 
"mature" area among the less developed regions with 4.1 percent. However, 
this may be accounted for because the region includes Japan and other small 
city-countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore. Latin America, with 3.7 
percent of the age group 65 and over, is regarded as being in almost the 
same or in a better position than East Asia, excluding Japan. The rest 
of the regions, Africa with 1.8 percent. South Asia with 3.0 percent, and 
Latin America are all categorized as demographically "young" nations. In 
light of the comments made previously. East Asia properly falls into this 
category as well. They are characterized, without exception, as econmi-
cally less developed countries. 
Another index based on age structure is afforded by the "dependency 
ratio". The dependency ratio is a measure, based upon age structure alone. 
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of the number of persons of dependent age under 15, and over 65, per 100 
persons of "productive" age group 15-65. The age structure of Table 16 
was used to compute dependency ratios projected, by five year periods, to 
1985. These are presented in Table 17. Overall, the figures of dependency 
show that less developed areas have had higher (81 percent) ratios than 
those of more developed regions throughout the period 1965-1975. 
Regionally, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America had above 85 percent 
in 1965 and 1970 and are expected to retain that ratio through 1985 without 
any substantial reductions in any of these regions. 
Table 17. Dependency ratio (per 100) by major areas, 1965-1985 (median 
variant) 
Major Areas 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
World 74 73 73 73 72 
More developed regions 59 57 57 57 58 
Less developed regions 81 81 80 80 77 
Europe 56 57 59 60 58 
U.S.S.R. 61 57 54 54 55 
North America 67 63 60 59 62 
Oceania 67 65 64 64 66 
South Asia 85 86 87 87 78 
East Asia 69 66 63 61 56 
Africa 86 87 89 91 92 
Latin America 86 86 85 85 84 
^Source; United Nations (1973a:17). 
It should be noted that age data in most developing countries are quite 
inaccurate. Not only is there serious misreporting of age in census enu­
meration, but the undercount of children, particularly Infants, requires 
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careful adjustment In estimation. The technical refinement of estimates 
of population statistics, and their assessment in terms of the reliability 
of the data, are beyond the scope of this study. The statistics of the 
dependency ratio are taken for granted. However, in mathematical reason­
ing, the numerator of the number of persons in the age groups under 15 and 
over 65 neutralizes some of the differences between developed and less 
developed countries because, in the case of developing countries, a higher 
portion of young persons are somewhat compensated for by lower proportions 
of older persons. According to recent information, conqpared with a depen­
dency ratio of around 100 in the developing countries, the median is 58, 
with a range from 45 for Japan to 67 for New Zealand, among the 16 
specified developed countries (Population Council, 1974:88). 
High fertility (along with lowering infant mortality rate) is con­
sidered to be a msjor composent in population growth in the less developed 
countries and in the production of their characteristically "young" popula­
tions. The adverse impacts of high child dependency in population composi­
tion are far-reaching in the various aspects of the socioeconomic develop­
ment efforts in less developed countries. In the first place, the immedi­
ate adverse Impact of high child dependency, as a main source of population 
growth, is to retard overall rapid socioeconomic development. Because 
the recent high fertility rate does not affect the size of the labor force, 
for fixed size of labor force and a fixed national income, the population 
with a heavy burden of increasing child dependency will be under constant 
pressure to direct scarce investment funds and resources to a less produc­
tive use, i.e., simply to feed additional mouths. For instance, the 
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average family size will be larger with a large number of living children. 
It will require more housing construction than can be produced. Housing 
conditions will be seriously deteriorated or In short supply. At the same 
time, the general human conditions of health, nutrition, children's educa­
tional attainment, and the like, are not likely to be Improved unless 
there Is epoch-making success In socioeconomic progress. 
In the second place, the Impact of today's heavy child dependency and 
high fertility will eventually result in large numbers In the later labor 
forces. This may result in persistent socioeconomic retardation or stagna­
tion, which will manifest itself as serious unemployment and underemploy­
ment; eventually becoming one of the main sources of social unrest and 
economic deprivation unless there is rapid structural change in the exist­
ing industrial and occupational structures. Projections of regional labor 
forces for the base year of 1970, according to the International Labor 
Organization, are shown in Table 18. The labor force includes those gain­
fully employed and those seeking jobs. The reliability and comparability 
of the statistics are considered doubtful. Another way of looking at popu­
lation composition, besides age groupings, is the composition by sex. 
Table 18 is narrowed to that of labor force by sex. The impact or popula­
tion composition on economic activity will be further discussed shortly. 
Thirdly, this portion of the populations of the less developed regions 
will soon reach child=bsaring age and, therefore» provide a base for in­
creased population growth during the next generation, unless, that is, a 
dramatic change occurs in the fertility rate. If this change fails to 
occur, the heavy burden of child dependency in the less developed areas 
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Table 18. Projection of labor force, percentage of labor force In the 
total population, and percent of women within the labor force. 
In the world and major areas, 1970 and 1975, according to the 
I.L.U.* 
Percent of 
Labor Force 
(Millions) 
Labor Force 
in the Total 
Population 
Percent of 
Women in the 
Labor Force 
Area 1970 1975 1970 1975 1970 1975 
World total 1,507 1,637 41.6 41.1 34.2 34.0 
More developed regions 486 516 44.8 45.5 38.4 38.5 
Less developed regions 1,021 1,122 40.3 39.3 32.2 31.9 
Europe 202 210 43.9 44.2 34.1 34.4 
U.S.S.R. 123 132 50.8 51.9 49.9 49.5 
North America 90 98 39.7 41.2 34.4 35.1 
Oceania 8 9 41.3 41.5 29.6 30.2 
South Asia 428 472 38.5 37.2 29.8 29.6 
East Asia 436 468 47.0 46.6 37.9 37.7 
Africa 134 149 38.0 37.2 31.4 31.2 
Latin America 88 100 30.9 30.6 19.5 19.6 
^Source: United Nations (197Aaî29)-
will bsccse increasingly detri&sntal to the possibility of the betterment 
of human conditions. 
Finally, the population growth due to high fertility and increased 
life expectancy will continue to aggravate population density in the 
already overcrowded low income countries In the next couple of decades. 
This means that the unfavorable man/land ratio, especially in the already 
densely populated agricultural areas, will probably result in an unprece­
dented crisis. Taken together, all these sequential effects of population 
growth with high fertility will devastate the economic well-being of the 
future generations. It will also produce destructive mental strains and 
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stresses in human relationships and activities because of the manifest 
relative deprivation of the "havenots" relative to the "haves"; and an 
absolute deprivation in terms of depleted resources. 
Economic activities vary by sex» age, and by regions and countries. 
The overall activity rates are significantly affected by the participation 
of women in economic activities. In the Soviet Union, 50 percent of the 
labor force is made up of women in 1970 as contrasted with only 20 percent 
In Latin America. The role of women in society is apt to be enhanced when 
they are engaged in productive functions outside the home. Such activities 
have, of course, played a significant part in emancipating them from their 
traditional role of mother and homemaker, especially in the more developed 
countries. The rise in the participation of women In the labor force does 
not seem to be a general expectation in the less developed regions. The 
low rate or participation of women In the labor force may be determined by 
various factors, including: educational attainment, training, experience, 
potential absenteeism as produced by pregnancies and child rearing, and, 
structurally, the opportunity structure In the labor market and customs 
affecting the gainful employment of women. The hidden fact behind formal 
statistics, however, is that seasonal participation of women in the labor 
force is very high, especially in the rice growing monsoon climate areas. 
Irregular or marginal work participation, for example, as peddlers and 
hired bouse maids, Is particularly conspicuous in the leas developed areas. 
The women are either paid intermittently, or have a very low remuneration. 
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4. Population distribution 
Population distribution within the territory of a country is also 
another direct aspect of population study. Within a country, population 
distribution is generally heavily concentrated in some particular regions 
while sparsely populated elsewhere. Besides this differential population 
distribution, and the natural population increases which contribute to it, 
migration is an essential mechanism of the current population distribution. 
Throughout human existence, migratory movements have been made; ranging 
from short distances to a cross-continental scale. The basic motivations 
for human movement have changed little from time to time, although they 
have become much more complex in modern times: the search for more and 
better opportunities, the desire to better oneself or one's group materially, 
the need for security, and refuge from the oppression of others. In 
general, the major determinants of human migration can be regarded as the 
various forms of existing population pressures, the availability of re­
sources, and social disorganization. 
Historically, under the colonial era, there were massive international 
migrations to fill the labor shortages created in the operation of 
colonial plantations or mines. Cheap Chinese laborers were brought by the 
colonial powers to the areas of Indochina and Malaysia. Destitute low-
caste Indian laborers were brought to Burma for rice production, to Ceylon 
for plantation works and to other areas in Southeast Asia and western 
Africa for railroad construction. Some evidences of slavery trade, as one 
type of migratory movement, remain In North America and Central and Latin 
America. Except in Central and Latin America, these particular ethnic 
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migrants now remain an Isolated "ethnic enclave" In the countries of South­
east Asia and Western Africa. 
After World War II International migration almost stopped; the 
majority of the world's population coming to be concentrated In urban 
settlements. The present urban concentration In the advanced nations Is 
almost wholly a product of the last 150 years and has accompanied the 
growth of Industrialization. The North Atlantic regions and Japan are now 
over 70 percent urbanized (Gallagher, 1973). The sudden population con­
glomeration In urban centers of developing countries is quite a recent 
phenomenon, the highest percentage of Increase in urbanization being 
manifested in the last two decades (Davis, 1969). 
Table 19 gives the relative scale and urbanization trends for the 
period 1920-1960, In relation to the world total. The percentage Increases 
in urbanization In South Asia are 52 percent for 1940-1950 and 51 percent 
for 1950-1960, compared with the 25 percent and 42 percent of the world's 
total during those respective periods. This means that most ongoing urban 
growth in the developing countries, most of them heavily dependent on 
agriculture, is accelerated by the Increasing tempo of rural-to-urban 
migration on a massive scale. Given the poverty of the Asian countries, 
the problem of urbanization becomes acute due to urban population size and 
the inability of the economies to provide the economic and social over­
head necessary to support such populations; There is no standard defini­
tion of "urban area". In fact, the census definition of "urban" varies 
from country to country and, sometimes, from one census to another in the 
same country. According to the 1961 Indian census, th^ qualified "urban 
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Table 19. Scale and pace of urbanization in South Asia in relation to 
world total, 1960,® 
Indices 
South 
Asia 
World 
Total 
1. Urban population (localities of 20,000 or more 116 753 
Inhabitants) in millions (1960) 
2. Population in rural areas and small towns (smaller 742 2,241 
than 20,000) in millions (1960) 
3. Urban population (20,000+) as a percentage of 14 25 
total population (1960) 
4. Decennial increase (percent) in urban population 
(20,000+): 1920-1930 26 30 
1930-1940 46 30 
1940-1950 52 25 
1950-1960 51 42 
5. Big-city population (500,000+) in millions (1960) 42 352 
6. Big-city population as a percentage of urban 37 47 
population (20,000+) 
7. Big-city population as a percentage of total pop 5 12 
population 
^Source: Adapted from Bose (1971:82). 
areas" as follows: (1) a density of more than 1,000 persons per square 
mile, (2) a population of more than 5,000, and (3) more than 75 percent of 
the working population engaged in nonagricultural activities. Following 
the above three categories of urban qualification, the 1961 Indian census 
analyzed 59.6 percent of the total number of towns with 83.5 percent of 
the total urban population as urban areas (Bose, 1971:87-89). 
On the assumption that rates of natural increase in urban and rural 
areas are nearly the same (although according to United Nations estimates 
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the developing countries have higher fertility rates in rural areas than 
in urban areas) it was projected that between 1970 and 1975 about 106 
million individuals moved from rural to urban places, 33 million were in 
the more developed countries and 73 million in the less developed regions. 
At a regional base, the net incoming urban migration of 1970-1975 amounts 
to 33 million in East Asia, 23 million in South Asia, 12 million in Europe, 
11 million each in Latin America and Africa, and the rest in the Soviet 
Union and North America (United Nations, 1974*:32-33). 
Table 20 shows that in the more developed regions, the proportion of 
urban population to total population, in 1975 was projected to reach 67 
Table 20. Projection of urban and rural population and percent of urban 
in total population, in the world and major areas, 1970 and 
1975.* 
Urban Rural Percent of 
Population Population Urban in Total 
(Millions) (Millions) Population 
Area 1970 1975 1970 1975 1970 1975 
World total 1,330 1,548 2,291 2,439 36.7 38.8 
More developed regies 699 763 386 37Ô 64.4 67.4 
Less developed regions 631 785 1,906 2,070 24.9 27.5 
Europe 297 318 162 156 64.6 67.1 
u.S.S.R. 137 154 105 101 56.6 60.5 
Northern America 168 181 59 56 74.2 76.5 
Oceania 14 15 6 6 69.9 71.2 
South Asia 232 288 879 980 20.9 22.7 
East Asia 245 299 681 706 26.5 29.8 
Africa 75 96 276 305 21.5 24.0 
Latin America 161 196 123 130 56.7 60.1 
^Source; United Nations (1974a:33). 
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percent, while In the less developed regions a projectlonal 28 percent 
was obtained. Among the less developed regions, Latin America Is as highly 
urbanized as the Soviet Union. South Asia and Africa are still, compar­
atively, at a lower level of urbanization than other regions. In the more 
developed regions, continued urban growth occurs partly at the expense of 
a decline In rural population. Host less developed areas still have steady 
growth In the absolute number of population In the rural areas, though a 
massive outmlgratlon to urban areas Is ongoing. 
According to the United Nations assessment of the nature of urban 
migration and Its composition by sex, age, and marital status, most of the 
urban migrants are late adolescents and young adults ranging from 15 to 30 
years of age. Among such migrants women predominate In the developed 
regions and In Latin America. Men predominate In the cities of South Asia 
and Africa. In the developed regions and Latin America many migrants 
generally settle down permanently in the cities and never return to the 
rural area. In South Asia and Africa, by contrast, there is much more 
turnover in the urban population. Many of them are married men whose 
families remain in the country, and sooner or later these migrant men re­
turn to their villages. This may be explained by the fact that a large 
number of rural-to-urban migrants, unable to secure any job in the city, 
return to their native place or some other place. A widely accepted view 
about rural^urban migrants in developing countries is that they are "pushed" 
rather than "pulled" into urban areas because of over population in the 
rural areas and rural deprivation. Considered in terms of the phenomenon 
of the "turn-over" in migration in South Asia and Africa (under the 
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conditions of high rates of natural population increase in both the rural 
and urban areas) the push factor operates In the urban areas also. Thus, 
the push and pull factors should be Interpreted in the overall demographic 
and social context. At the same time, it is generally true that more 
people come to the cities in search of employment, rather than just better 
employment. On the basis of Indian data, Bose estimated that for every 
100 persons migrating to urban areas for better employment, 254 migrated 
just in search of employment (Bose, 1971:100). 
In a traditional social context, like India, the individual migration 
of labor, especially long-distance migration, from rural to urban areas 
largely depends on the presence of friends or relatives in the city of 
migration. According to Fatel's findings, surveyed in Bombay, India, 
most rural-urban migrants with gainful employment have close relatives or 
friends already settled as urban residents. This implies that floating» 
rural-urban migrants, with no ties in the migrated cities, may be employed 
and living in the slum areas, wandering the streets, or they return to 
their native places (Patel, 1963:29). 
The process of urbanization has commonly been closely associated with 
economic development, especially industrialization. In the more developed 
Western countries, the urban areas have historically become industrial 
centers by absorbing labor forces from the rural areas as their economies 
were rapidly expanding. In the context of developed industrial countries, 
urbanization has gone hand-in-hand with economic development. Thus, levels 
of urbanization have been regarded as comparable degrees of "urbanlsm" in 
terms of the prevalence of typically urban economic, social, cultural, or 
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physical features; that is, the essential characteristics of modernization. 
In the more developed countries rural areas are already permeated by all 
the characteristics of "urhanlsm", exceeding the levels of urbanization. 
In many of the less developed countries, recently burgeoning large 
cities have been over-urbanized, far in advance of lagging "urbanlsm". 
Excessive urbanization in the less developed regions does not appear to be 
positively correlated with social or economic development. Rather, "over-
urbanization" seems to have an adverse effect on economic development. 
This recent phenomenon of urbanization in less developed regions may be 
viewed as a function of the national economic structure. For Instance, 
according to one study, the densely settled and economically impoverished 
countryside in Egypt was pushing people into the cities because they had 
no other alternative (Davis and Golden, 1954). 
In Korea after the Japanese occupation in 1910, economic development 
lagged far behind urbanization. Korean city growth was more the result of 
the "push" from a hard pressed rural economy than of the "pull" from 
expanding opportunities in urban areas (Wilkinson, 1954). After the de­
parture of the Japanese, this tendency was increased. Furthermore, most 
of the refugees from the northern region flocked to the large cities during 
the Korean War of 1950-1953. In this respect, cities function as refuges 
for migrants from the poverty of rural areas, and become a pool of con­
sumption units, rather than a base for industrialization and productivity. 
Thus, such over-urbanization is harmful to a balanced economic growth. 
Recent over-urbanization in developing countries is one aspect of a 
demographic phenomena in population distribution, a phenomena largely 
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produced by the mechanism of rural-to-urban migration. However, the impact 
of the problem of urbanization In developing countries Is enormous In terms 
of the economic, social, and political Impacts for the nation. 
In the economic sphere, the urban growth has its own self-generating 
dynamics; even though, in Its initial stage, urbanization was made up of 
pushed outmlgrants from impoverished rural areas. Private and public 
capital funds are invested primarily in large new administrative office 
buildings, hotels, stores, and storage houses — not in productive indus­
tries. At the same time the transportation, communication, and educational 
institutions are concentrated in the large cities. 
Everything being considered, rapid urban growth in the developing 
regions requires more consumptive goods and services, outpacing national 
industrialization. This situation of urbanization and modernization is 
inevitably subjecteu to the dependence relation upon the developed In­
dustrial countries as was discussed in chapter three. The demand for 
foreign consumption goods is reinforced and aggravated by the effects of 
conspicuous consumption by a small number of people in the upper strata. 
Ultimately, urban areas, without much contribution to the national product, 
are maintained and grow at the expense of the rural economy. ?or instance, 
to secure urban interests, or under the pressure of the urbanité public 
opinion, the "urban government" controls the price ceilings of the major 
agricultural products, even under the unit-production costs. 
The social implication of urbanization in developing countries is much 
deeper and wider In its adverse impacts. In the cities, increasingly high 
demands for services, in the light of limited resources, creates 
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frustration and unrest. This often makes the very viability of the 
countries themselves questionable. 
Almost all cities suffer from severe housing shortages and, thus, 
the floating urban migrants feel residential insecurity. All the cities 
in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa seem to be plagued with 
squatters and slum dwellers. Some 25 percent of the populations of 
Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and about one-third in Manilla live in slums or 
squatter shanties (Laquian, 1971:184). According to UNICEF, in Mexico City 
30 percent of the population lives in self-built housing, 11 percent in 
antiquated substandard housing, 14 percent in "proletarian" housing, 26 
percent in "antiquated housing", and only 19 percent live "in housing that 
may be classified as good" (Frank, 1969c:281). 
As a group, these slum dwellers are usually at the bottom of the 
socioeconomic ladder. They are commonly found in jobs that require little 
or no skill, especially in the service fields. Since the primary and 
secondary sectors are not expanding fast enough, much of the population in 
this unstable sector is forced into the tertiary sector — such as street 
vending, odd jobs, and domestic service. Thus, unstable employment, as an 
immediate concern of the marginal slum dweller, is directly related to 
economic insecurity. In Brazil, 40 percent of the family heads "work with 
irregularity" and another 55 percent are entirely unemployed. In Santiago, 
41 percent of its employable people have been unemployed between four and 
twelve months out of the year (Frank, 1969c:279). Besides the attributes 
of the people, the slum areas are characterized as: (2) spatially periph­
eral areas on the hillside or riverside; (2) with physical deterioration 
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of surroundings; (3) overcrowding and congestion; and (4) with inadequate 
urban services such as water, fuel, light, medical, welfare services, etc. 
In many large cities either the municipal or central government is 
attempting to clear out or improve the slum areas by means of urban renewal 
plans or community development programs. Without a fundamental change in 
the overall social and economic structure of the nations, the misery and 
poverty of the slums and squatter dwellers will remain hidden; under the 
cosmetics of the tentative and superficial administrative measures usually 
taken. The central government must take comprehensive measures to control 
the rural immigrants and increasingly sprawling urban slums which tend to 
surround the urban area. This might be accomplished by: (1) population 
redistribution policies, with a nation-wide reallocation of essential 
functions and resources; (2) integrative linkages with regional plans; (3) 
providing the unemployed and uwueremployed with employment opportunities 
for themselves: and (4) community development under an effective urban re­
newal plan. 
Industrialization, the slow rate of economic development, urban un­
employment, poor housing, and inadequate services: all these factors have 
significantly affected the growth of crime in urban areas. This is another 
adverse effect of urbanization in the developing countries. Delinquency 
and crime rates are always lower in rural than in urban areas in developed 
countries, and a similar situation exists in the developing countries 
(Clinard, 1968). After studying the urbanization process In Denmark, 
Christiansen (1960) concluded it could be predicted that countries in which 
the process of industrialization and urbanisation continues, will experience 
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a further Increase In crime and delinquency. Throughout the Third World 
pronounced differences have been found between the urban and rural areas 
in the Incidence of crime and delinquency (Cllnard, 1968:81-99). 
In Iraq In 1969, nine out of ten convicted juvenile offenders came from 
urban areas (Chambers and Barker, 1971). 
Delinquency and crime are not only concentrated In the urban areas of 
any country, but also tend to occur In the largest of these cities, for 
crime rates tend to vary directly with the city size. Crime rates appear 
to be Increasing at a more rapid rate in cities (Cllnard, 1968: 
83). These social pathological phenomena seem to be closely related to 
the increasing economic distress In the urban slum areas. These deteriorat­
ing and overcrowded urban areas are becoming a hotbed for the breakdown 
of family life of the poor, the rise of prostitution for their daughters 
and wives, delinquency and crime, problems of psychic maladjustmentj and 
dehumanizatlon. In addition to external vulnerability of their children, 
the family heads with economic insecurity are losing parental authority. 
Other traditional social controls of all persons are weakened or broken 
down in the midst of social chaos in the urban slum areas. 
All things considered, in the urban congestion of the developing 
countries, the apathy, dehumanizatlon, and fatalism, are additional social 
phenomena which obstruct the constructive human mobilization necessary for 
development. The modem political systems of many noncommunlst developing 
countries are, in principle, based upon the idea of Western style democracy. 
However, in the process of rapid urbanization during the past independence 
period, the political system of democracy in the developing countries has 
166 
been rooted in the urban middle and upper classes, rather than In the 
majority of the population In the rural areas or In the lower class urban 
areas. What counts as public opinion, in other words, is synonymous with 
the voice of the upper and middle classes. Public opinion is manipulated 
by the urban mass media, which is owned and operated by these same 
classes. As a result, the socially and economically alienated majority 
are apathetic toward politics and are moving away from real participation 
in political activities. 
All-in-all, the far-reaching impacts of these current demographic 
mechanisms in developing countries seem to remain stable or worsen without 
any structural change in the population composition, population distribu­
tion, or in the total socioeconomic structure. 
B. Qualitative Aspects of Population 
Poverty, misery, and unemployment are the end results of underdevelop­
ment. They are not underdevelopment itself. In fact, most poor countries 
today a~£ underdeveloped; Poverty and its related low living standards 
are concurrent with the problems of underdevelopment, or are indicators of 
underdevelopment. The previous section dealt with the demographic 
mechanisms of underdevelopment which could be quantitatively expressed. 
This section is devoted to the qualitative aspects of population, espe­
cially two aspects of the quality of life; health status and the educa­
tional attainment of the population of less developed countries. 
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1. Health and nutrition 
To an ordinary individual» health, long life, and material well-being 
are generally conceived as necessary conditions for human happiness. 
Health Itself is an end and means in life, because everyone values health 
and a healthy person leads a normal everyday life; participating in various 
productive activities. 
With the advancements in medical science, most of the previously fatal 
epidemic and Infectious diseases have been brought under control in both 
the developed and less developed countries. In addition, extensive public 
sanitation, personal hygiene, and generally Improved living standards have 
substantially reduced mortality and, in turn. Increased the average human 
longevity. 
Table 21 shows the major regional differentials of crude death rate 
and life esq^eetancy at birth in 1972. Though there has been a general de­
crease In mortality rate and Increase in life expectancy at birth, there 
are still substantial discrepancies In mortality and life expectancy 
between developed regions and poor regions. Among 109 countries, the 
regional average crude death rate ranged from 10.1 in developed North 
Atlantic region to 22.0 in Black Africa. In 1972 life expectancy at birth 
varied from 43.4 years in Black Africa to 71.3 years In the developed 
regions, with a world average of 58 years. 
It may be worthwhile to look at the availability of medical systems 
of hospital beds and physicians In world distribution as a factor in the 
differentials In average human longevity and mortality rate between the 
developed and less developed countries. Table 22 gives the aggregate 
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Table 21. Differentials of mortality rates (per 1,000) and life 
expectancy by major region, 1972.® 
Regions 
Crude Birth Rate Life Expectancy 
Min. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max. 
World total (109)^ 5.0 14.0 29.0 35.0 58.0 75.0 
Black Africa (29) 14.0 22.0 29.0 35.0 43.4 55.0 
North Africa and Middle 7.0 14.0 20.0 45.0 54.6 67.0 
East® (13) 
Asia (17) 5.0 11.0 27.0 40.0 60.6 73.0 
Central and Latin 6.0 10.6 18.0 47.0 61.0 72.0 
America (22) 
North Atlantic Region (28) 7.0 10.1 14.0 67.0 71.3 75.0 
^Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix. 
^Numbers in parentheses is number of countries in the region. 
^Includes Israel and Asia with Japan. 
^Includes Australia and New Zealand. 
averages of accessibility of hospital beds and physicians among the major 
regions of the world. 
In terms of population per hospital bed, the Asian countries have a 
severe shortage of hospital establishments with an average of 1,280 persons 
per hospital bed. This is more than ten times greater than developed 
countries, with 114 persons per bed. Sub-Sahara African countries show a 
serious shortage of medical practitioners with 26,520 persons per physician 
as ccapared with an average of 715 persons per physician in the Western 
countries. Moreover, in less developed countries, medical facilities and 
personnel are usually concentrated in the large cities. Therefore, most 
of the rural areas of countries with low urbanization are almost entirely 
excluded from the benefits of modem medicine, partly because of its 
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Table 22. Outlook of population per hospital bed and population per 
physician by major region, 1970.® 
Population Per Bed Population per Phylclan 
Regions Mln. Mean Max. Mln. Mean Maxf 
World average (108)^ 67 633 7,051 390 9,298 92,759 
Black Africa (29) 98 915 3,420 5,104 26,520 92,759 
North Africa and Middle 210 711 2,760 1,070 4,264 13,156 
East^ (13) 
Asia (16) 79 1,280 7,501 390 6,379 27,655 
Central and Latin 98 405 1,350 504 2,619 13,210 
America (22) . 
North Atlantic Region (28) 67 114 218 461 715 1,064 
^Source: See the secondary sources listed In Appendix. 
^Numbers In parentheses Is number of countries In the region. 
^Includes Israel and Asia with Japan. 
^Includes Australia and New Zealand. 
substantial distance from the rural villages and partly because of medical 
costs. The poor rural population Is more susceptible to various diseases 
because of inadequate diets, poor sanitation, and substandard living con­
ditions. In general trends, nonetheless. It Is true that the average life 
expectancy has Increased. However, the sheer extension of life with In­
creased life-expectancy does not Imply a healthy life. Unfortunately 
morbidity statistics are not as available In most of the low income coun­
tries as they are in high income couutrles and existent statistics are 
merely rough estimates of doubtful reliability. 
Man is mortal with a limited life-span, whether he is rich or poor, 
though modern medicine has helped to extent life-expectsncy to s limited 
degree. Under ordinary circumstances, a man dies of certain Illnesses. 
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On the basis of both causes of deaths and morbidity patterns, a hypotheti­
cal relationship between morbidity patterns and the level of national 
economic affluence was drawn in Figure 1. This assumes that there is a 
certain degree of association between the levels of living standards with 
the relative incidences of diseases. In other words, chronic illnesses, 
other age-related Illnesses, and mental illnesses, which are not neces­
sarily a direct cause of death, have a statistically higher proportion of 
incidence in the high income countries than in the lower income countries. 
Infectious diseases and other endemic or parasitic sufferings have a com­
paratively higher proportion in the countries with lower living standards 
than those of chronic illnesses. 
Level of 
Economic 
Affluence 
A. 
High 
Chronic and mental 
Illnesses, aging 
related 
Low 
Infectious or endemic 
disease, parasites 
High Low 
Proportion of Incidence 
of Diseases 
Figure 1. A hypothetical relationship between morbitity patterns and 
levels of economic affluence. 
171 
Health status Is affected by various factors such as: the degree of 
sanitation and hygiene, preventive medicine, appropriate exercise, etc. 
The basis for health maintenance Is adequate nutrition. Malnutrition and 
undernourishment are fatal to the status of health. 
Regional differentials in average dally caloric Intake per person 
range from the regional average of 2,145 calories In Black Africa, to 
3,109 In developed regions. The difference between the national aggregate 
average caloric intake at the bottom and at the top Is more than double, 
as shown In Table 23. According to experts in the nutrition field, the 
normal requirement of a full grown person of 154 pounds is 3,000 calories 
per day (Borgstrom, 1970:30). Brown (1954) gives us a more detailed 
example about calorie-intake. Man requires energy to survive and obtains 
energy by ingesting organic matters (food) and burning them with oxygen. 
Although the basic quantity of energy needed to maintain li&s depends upon 
sex, age, body weight, and certain other biological characteristics, a man 
lying in bed and performing no external work requires about 1,700 calories 
per day. If he works for approximately 16 hours at light physical activity, 
the total dally requirement of energy becomes about 2,600 calories. In 
terms of body weight, a man of 125 pounds engaging in moderate activity 
requires about 2,600 calories per day, while a man weighing 200 pounds re­
quires 3,700 calories per day. A man weighing 165 pounds requires about 
2,800 calories per day for light work, about 3,300 calories for moderate 
work, and as much as 4,500 calories for heavy physical labor (Brown, 1954: 
107-109). 
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Table 23. Differentials in caloric intake per day and protein Intake per 
day by major region, 1970.* 
Regions 
Calorie Intake Protein Intake (Gram) 
Kin. Mean Max. Min. Mean Max. 
World average (109)^ 1,700 2,477 3,510 3 67.2 108 
Black Africa (29) 1,700 2,145 2,430 33 51.1 80 
North Africa and Middle 1,890 2,313 2,770 41 61.3 78 
EastC (13) 
Asia (17) 1,920 2,306 2,990 3 57.5 92 
Central and Latin 1,760 2,312 3,160 45 60.3 105 
America (22) 
North Atlantic Region 2,770 3,109 3,510 76 89.8 108 
(28) 
^Source: See the secondary sources listed In Appendix. 
^Numbers in parentheses is number of countries in the region. 
^Includes Israel and Asia with Japan. 
^Includes Australia and New Zealand. 
Figure 2 shows a presumed relationship between caloric Intake per 
day and productivity, replacing Brown's different types of work. This 
assumes that a certain minimum energy intake is required simply for physi­
cal maintenance and, up to a certain amount, the productivity of physical 
and mental activity is roughly proportional to the additional calorie-
intake per day. Human endeavor and productivity depends, to a considerable 
extent, upon adequate food. Conversely, lack of food resources continues 
ÊÛ draatleally limit and retard labor productivity» 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization's studies of food 
consumption patterns, at a very conservative estimate, some twenty percent 
of the people in developing countries are undernourished and sixty percent 
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Productivity 
High 
Productivity 
of man of 
165 pounds 
Medium 
Low 
X 
1,500 3,000 A,5'00 
Amount of Caloric Intake 
Figure 2. A hypothetical relatlonthip between amount of caloric Intake 
and productivity. 
are malnourished. Undernutrition refers to inadequacy in quantity of food 
available to an individual, on the one hand, and malnutrition refers to 
the quality of diets, on the other hand. The direct effects of under­
nourishment over a long period srs: less of weightj susceptibility to 
disease, and low physical activity. A malnourished person may or may not 
be undernourished. The person who is undernourished, however, will very 
likely be malnourished. Both are hungry (Simon and Simon,.1973:xvi). 
In his food man does need adequate calories plus a number of vitamins 
and other nutrients» Proteins, however, are the key compounds. Proteins 
with amino acids are needed for the growth, repair, and building up of 
human bodies; while calories are needed to maintain the physiological 
metabolism internally and for human activities in daily life. Protein 
deficiency is a direct cause of various fatal diseases. During recent 
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decades, protein deficiency diseases have come to prevail in most of the 
low income countries and to be regarded as the chief nutritional deficiency 
of the world. A calorie shortage causes a man to look tired and lazy, 
lacking a sense of responsibility, devoid of all ambition, and, finally, 
low in productivity. Lack of protein in the first weeks and months of a 
child's life Induces brain damage, which can never be repaired. This 
protein deficiency results in sustained detrimental effects on mental 
capability, learning, etc. (Simon and Simon, 1973:58-59). 
From the above examination of the health and nutritional status of 
low income countries and the importance of it in human life» promoting the 
health status by Improving health delivery systems, eradicating under­
nutrition, and preventing malnutrition are of immediate and urgent concern. 
These concerns are the means to develop productivity and creativity of 
human potentials, as well as an ends in themselves in the quality of life. 
2. Education 
Education may be considered a social institution specifically designed 
for the socialization of new generations. Broadly speaking, its objective 
is to awaken and develop those physical. Intellectual, and moral states 
in the child, which are required of him by his society. The socialization 
of new generations necessarily takes place in all societies. It takes 
varying foms la respect to the social groups and institutions, and is 
respect to its own dynamics and complexity. The function of education is 
to transmit knowledge and cultural heritage to the new generation for the 
continuity of the culture. It also contributes to new discovery and in­
novation, on the basis of the accumulation of knowledge, by analyzing 
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situations In terms of the needs and Instruments which might lead to 
changing society. 
Historically, much of the educational effort has been concentrated 
upon the children of the upper stratum of the social ladder. Wherever 
there is a system of social stratification, there is a corresponding dif­
ferentiation within the educational system. In other words, educational 
differences in kind and quality are closely related to social stratifica­
tion. The children of high status families are, in general, better 
qualified for higher education. 
Every educational system historically has been, and still is, selec­
tive in one way or another. The coming of mass society revolutionized 
the whole educational system, even in the less developed countries. "The 
revolution of rising expectations" of the people in a wide social spectrum, 
along with governmental policy introducing compulsory education, isakes 
education accessible to all. Therefore, education, like health, becomes 
an ends and a means for development; where development is considered pri­
marily as economic, political, and social development. 
In the developmental perspective, the educational institution con­
tributes to the transformation of potential human resources into actual 
resources: the most essential element in societal development. In the 
long-range view, the educational effort is a human investment, although 
structured and determined by the given sccloeccnoiBic conditions. The 
Impacts are far-reaching for socioeconomic productivity, national manpower 
composition and quality, and socioeconomic stratification (especially the 
industrial and occupational structure). All these impacts of education 
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are regarded as valid social Indicators of development and quality of 
life. 
Most of the less developed countries have been faced with a paradoxical 
situation of a severe shortage of necessary and qualified manpower In the 
midst of the overflowing unemployed and underemployed. Educational policy 
as a means for development may not be the only way. Surely It Is one of 
the most urgent and possible ways open to socioeconomic development In the 
less developed countries. Without effective and appropriate human develop­
ment through the educational system, economic growth will result In the 
failure of societal development. In other words» the sheer number of grow­
ing untrained labor forces Is not necessarily conceived to be human capital 
formation. Rather, the problems of unemployment and underemployment is 
one of the most pressing social problems, especially in the less developed 
countries with limited labor market and lack of capital, when these mas­
sive labor forces are well trained they will eventually turn into the 
valuable formation of human capital which is essential in the development 
program. 
Because of the fact that formal education in the new states was 
primarily Introduced by colonizers or borrowed from the outside, the under­
lying objectives of the formal educational system was generally not for 
the Indigenous people. Bather, it was deliberately used for the purposes 
of colonial governing; by training clerks and a limited nts^er of admin­
istrative functionaries. Often, separate school systems were established 
for the children of the colonial rulers. The direction of higher education 
established under colonial rule largely agreed with the cultural 
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inheritance from precolonial times; that is» an education producing a 
traditionally highly valued literary type, as well as an attitude con­
temptuous of manual work. The colonial formal educational system produced 
a handful of identity-lost, educated elites, while neglecting the formal 
education of the masses of people who were left an illiterate society. 
The colonial heritage in the educational system and its end result still 
remain Intact in many of the less developed countries. 
The reliability of the statistics of illiteracy rates, especially in 
the developing regions, is highly doubtful. Table 24 gives partial 
features of the literacy and vocational enrollment rates in secondary and 
third level education around 1970. The national aggregate average literacy 
rate in Black African countries is less than 15 percent of those 15 years 
old and above, while mostly former colonial rulers average almost 95 per­
cent literacy. In the vocational enrollment rates in secondary education, 
the lowest rate is only 1 percent of total enrollment in secondary educa­
tion, with one country each both in Asia and Black Africa. The national 
aggregate average ratés of vocâtloûâl an&ollseat are generally very Ice; 
13.1 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 8.9 percent in the Middle East, II.9 
percent in Asia, and 19.7 percent in the Latin American countries, compared 
to 45.6 percent in the Western developed countries. 
For the national development of the less developed countries, techni­
cal end vocational educated personnel are needed. There is a serious 
shortage of skilled laborers, technicians, and agriculturalists. The 
responsibility of the unbalanced and maladjusted education system with 
respect to socioeconomic needs is, of course, not entirely caused by 
Table 24. Differential percent of literacy, vocational enrollment rate in secondary education, 
science and engineering students in the third level by major region, 1970.* 
Literacy Vocational Enrollment Vocational Engineering 
(No. of (No. of (No. of 
Coun­ Coun­ Coun­
Regions tries) Min. Me{in Max. tries) Min. Mean Max. tries) Min. Mean Max. 
World (109) 5 57.1 100 (103) 1 22.3 99 (101) 0.0 35.5 100.0 
Black Africa ( 29) 5 14.8 39 ( 26) 1 13.1 95 ( 23) 0.0 29.9 100.0 
Middle East^ ( 13) 15 39.8 86 ( 13) 2 8.9 34 ( 13) 11.6 31.9 50.7 
Asiac < 17) 8 65.7 98 ( 15) 1 11.9 44 ( 15) 17.3 34.4 55.4 
Latin America ( 22) 20 68.8 91 ( 22) 4 19.7 55 ( 22) 10.1 34.8 49.0 
Western Regions ( 28) 62 94.6 100 ( 27) 16 45.6 99 ( 28) 24.0 42.8 61.0 
Source; See the secondary sources listed in Appendix. 
^Includes Israel. 
^Includes Japan. 
^Includes Australia and New Zealand and ejccludes the United States and Soviet Russia. 
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colonial policy. It Is partly caused by the mentality of the ruling 
elites of the less developed countries 
Without substantiating the absolute numbers in distribution, the 
relative proportion of percentage is likely to distort the real facts. 
The percent of science and engineer majors in the third level of education 
suggests some ideas about the distribution of students at college level by 
major regions. One country in Africa shows 100 percent of the university 
students majoring in science and engineering because there is only one 
university, which is based on science and technology. In addition to this 
kind of pitfall in the statistics, the real number of universities and 
students are generally very small in terms of the proportion of the cor­
responding age group in the less developed countries. Some countries in 
Asia and many of Latin America have placed comparatively more emphasis on 
higher education. 
Table 25 was tabulated by the Population Council and is based on the 
UNESCO criterion of literacy, i.e., the ability both to read and write. 
Female literacy is much lower thaa male literacy, especially in developing 
traditional countries. According to the Population Council reports, most 
of the developing countries with a high proportion of literacy are in Latin 
America. Several Asian countries have over 75 percent literacy, including 
the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. In the developed 
countries, even female literacy is practically universal. 
In a sense, universal literacy is one step toward national consolida­
tion by means of the development of a common, or national, language. Uni­
versal literacy is almost a precondition for social development, especially 
for those newly Independent countries with multi-ethnic and multi-language 
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Table 25. Percent of adult females literacy 
among 74 selected developing 
countries» 1974.® 
Percent of 
Adult Female 
Literacy 
Number Among 
74 Selected 
Developing 
Countries 
Less than 25.1 13 
25.1 to 50 10 
50.1 to 75 15 
75.1 and over 12 
Unavailable 2^ 
Total 74 
^Source: Population Council (1974:89). 
^Most of these countries are likely to 
have a low proportion literate. 
populations. In this regard, literacy serves as a valuable means for de­
velopment because it is needed for acquiring higher skills in all occupa­
tions, for efficiency in implementing development policies and for acquir­
ing more rational attitudes in dally life. Illiterate persons are likely 
to be left economically dependent, unemployed, underemployed» and stand 
in the way of development. 
Although educational policies vary from country to country, and often 
within a country, school enrollment in both age groups of 6-11 years and 
12-17 years increased greatly during 1960-1970, as shown in Table 26. In 
the less developed regions, boys enrolled In age group 6-11 increased from 
54.4 percent to 68.6 percent during 1960-1970, In addition to continuing 
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Table 26. Percent of all boys and all girls enrolled in schools at ages 
6-11, 12-17, and 18-29, as estimated for 1960 and 1970 accord­
ing to UNESCO.* 
Percent of Boys Percent of Girls 
in School in School 
Area 1960 1970 1960 1970 
AGED 6-11 YEARS 
World total^ 66.7 75.8 54.8 63.8 
More developed regions^ 90.4 92.9 90.5 93.2 
Less developed regions 54.4 68.6 36.4 51.6 
South Asia 56.2 71.7 33.4 49.4 
Africa 40.9 51.8 25.1 36.5 
Latin America 59.0 71.9 58.8 73.0 
AGED 12-17 YEARS 
World total** 45.7 55.1 35.9 43.7 
More developed regions 79.5 87.3 76.1 85.5 
Less developed regions 27.6 39.4 14.5 23.7 
South Asia 26.6 37.5 11.6 19.3 
Africa 23.0 35.8 11.1 19.5 
Latin America 37.0 50.4 32.4 46.8 
AGED 18-29 YEARS 
World total^ 5.9 9.3 3.0 5.8 
More developed regions 10.5 16.4 6.0 11.6 
Less developed regions 2.9 5.2 1.0 2.5 
South Asia 2.9 4.8 .9 2.0 
Africa 1.4 3.4 .4 1,1 
Latin America 4.7 9.1 2.9 6.5 
^Source: United Nations (1974a:28). 
^Not including China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Mongolia. 
growth in the absolute number of school age children. Enrollment for those 
aged 12=17 years increased from 2?>6 percent to 39.A percent during the 
same period. In the more developed regions and in Latin America, the 
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enrollment ratio of girls slightly exceeds that of boys at age 6-11 and 
does not fall far short of boys at age 12-17. Advanced education is some­
what less accessible to young women than to young men, although the dif­
ference in that respect may tend to diminish with time. By contrast, in 
South Asia and Africa, enrollment ratios of girls fall far short of boys 
at age 6-11 and at age 12-17. Women, aged 18-29 in advanced education, 
are still exceptionally few. There are enormous gaps in the enrollment 
ratios between more developed and less developed regions, especially in 
the higher levels of education. The gap in ages 12-17 is more than double 
in 1970 and the gap in age 18-29 is more than three times for young men 
in the same year. 
The educational establishment, since obtaining Independence in most 
of the underdeveloped areas, is still an expansion of the earlier colonial 
system with a few marginal changes in nature and technique. The earlier 
graduates from secondary and tertiary education, which is a general educa­
tion oriented toward literature, law, and the other humanities, could fill 
vacancies in governmental administrative positions when colonial personnel 
withdrew. The recent graduates from the expanded general educational 
system are overflowing the limited job market. They await opportunities, 
remaining idlY the cities as "educated unemployed", becoming the 
targets of the social complaints of inhibitors and opportunists. 
In the above case, education is not only wasteful In time and money 
but also is dysfunctional for development. Education, with due structural 
reform in terms of socioeconomic needs and long-term perspectives, can only 
be effective for development if, at the same time, all the social. 
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economic, political, and cultural systems work together to provide suffi­
cient job opportunities for the educated people and financial support to 
enhance quality of education. 
Aside from the problems of educational systems, the quality of educa­
tion in the less developed countries Is quite low due to obsolete methods 
of teaching, shortage of qualified personnel, lack of teaching materials, 
overcrowded school buildings, etc. According to Table 27, the national 
average percent of public educational expenditure of the governmental 
budget is around 15-20 percent throughout the world. In most of the less 
developed countries, public education is predominant and their total gov­
ernment budget is smaller when compared with the rich countries. In de­
veloped countries private schools occupy a much larger proportion of the 
educational system, in addition to an appreciably larger total government 
budget. This implies that the percent of the government budget expended 
on public education is probably financially Insufficient for the quality 
education necessary in developing countries, in comparison to the rich 
countries. 
Besides a large proportion of unqualified teaching personnel, the 
aggregate average pupil-teacher ratios are higher in the less developed 
countries than in the developed Western countries, as shown in Table 27. 
The teacher shortage and lack of classrooms is particularly acute. This 
lack has resulted in the Introduction of shift systems in various Asian 
states. For instance, two or three shifts have operated in some schools, 
especially in the large cities of South Korea. 
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Table 27. Differential percent of pupil-teacher ratio for primary educa­
tion, and public expenditure on education to government budget 
by major region, 1970.* 
Percent of Educational 
Expenditure to Budget Pupil-Teacher Ratio 
Regions No. Min. Mean Max. No. Min. Mean Max. 
World 106 3.4 20.0 79.0 103 11 34.4 65 
Black Africa 28 7.2 16.8 27.2 26 25 43.8 65 
Middle East® 12 9.9 15.1 25.2 13 13 32.1 48 
Asia 16 4.2 16.7 28.1 16 17 37.1 56 
Latin America ^ 22 9.3 19.3 35.0 22 19 36.3 53 
Western Regions 28 3.4 16.2 79.0 27 11 23.5 34 
^Source: See the secondary sources listed in Appendix. 
^Includes Israel and Asia with Japan. 
^Includes Australia and New Zealand. 
The shortage of qualified personnel is not just limited to the teach­
ing personnel. Recently, a significant number of badly needed technicians 
and professionals, vital to development, have emigrated to Europe and 
North America. Many of the less developed countries have also lost man­
power as many of their students studying abroad do not return home. Between 
1957 and 1963, Taiwan had a net loss of 6,900 students (Stein, 1972:89). 
In 1967, 44 percent of the junior medical staff in the United Klndgom came 
from overseas; mainly from India and Pakistan (Godfrey, 1970). Higher 
salaries abroad, especially In the United States, undoubtedly are the 
major determinants of 'Israin drain" from the less develvpsd countries. 
In terms of manpower planning, a basis for calculating various educa­
tional costs and social needs must be provided ^ ich is consistent with 
the preconditions for national development in a broad context. It must 
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also be able to pinpoint, in real terms, the types and quantitlss of edu­
cational resources required and where potential bottlenecks might arise. 
Modern development has been achieved due to advancements in knowledge and 
in technology — which has been accomplished through development of human 
potential resources. In comparing changes in total inputs and total out­
puts over time, output changes could not entirely be attributed to the 
growth of inputs. Thus the residual can be regarded as the effective 
human capital formation through educational processes of training, learn­
ing, etc. 
C. Social Conditions 
In the previous section, we have analyzed the levels of living and 
qualitative aspects of population in the underdeveloped countries. This 
section is concerned with such social conditions as: attitudes, behaviors, 
and the social institutional aspects of underdevelopment. Besides economic 
criterion such as low levels of living standards in the general popula-
tlou, êû "underdeveloped" country is usually chsrsctsrissd by overall 
Bocisl conditions of the country which are evaluated as unfavorable, or 
undesirable, from a developmental perspective. These unfavorable social 
conditions are perceived to be obstacles to development; since all of these 
social forces contribute to the preservation of stability in social 
syatarns. 
All these social factors are considered to be closely interrelated in 
a social system, especially in the underdeveloped countries where economic 
and social behaviors are not well differentiated. Economic development 
cannot be viewed simply as the function of economic inputs alone in the 
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underdeveloped country. Rather It may well be Influenced by the other 
social conditions. Thus, the Interdependence of the various social con­
ditions which Is general characteristics of a social system must be taken 
Into account In development planning. In a way, development Implies 
either the elimination of the unfavorable social obstacles, or the Im­
provement of the existing conditions In a favorable direction. 
Among the various underdeveloped social conditions, this section 
will be confined to the three aspects: (1) socio-political atmosphere, 
(2) socio-economic inequalities, and (3) the land-tenure systems. Many 
developing countries have been chronically suffering from political tur­
moils, and accompanying social disturbances, which are believed to con­
tribute profoundly to the shrinkage of productive economic activities. 
One of the important sources of such political instability is believed to 
be the prevalence of political corruptions of political leaders, 
The second problem of socioeconomic inequalities is perceived, not 
only as unfavorable to development programs in terms of the social mobili­
zation of the masses of people, but also as the most serious social problem 
in terms of social Justice and rising egalitarian Ideals. However, in 
the subsistence economies of underdeveloped countries, the problam of 
economic inequalities are not Just the sociological problem of relative 
deprivation, but the problem of the absolute deprivation of masses of 
people who are illiterate, undernourished, often of ill-health, and who 
live in destitution. 
Most of the underdeveloped countries are nonindustrlallzed, agrarian 
societies. The largest proportion of population find their livelihood in 
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agriculture. Land Is, of course, one of the basic factors of production 
for food and other agricultural products. Thus, land-tenure system becomes 
to a large degree one of the most Important sources of economic Inequal­
ities In the underdeveloped agrarian societies. 
1. Political corruption 
In most of the underdeveloped countries, corruption of politicians 
and civil seirvants Is rampant and a common phenomenon. These corrupt 
practices are usually In the form of bribery, graft, and embezzlement on 
the part of both politicians and administrators; and fraud, nepotism, and 
favoritism In the social relationships among the ordinary citizens. 
People generally recognize the prevalence of political corruption In 
the less developed countries and the frequent revelation of these alleged 
corrupt practices through the mass media or some sort of ad hoc Investi­
gative committee. However, Intensive and scientific Inquiries on this 
subject are comparatively sterile. One reason is that corruption, by 
naturs, is nos ssnlfest but veiled; It remain# concealed and kept secret, 
because the techniques es^loyed in corruption are applied saeretly. The 
consequences of the corrupt practices are also camouflaged as far as 
possible; not only the event Itself but the causes and effects must be 
veiled. The corruption of ruling classes Is one of the most serious social 
and political Issues in the developing countries. Distrust and cynicism 
permeats the majority of the citizens and intellectuals working against the 
ruling elite and government. 
In terms of a dictionary definition, "political corruption" means the 
misuse or improper use of public power for private benefit. Corruption, 
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as Roy indicated, denotes "the corrosion of traditional values — thus 
moral decay and the disintegration of standards of proper behavior" (Roy, 
1970:86). However, functionalist theorists view corrupt practices as 
functional to integration of the political system and as a complemental 
role for the imperfect market: "such activities as usury, blackmarketlng, 
and smuggling, though patently illegal and immoral, have been identified 
as adaptations to market forces working to equilibrium" (Roy, 1970:89). 
Though he plainly criticizes such behavioral patterns as characteris­
tics of underdevelopment, Myrdal views these corrupt practices and the 
spoils systems they generate as functional to the societies in which 
"there is no market for services and goods" (Myrdal, 1968:948). In this 
regard, fardai even attempted to obscure the distinction between gifts and 
bribes. To outsiders, it may seem that there is no clear distinction 
between gifts and bribery. In fact, the inulgencus people Hell perceive 
which is gift and which is not. Just as the symbiotic relationship is 
different from the parasitic relationship, so a gift is different from 
bribery in corrupt practice. 
What is a mutually beneficial contribution to each party in the 
bribery case is not necessarily beneficial to the total society. The 
functionalist's interpretation of corruption in developing countries, in 
terms of misconceived and confused cultural behavior, fails to explain the 
underlying phenomenon and leads to erreaeQus concluslens « Corruption im­
plies misconduct, which has two sides of reality; one is a private benefit 
or, at best, is beneficial to a few, while the other obstructs the majority 
or is harmful to the totality. In this regard, corruption Is not 
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universally defined In terms of any legal or scientific concept, but cor­
ruption is what is called corruption by the Indigenous people. It is also 
true that corruption is prevalent in developing countries and that it is 
growing among higher officials and politicians. 
The causes of the growing phenomenon of corruption in the underde­
veloped countries can be listed as follows: In the first place, there is 
undoubtedly the legacy from the traditional patrlarchical-patrimonial 
system. Secondly, the salaries of governmental officials in developing 
countries are generally too low to match the corresponding social status. 
Moreover, the social status of the officials is relatively higher than 
manual workers or other services. These two factors together are likely 
to Increase the possibilities of bribery and graft. Thirdly, some of 
these government officials are in the position of administrating dis­
cretionary controls over private sectors which were originally designed 
to stimulate enterprise and investments for economic development. These 
officials are likely to be attracted by the temptation of corruption. 
Fourthly, on many occasions, large-scale foreign aid has been misused 
through the corrupt process. Finally, the businessmen and entrepreneurs 
in developing countries have been active clients to the higher officials 
and politicians. Under these circumstances, corruption is a natural social 
consequence and unavoidable in less developed countries. 
The effects of corruption are never favorable for development as well 
as social order. Corruption itself is wasteful. The earnings through 
corrupt practice are seldom used for productive purposes, such as invest­
ment, but often are used for conspicuous consumption or capital-flight 
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for later security. It is not only unproductive economically, but it is 
inefficient from the administrative viewpoint, by either obstructing or 
delaying the processes of government. 
Corrupt practices disintegrate popular mobilization and demoralize the 
spirits of the people. As a result, the effectiveness of a corrupt govern­
ment is seriously weakened in national development efforts. Most of the 
corrupted regimes themselves often pave the way to an irregular transfer 
of power with growing social disturbances. In resistance to the threaten­
ing political challenge, most of the corrupted regimes follow the only 
alternative way, ultimately resorting to a rigid, authoritarian dictator­
ship. The more often they are challenged by military coup attempts, 
student's anti-government demonstrations, and other oppositions, the more 
rigidly repressive measures the authoritarian regime takes. 
Table 28 shows the distribution of power transition types among 72 
developing countries, excluding socialist countries, as of 1970. Only 28 
countries out of 72 could manage to transfer power in regular ways, such 
as a general election or legitimately establishing new cabinets. The other 
39 countries experiences irregular transfers of power by means other than 
constitutionally legitimate ways. 
In Table 29, almost 60 percent of 72 developing countries have ex­
perienced successful coup Incidences once or more than twice. Table 30 
indicates the types of socio-political disturbances among 72 countries of 
the Third World. Chaotic civil war or organized social movement, such as 
violent anti-government demonstrations, marked 58.3 percent of the 72 
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Table 28. Transition of power In 72 developing 
countries, as of 1970.* 
Number of 
Type Countries Percent 
Regular transfer 28 38.9 
Irregular transfer 39 54.2 
Dictorial or monarchical _5 6.9 
Total 72 100.0 
^Source: See the secondary sources listed In 
Appendix. 
Table 29. Distribution of coup Incidences of 72 de­
veloping countries, as of 1970.* 
Number of Number of 
Incidences Countries Percent 
None 29 40.3 
One time 18 25.0 
Two times 9 12.5 
Three times 5 6.9 
More than four times 11 15.3 
Total 72 100.0 
^Source: See the secondary sources listed In 
Appendix. 
developing countries. Only 10 countries out of 72 have not suffered from 
such serious social and political Instabilities. 
The revelation of increasing political corruption at a colossal 
scale in developing countries is nothing but one of the manifest aspects 
of underdeveloped structures. As Myrdal pointed out, "people^s beliefs 
about corruption and the emotions attached to those beliefs are themselves 
192 
Table 30. Distribution of communal Instabilities of 
72 developing countries, as of 1970.* 
Number of 
Type Countries Percent 
Riots or guerrillas 11 15.3 
Civil war or organized 
anti-government 
42 58.3 
Ethnic violence 5 6.9 
Revolution 4 5.6 
None jJD 13.9 
Total 72 100.0 
^Source; See the secondary sources listed In 
Appendix. 
Important social facts" (ifyrdal, 1970:230). It Is not easy to eradicate 
the social problems of corruption and to make clear the people's beliefs 
about corruption under the present circumstances. 
Political systems, no matter how effective, will not likely function 
properly without a restoration of confidence in the political leadership. 
Under corrupt government, the integrity of the politicians and the offi­
cials is seriously damaged, and confidence in the government (Including 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches) is weakened. As a 
result, the majority of people become indifferent to governmental programs 
and plans. People no longer trust in their government. Taken all to­
gether, as Myrdal indicated, social indiscipline as characteristic of the 
so-called "soft states" is one of the conspicuous social phenomena in the 
underdeveloped countries (Myrdal, 1970). 
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2. Inequalities 
It is true that in any society, whether underdeveloped or not, an 
individual's place in the social order is defined in terms of his relative 
rank. This rank is a compound of the economic, social, and political 
factors of class, status, and power. According to Parsons (1954), prestige 
is the most important dimension of stratification. Social prestige is 
differentially allocated by the joint product of two factors: the division 
of labor and sets of social values (Parsons, 1954:386-439). A social 
stratum means a subpopulation of individuals with more or less equal status 
in the arranged hierarchy. Every member of a society may be placed in 
these hierarchies, and, hence, a total society can be viewed as consisting 
of a stratified population. 
The functionalist alleges that stratification with inequalities 
serves as integrative function for society in several ways (Davis and 
Moore, 1945:242-249). It may be pointed out that judgmental Interpretation 
is quite different from objective analysis. As Mayhew said, "stratifica­
tion is not a specialized integrative subsystem, but a system that per­
meates the total society and all of its differentiated subsectors" (Mayhew, 
1971:205). 
Inequality among social members is the sine qua non of institutional­
ized stratification systems. Inequality relates to all social, economic, 
and political relationships. Functionalist sociologists regard stratified 
inequalities as functional to the integration of a society. To many 
economists, it is a generally accepted contention of economic development 
that, at least in the initial stages of development, an unequally skewed 
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Income distribution may be favorable to the attainment of a rapid rate of 
economic growth. This argument is based upon the naive assumptions that 
the marginal savings rate is greater in the higher income than in the 
lower income groups, and that the larger savings realized from an unequal 
income distribution will lead to a high rate of investment (Lefeber, 1972: 
133-151). On the contrary, inequality in the less developed countries 
stands as a complex of inhibitions and obstacles to development. In fact, 
the economic inequality in both relative and absolute terms is greater in 
the underdeveloped countries than In the developed countries. The in­
equality between the few top rich and the poor majority is, in itself, the 
characteristics of underdevelopment in developing countries. The issue of 
inequality is not only the problem in development, but it is the very 
matter of social justice. Modernization or development is generally re­
garded as an increase in structural differentiation from a sociological 
point of view (Frledland, 1969:34-84). The increasing structural dif­
ferentiation, however, does not necessarily imply widening inequality. 
Rather, it indicates the featurs of gro^ sg ccsplsxity In social roles^ 
Hence, the structural differentiation is a precondition for increasing 
social mobility. 
However, social inequality in underdeveloped countries is character­
ized by an extreme lack of social mobility; it becomes rigid and tends to 
«Iden disparities in Hoelal privileges. In most underdeveloped new states 
there has been a built-in mechanism that the existing upper strata almost 
automatically remained in power after decolonization, without any funda­
mental change in the colonial social structure. The colonial powers 
allied with the precolonial privileged groups to share their vested 
4 
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Interests In maintaining the economic and social status quo by strengthen­
ing the Inegalltarlan social and economic structure in their colonies. 
Thus, in the newly independent countries, conservative regimes could 
tightly rule their people by preserving the social, economic, and political 
power structure inherited from the colonial times. It is a general rule 
that at the upper strata the systems of stratification more closely link 
all other privileged Institutional spheres than at the lower strata. The 
upper strata is tied to high economic status and higher political power. 
Social inequality stands as a main cause of economic inequality and, at 
the same time, economic inequality reinforces social Inequality. 
Economic Inequality in the underdeveloped countries is serious because 
of absolute deprivation. Extremely concentrated Income in these countries 
stands as a main cause of the misery and poverty of a nation. Table 31 
shows the 1961 income distribution figures for selected dsvelcplng coun­
tries, ranging from the lowest gross national product per capita of $53.6 
in Tanzania to $1,334.9 in Israel. In some Important respects, the lowest 
gross national product group — below $75 — is characterized by compar­
atively more equal distribution. The greatest inequality exists for the 
countries that fall in the $200 to $500 range of per capita gross national 
product. In these countries, the bottom 20 percent of population receive 
an income shared by about 2 percent to less than 5 percent, the lower 60 
percent share an income of about 15 percent tc less than 25 percent; the 
upper 20 percent share from 57 percent to 71 percent, and the top 5 percent 
of the population alone receive an Income share from 28 percent to 60 per­
cent of the gross national product. 
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Table 31. Income share received by various ordinal groups and per capita 
gross national product, 1961, selected countries.* 
1961/per 
Bottom Bottom Top Top Capita 
Countries 20% 60% 20% 5% GNP 
Tanzania 9. 75 29. 25 61. 00 42. 90 53. 6 
Burma 10. 00 36. 00 48. 50 28. 21 66. 3 
Niger 12. 00 35. 00 42. 00 23. 00 74. 0 
Kenya 7. 00 21. 00 64. 00 22. 20 75. 3 
Nigeria 7. 00 23. 00 60. 90 38. 38 75. 6 
Pakistan 6. 50 33. 00 45. 00 20. 00 81. 6 
Sudan 5. 60 29. 30 48. 10 17. 10 97. 9 
Bolivia 4. 00 26. 60 59. 10 35. 70 117. ,0 
Taiwan 4. 50 29. 00 52. 00 24. 10 159. ,8 
Ecuador 6. 30 42. 60 41. 80 21. 50 195. ,7 
Rhodesia 4. 00 20. 00 65. 00 60. 00 203. ,1 
Brazil 3. 50 22. ,70 61. 50 38. 40 214. ,9 
Peru 4. 04 17. 10 67. 60 48. 30 225. ,4 
Columbia 2. 21 15. 88 68. 06 40. 36 282, .1 
Gabon 2. 00 15. ,00 71. 00 47. 00 339. 2 
Mexico 3. 66 21. ,75 58. 04 28. 52 351, .9 
Jamaica 2. ,20 19. ,00 61, ,30 31. ,20 412 = 0 
South Africa 1. ,94 16. 27 57. ,36 39. ,38 454, .0 
Chile 5. ,40 27. ,00 52. ,30 22. ,60 558 .9 
Argentina 7, .00 30, .40 52. 00 29, .40 710 .0 
Venezuela 4, .40 30 .00 47. 10 23. ,20 968 .1 
Israel 6, .80 38, .80 39, >40 11, .20 1,334 .9 
^Source: Adapted from Kravls (1973:00). 
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The income distribution becomes more equal in the higher "gross 
national product per capita" countries. In developing countries, the over­
all income inequality gets worse, especially in the low income bracket. 
In Mexico during 1950-1963, for instance, the income share of the 
lowest two deciles of population substantially decreased from 6.1 percent 
in 1950, to 4.4 percent in 1957, and 3.6 percent in 1963 of the gross 
national product. This implies that the living standards of the lowest 
20 percent got worse rather than improving or, at best, they retain almost 
the same standard of living (if we account for the increase in gross 
national product during the period). There was some redistribution of 
income in the top 5 percent and the tiny 1 percent group during the same 
period. There was not much change in the higher 20 percent — 59.8 percent 
in 1950, 60.4 percent in 1957, and 58.5 percent in 1963 (see Table 32). 
The other developing countries are assumed to be about the same as the 
example of Mexico. 
Table 32^  Estimates of changes in personal income distribution in Mexico, 
1950-1963.3 
Percent of Total Income Received 
Family Unit Rank 1950 1956-57 1963 
Lower than 20 percent 
Higher than 20 percent 
Highest 5 percent 
Highest 1 percent 
6 . 1  
59.8 
40.0 
4.4 
60.4 
36.5 
16.0 
3.6 
58.5 
29.0 
23.0 14.V 
^Source: Adapted from Committee for Economic Development (1966:220). 
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The system of stratification bearing on Inequalities» as differentiated 
Institutional spheres, Is Inseparably connected with the population in 
size, composition, and pattern of mobility. Likewise, Inequality is not 
confined to the overall population but it is patterned by region — 
especially urban and rural differences — on race or ethnic groups, and 
Industrial and occupational differences. In Mexico in 1963, the average 
income per family was 1,278 pesos per month. The average for rural and 
urban families were, respectively, 738 pesos and 1,706 pesos. 
Thus, rural families had an average income equal to only 43 percent 
of that of urban families (Ducoff, 1970:110). From Table 33, almost two-
thirds of Mexican families had a monthly income of less than 1,000 pesos 
Table 33. Percent distribution of families and income by level of family 
income, for the total, urban, and rural areas in Mexico, 1963.* 
Level of Monthly Income Total Kural urban 
per Family (Pesos) Fam. Income Fam. Income Fam. Income 
Under 300 18.4 3.1 29.-0 8.5 10.0 1.2 
301-600 25.1 8.6 32.4 18.8 19.4 5.1 
601 - 1,000 21.6 13.1 22.4 23.2 21.0 9.7 
1,001 - 1,500 10.9 10.6 5.7 9.4 15.0 11.0 
1,501 - 3,000 15.0 24.6 7.8 22.3 20.7 25.5 
3,001 - 10,000 8.1 30.7 2.6 15.7 12.4 35.8 
10,000 and over ,9 9.3 .1 2.1 1.5 11.7 
All families 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
^Source: Adapted from Ducoff (1970:110)» 
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(United States $80) and they share about one-fifth of the gross national 
Income. For the rural families the same monthly income is shared by nearly 
85 percent. The degree of Inequality in Income distribution was not very 
different between the urban and the rural sectors in terms of their 
respective shares of income, but the share of the total income going to 
the half of the Mexican families living in rural areas was only 25.6 per­
cent (Ducoff, 1970:111). 
It is apparent that the purchasing power of lower income families is 
extremely low and, thus, their participation in the market is virtually 
nonexistent in developing countries. In most cases of national economic 
growth in developing countries, the average income gain for the urban 
families is generally ^ uch greater than that for rural families. Thus, 
for this reason, the gap between rural and urban family Incomes has not 
Only widened relatively but absolutely. 
The validity of the usual argument that income inequality is a condi­
tion for saving is doubtful in the present situation of underdeveloped 
countries. The national income, usually concentrated in the nonproductive 
upper class of high government officials, military officers, landlords, 
and a handful of capitalists as well, is not likely to be reinvested in 
ways beneficial for development. As a direct result, many developing 
countries are suffering from difficulties in capital formation for 
economic development in addition to an innate capital deficiency. 
It also cannot be overlooked, from a particular point of view, that 
the prevailing laissez-faire attitude towards distributional aspects of 
development policies lends only convenient support to maintenance of the 
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political and social status quo in many underdeveloped new states. The 
enrichment of few or upper stratum members In underdeveloped countries is 
only possible by leaving the masses of peasantry and urban poors in 
poverty. 
In conclusion, the currently growing Income disparities within a 
country seems more likely to impede healthy economic expansion by operat­
ing as powerful disincentives to public participation in development pro­
grams. The impoverishment of the masses is characterized by lack of 
elementary health care, educational opportunities, and suffering from 
undernourishment and malnutrition. Thus, all these poverty-stricken 
people are likely to be unable to raise their productivity; from a de­
velopmental perspective. 
3. Land ownership and land reform 
Underdeveloped countries are often referred to as nonlndustrialized 
societies. Most underdeveloped countries are, in fact, agrarian societies. 
As of 1970; abcut tec-thirds of the population in developing regions were 
still dependent on agriculture (see Table 14). Ecwever, agriculture in 
most parts of the underdeveloped countries is generally characterized by 
extensive land-use combined with a high man/land ratio. As a result, the 
productivity per acre and productivity per laborer «se exceedingly low in 
most underdeveloped countries compared with some developed countries such 
as Japan and countries in Europe. 
Low productivity in agriculture naturally results in extremely low 
real Incomes for agricultural people. The real Incomes of the farmers in 
most parts of underdeveloped countries are so low that the farmers are 
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not only unable to Invest In improved fanning methods and technological 
Improvement, but many of them are unable to feed themselves. Thus, the 
vicious circle of chronic poverty will continue to operate in the low In­
come rural areas of the underdeveloped countries; unless there Is a funda­
mental change in the agricultural structure. 
It Is generally true that the low productivity per acre in most parts 
of the underdeveloped countries is due to the low levels of agricultural 
technology, and the low productivity per labor force Is due to under-
utillzatlon of the labor force. However, it may be that the underlying 
factors of the low productivities, underutillzation of land and labor 
force, and the low levels of agricultural technology, must be found in 
the social and Institutional structure of the underdeveloped countries. 
Man's relationship to the land, the patterns of land-holding and land 
use, are shaped by the interaction of a complex of forces — climatic, 
economic, cultural, and other social. Thus, the patterns of land control 
and land use in the temperate areas are different from those In the 
tropical and arid areas. Similarly, laws and customs governing inheritance 
have an effect on the distribution of land. 
The established pattern of land ownership is basic to both the social 
organization and to the Institutional structure of rural areas. The 
status hierarchy in most agrarian societies reflects the kind of access 
that different groups have to land, while inulvluual status vlthln these 
groups is dependent upon the amount and quality of land commanded. The 
iimtitutional structure, which formalizes and legitimates the various 
means of control (and the relationship between categories of land users). 
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also determines the accessibility of external Institutions and services 
to various groups. 
According to the World Bank's study of land reform (1974), the systems 
of land ownership and tenure were classlfed Into six major types though In 
many countries examples can be found of more than one type. Three of the 
six types are found in a traditional context: (1) the feudallstic Asian 
type of landlord and tenant system, (2) the feudal Latin American system 
of large farms, and (3) the communal land ownership pattern of many tribal 
groups (especially in Africa). The other three major types have a modem 
context; (4) the private ownership of land common in market economies, 
(5) the state or collective ownership of socialist countries, and (6) the 
plantation or ranch-type. 
Although few data are available, the distribution of land ownership 
is known to be skewed, with the degree of concentration varying with the 
tenure situation types. The Asian, Latin American feudal, and the 
plantation-ranch types generally have high degrees of property concentra­
tion, while the socialist and traditional communal types have low con­
centrations. The market economy type is somewhere in between. 
The distribution of holdings by size is frequently used as a first 
approximation in estimating the distribution of wealth and Income in the 
sgriculturel sector» The skewedness of the distribution of holdings, 
though, does not reflect, precisely, the patterns of the distribution of 
wealth or income. First, all land is not homogeneous in value and quality. 
Second, the distribution of holdings by size is not the same as the 
distribution of ownership of land; in general there is a greater 
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concentration of land ownership than of holdings. In some parts of Asia» 
the distribution of income of rural people may depend largely on the con­
tractual arrangements between owners and tenants, or sharecroppers. But, 
in most cases, the distribution of Income will be more skewed than the 
pattern of holdings. Frequently the income of sharecroppers and renters 
differ very little from that of the landless laborers. 
Conditions governing agriculture vary from country to country. One 
characteristic, common to all, however, is a rapid growth in the rural 
population. Thus, while pressure on the land is increasing, the average 
man/land ratio is worsening. At the same time, nonagricultural employment 
opportunities are not expanding rapidly enough to provide adequate incomes 
for all entrants to the labor market. In many countries, as a consequence, 
massive rural underemployment is accompanied by high rates of open un-
employïùent in the cities and growing inequalities in the overall distribu­
tion of Income. 
The consequential extreme poverty of the many who live on the land, 
and the chronic underemployment and underutillzation of labor under the 
Increasing population pressure require some viable policy measures to 
raise productivity and income in agriculture and, at the same time, to 
absorb more people into employment in the sector. Some countries have 
prospects for expanding the frontier of cultivation to absorb more labor. 
In ether countries; since the conditions that govern access to land are 
questions of major Importance, a policy of land reform through the redis­
tribution of land is required and has been adopted to provide more 
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equitable employment opportunities and to raise productivity per acre and 
per laborer. 
Land reform, by Its nature, Is Interconnected with political, economic, 
and social aspects of development. In general, land reform Is concerned 
with changing the Institutional structure governing man's relationship 
with the land. Thus, land reform Involves Intervention In the prevailing 
patteims of land ownership, and usage. In order to change the structure 
of holdings, Improve land productivity, and broaden the distribution of 
benefits. In practice, however, land reform Is pursued In response to 
political pressures for aocloeconomlc change arising from factors such as 
Increased population, pressure on a limited land base, and/or rising 
egalltarlanlsm. 
Land reform necessarily implies many different kinds of adjustments 
In an array of situations and with great variations in distribution and 
agricultural productivity. In most instances, the considerations of 
social and economic equity are the main concerns. Thus, %Aen there are 
exploitive landlord-tenant systems of the Asian or Latin American feudal 
type, land reform incorporates changes in the rigjhts of tenants, redis­
tribution of ownership to existing tenants, or the replacement of the 
landlord by community ownership. 
A primary conclusion drawn from past experiences with land reform, 
concerns the overriding importance of political factors in securing mean­
ingful change. The concentration of control over land provides a power 
base for many groups in the less developed countries. Land is a source 
of political power as well as economic security, especially where the 
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land owner controls the access of peasants to their only source of 
security — the land. A meaningful land reform program will Inevitably 
destroy or limit the power base of many persons. Thus, the resistance 
from the various vested Interests In land ownership Is mainly responsible 
for the failure of agrarian reform In many countries. On the other hand, 
the masses of poorer strata In the villages are powerless in the existing 
social situation, remaining inarticulate and too unorganized to defend 
their Interests in the movement of land reform. As a result, many coun­
tries have legislated land reform but only a few can be said to have 
achieved real land reform. These reforms, furthermore, were only imple­
mented when there was a new revolutionary government or a change in 
government that favored drastic change (such as was the case in Mexico, 
Japan, and Taiwan). 
In terms of land reform policy, one is confronted with a range cf 
cultural and political situations — based on different patterns of social 
organization and customs — associated with different levels of develop­
ment. As cited, the differences among these six types of land tenure 
systems point to the varying reforms necessary to achieve more equitable 
land access and improved productivity in country specific situations. 
Accordingly, while it is possible to identify the need for land reform, 
It is difficult to make general prescriptions with regard to the form of 
land holding reorganization or patterns of land distribution necessary 
to achieve the multipurpose objectives of development. Nonetheless, one 
thing is certain, land must be redistributed to the tillers, from the 
standpoint of both egalitarian Ideals and a developmental perspective; 
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especially in the context of the exploitive traditional sharecropplng 
system and the skewed patterns of current ownership. 
In the main, land reform Is seen as a means of bringing about struc­
tural change In the agricultural sector, thereby altering the distribution 
of holdings or the distribution of Income. It Is also viewed as a goal 
In Itself in terms of social equality, but In a development context, Is 
usually seen as a concomitant of agrarian reform or rural development 
programs. From the experiences of land reform In much of Asia and Latin 
America, some form of rural organization may be a critical condition for 
successful land redistribution, but mere redistribution of land may not 
suffice to raise agricultural output substantially without accompanying 
other complementary Institutional reforms and new services. 
D. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the Internal conditions and related problems of 
underdevelopment In the Third World have been discussed with reference to 
the two factors ô£ the foriûulêtâd mvdsl dszcgrzphlc and social condi­
tions. The analysis of current demographic conditions Indicates the 
problem which most of the Third World countries face with rapid population 
Increase. The population explosion produces acute adverse effects on 
economic development of those countries. These adverse effects are: (1) 
to retard directly the increase in per capita national gross production 
and to reduce social overhead for general population, (2) to necessitate 
spending additional national Income to feed the additional mouths (thereby 
reducing the rate of capital formation), (3) to Increase the ratio of 
child-dependency resulting in heavier burdens for the labor force, and 
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(4) to Increase underemployment or unemployment without substantially 
expansion of labor markets. Thus, effective population control becomes a 
precondition for a viable economic development. 
Tlie rapid growth of urban population, due to recent urban migration 
(as well as natural increase in original urban population), also produces 
serious social problems such as Increases in unemployment, crime and 
delinquency, deterioration of urban environment with Insufficient public 
sanitation, shortages of housing, water supply, educational facilities, 
and other social services. In this regard, a comprehensive program of 
population redistribution is necessary, not only through urban renewal, 
but also through coordinated regional development programs. 
In the second section, the qualitative aspects of population were 
discussed in the areas of nutrition, health, and education. Many people 
in most parts of the Third world are undernourished or of malnutrlticnal 
status, and they are also in poor health. Food-shortage, mainly due to 
the current rapid increase in population, in addition to low agricultural 
productivity, is the main cause of the undernourishment problem. The 
causes of poor health are: Inadequate public health sanitation, inade­
quate medical personnel and facilities, and the concentration of medical 
delivery systems usually in urban centers. 
In the third section, the problems of political corruption, inequal­
ity, and the traditional land tenure systems were discussed. Political 
corruption is prevalent in most countries of the Third World, and its 
impacts are profound in terms of the effectiveness of governments, in 
political leadership, in the maintenance of the national solidarity of 
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the populations, and in social mobilization for national development 
planning. Thus, the general climate in the circle of power elites and in 
the administrative machinery should be cleared. 
Social stratification in the parts of the Third World are generally 
more rigid and the inequalities more acute than in the developed countries. 
These inequalities are not only inappropriate with regard to the concepts 
of social equity and social justice, but are also unfavorable to economic 
development. Finally, the land tenure system is one of the sources of 
social and economic inequalities in agrarian societies; these traditional 
land tenure systems being mainly based on rigidly unequal social stratifi­
cation. Further, it is generally inefficient for the increase in agri­
cultural productivity and rural development. Thus, an appropriate land 
reform need to be effectively implemented in such areas. 
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VI. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
AND A GENERAL STRATEGY 
This chapter will deal with the nature of development planning and 
presents a. general strategy for comprehensive development planning. The 
first section of this chapter will present a discussion of the major 
characteristics of converging processes of modernization as manifested 
in the First World (developed capitalist) countries and the Second World 
(socialist) countries. It also contrasts the development strategies and 
development goals of the capitalist and the socialist lines of develop­
ment. 
The second and third sections will deal with the general character­
istics of development planning and the possible utility of "social indi­
cators" for a comprehensive development plan, respectively. The fourth 
section will propose a general strategy for comprehensive development 
planning derived from the analytical model formulated and its subsequent 
analysis of the conditions and related problems of underdevelopment of 
the Third World. 
A. Hodernlzation and Development 
Almost all the development plans of developing countries may be said 
to have been directed toward ultimately modernizing their societies. In 
a sense, modernization is viewed as a specific form of development ex­
emplified as in the industrialized capitalist countries and the now devel­
oped socialist societies. In the Third World countries, a variety of 
development efforts are being made to bridge the gap between the levels 
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of modernity In their societies and the levels achieved In developed 
societies. 
Modernization may be regarded as both a process and product. The 
rubric of modernization essentially envelops all the basic aspects of 
social life, because change In one part system brings about change 
In other sectors of the system. Modernization theorists are diverse In 
their perspectives concerning the basic processes of modernization. First, 
modernization In the intellectual sphere is thought to exhibit Itself In 
the advancement of science and its application in technology. Since In­
creasing knowledge and advancing science play a vital role in the process 
of change in modern times, the development of rational attitudes is re­
garded as the core process of modernization (Black, 1966). 
Secondly, modernization, as a complex process of "system transfor­
mation", manifests Itself both in "sociodemographic aspects" and in the 
structural aspects of social organization. The "soclodemographlc aspect 
of modernization", as referred to by Elsenstadt (1966), is termed "social 
mobilization" by Deutsch (1961). "Social mobilization refers to the 
process in which people become available for new patterns of socialization 
and behavior" (Deutsch, 1961:494-495). Modernisation In social structural 
aspsct is characterized by "high differentiation and specialization with 
respect to individual activities and institutional structure; recruitment 
for these (roles) is not determined by ascription but by âchiêvââênC" 
(Elsenstadt, 1966:2-3). 
Thirdly, political changes in modernization often referred to are: 
(1) the legitimacy of the sovereign authority of the state is derived from 
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the people not from supernatural sanctions; (2) the growing mass participa­
tion by means of universal adult suffrage; and (3) the growing extension 
of the territorial scope and intensification of power of the central, 
legal, administrative, and political agencies of the society (Eisenstadt, 
1966). 
Fourthly, modernization in economic aspect Is characterized by 
industrialization (increasing substitution of inanimate power for human 
and animal power as the means of production). It is also indicated by 
the replacement of primitive tools by machines and technology. In such 
a way, mess production has been possible and economic growth has been 
accelerated. In terms of consumption, general levels of living standard 
have been substantially raised among the mass of the people. Fifthly, 
in the ecological aspect, modernization is characterized by ever-Increasing 
urbanization, and the environmental pollution resulting from Industrializa­
tion and mass consumption. Finally, modernization manifests Itself in 
the cultural sphere by the spread of literacy and secular education pro­
vided by the formal educational institutions; by the emergence of a new 
personality orientation to the broadening societal horizons, and by the 
growing faith in science and technology (Eisenstadt, 1966). 
These processes of modernization range from changes in individual 
personality and attitudes to the structural transformation of the social 
and economic infrastruecures by means of application of technology to 
social and political institutions. The point to be made is that the 
complexity and extenslveness of modernization made It hard to distinguish 
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between causal factors and concomitants of the modernization process. 
This means that the development of theories will be difficult. 
According to Horowitz (1966), one should distinguish between the 
First World, developed capitalist societies, and the Second World, 
socialist societies. Both similarities and differences result #ien one 
compares these two kinds of societies. Although they have taken different 
paths of development, and different agencies of development, both have 
certain processes In common and converge Into certain observable char­
acteristics. Both are attempting to transform the social structure from 
one based on ascrlptlve to achieving roles; and both are evolving structural 
differentiation on a principle based on role specialization. Both are 
attempting to harness Inanimate power as a base of mass production; and 
both are establishing programs of Industrialization as the central sector 
of the ëcoâoûy. Both have been urbanized, and both are also elaborating 
large-scale bureaucratic organizations, which provide a framework for in­
dustrialization, urbanization, and mobilization of the population in social 
and political activities. Recognizing the role of knowledge and of 
science, both emphasize the significance of formal education and mass media 
communication in development efforts. 
Despite these similarities in the process and convergences character­
ized in some outcomes of modernization, the two kinds of societies 
fundamentally differ in their dsvclcpment, goals, and in the strategies 
employed In the development efforts. Development along capitalist lines 
takes place on the axis of private property as the means of production, 
and the properties class and entrepreneurs are the main driving force of 
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development. On the other hand, development on the socialist lines 
occurs on the axis of public ownership as the chief means of production. 
A large number of nonpropertles, laboring workers are the driving force 
of development. These two approaches to development are qualitatively 
different In terms of their principles of social organization. The 
socialist lines assume the meeting of the assessed needs of society as 
the central objective of production, while the capitalists assume that 
profits are the central motivation to produce and pursue their programs 
accordingly. 
In the capitalist theories of modernization, private ownership (of 
the means of production) works as a key factor in the system of social 
stratification (shaping the distributions of income and wealth, living 
standard, consumption patterns, and life style, etc.). On the other hand, 
the socialist theories elaborate a nev principle of stratification by 
eliminating the properties class possessing the means of production and 
transforming social groups into categories of people in terms of skills 
acquired for production. On the capitalist lines, the fundamental strategy 
for sustained economic growth relies on providing primary incentives to 
the property owners and entrepreneurs, while the Marxist lines rely on 
mobilization of landless peasants and propertyless workers. In the capi­
talist system, the private ownership of the property is a major in-
s'ciEutional means for keeping social order- In contrast, in the non-
capitalist societies, the political authority of the state become legiti­
mate apparatus for keeping social order by eliminating the properties 
class, thereby becoming the major agent for development. 
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The greatest portion of Third World countries have been shaping their 
social and economic structures on the basis of "market economies", but 
many of them are now undertaking the principle methods of so-called "mixed 
economic system" in order to reconstruct their national autonomy and to 
overcome poverty. Thus, these countries have undertaken some form of 
national economic development planning. As already noted in the intro­
duction, these countries In general have failed to achieve their develop­
ment goals, and some are unable to Improve general human conditions, 
leaving many people in extreme poverty and undernourished. Nonetheless, 
not only has the idea of national development planning been widely ac­
cepted among the scholars and policy-makers of these countries, but 
state planning is vigorously practiced to accelerate sustained economic 
growth and to improve individual well-being. In the next section, the 
general characteristics of the development planning will be presented. 
B. Development Planning Process 
One of the novel feetures in our time Is the prevalence of national 
development planning among the Third World countries. The major objectives 
of development planning are to accelerate sustained economic growth and 
to Improve the levels of living standard. Because of excessive emphasis 
on economic growth, national development has often been "confused with 
economic development and economic development with eccnomlc growth" 
(Seers, 1969:2). 
According to Ponsioen (1969), individual countries have different 
development orientation such as: 
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Some have their main emphasis on political development — 
nation-building, others put their emphasis on social de­
velopment, and again some others on economic development, 
making the other values subservient to the preferred one. 
(Ponsioen, 1969:148-149) 
These three factors (political, economic^ and social) are, in effect, 
closely interrelated in the process of development, and they are, 
ultimately, the essential aspects of national development. 
Development, whether economic, political, or social development 
planning is involved, refers to a rational, deliberate attempt to trans­
form the society in the desired directions under the direction of govern­
mental agencies. Planning incorporates a range of political decisions, 
but the essential attribute of planning is that it involves rationally 
calculated and anticipated action (or decision-making). Planning is 
The provisional set of policy decisions fixing the lines 
along with which the development administration have to make 
their day-co-day decisions in the face of restricted pos­
sibilities as well as in face of the interdependent op­
portunities for development. (Ponsioen, 1969:164) 
Development planning is a process of policy determination for orderly de­
velopment to achieve given objectives. As a series of generalized guides 
to future decisions and actions, the implementation of planning process 
calls for steps such as: 
(1) to clarify goals, priorities, interests 
(2) to ascertain the facts, the social realities, the trends 
O) to inventory the knowledge, skills, and resources avail­
able or obtainable 
(4) to analyze the alternatives and the predictable outcomes 
of choices among them 
(5) to formalize the expressions of preference and the 
process of choice 
(6) to translate policies into Implications program on 
different levels 
(7) to measure the outcome of the programs (Kahn, 1969:16). 
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In effect., In focusing on the nature of the planning process per se, 
the planning endeavor Itself Is "a developmental process In which the 
several levels of Intellectual undertaking are In constant interaction" 
(Kahn, 1969:60). Though somewhat arbitrary. Chart D depicts, on a reason­
able ground, a sequence of specified formal steps in planning endeavor. 
First, the planning process begins with major social problems. These 
social problems are often selected from social concern areas which are 
particularly tied to the general national objectives. As already indicated 
in the discussion of the social valuations underlying national objectives, 
development planning in general has been motivated by various factors, 
such as: (1) the idea of self-determination in nation-building and to 
overcome economic backwardness; (2) the so-called "revolution of rising 
expectations" in the postwar period; (3) the impatience with the present 
situations of underdevelopment; (4) the existence of possibilities of 
development as seen in the successful economic development of Russia; 
and (5) the "widening gap" between the levels of living in developed and 
in less developed countries. In the real world, however, development 
planning tends to begin with the substantive Issues in the political 
process. 
Second, once the problems are either politically assigned or iden­
tified, the planners try to build planning models or to formulate the plan­
ning task through a constant playback between an assessment of the relevant 
aspects of social reality and the social valuations of the target popula­
tion. At this stage of the planning process, major effort is given to 
social inquiry (including fact-finding, projection, and Inventory taking) 
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Planning Instigators: 
Problems (or Needs. Concern) Ideals 
Assessment of Factual Situations 
and 
Analysis of Value Preferences 
Formulation of Planning Model 
and 
Definition of the Planning Tasks 
^ 
Policy Formulation: 
Legitimation of the 
Levels of Interventions 
(Development Strategies) 
Programming: 
lime-Phased 
Budgeting and 
Adminis tratlve 
Structuring 
I 
Reporting, Evaluation and Follow-up j 
Formal Stsps 
of Planning 
feèaOâcK 
Process 
Chart D* A general process of planning (modification based on Kahn, 
1969:62). 
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Into social conditions, manpower, and resources. Because planning Is 
a normative activity, relevant social values need to be analyzed; sometimes 
through political mechanisms. At the third stage of the planning process, 
specific planning tasks may be formulated on the basis of an assessment 
of the factual situations In terms of both resource availability and the 
existence of obstacles; as well as the analysis of value preferences. The 
conceptual framework of planning at this stage formulates a systematized 
development model specifying a planning target, Its alternatives, 
anticipated impacts and possible side-effects. The model-building of 
development planning is generally based upon some form of development 
theory as generated from a particular perspective, as was discussed in 
chapter two. On the other hand, the development planning model develops 
out of an assessment of the relevant components of social reality, such 
as the operative values and preferences. Planning without an adequate 
investigation of relevant realities (the actual social facts) is Utopian 
thinking. At the same time, planning that assembles volumes of data 
without conceptual clarity, or priorities in their appraisal, is useless 
ritual. 
Through both conceptual formulation and empirical analysis, planning 
model (1) defines the problems in detail; (2) diagnoses the causes of the 
problems, the obstacles to development, and the interrelationships of the 
component parts; (3) inventories resources, skills, and manpower available 
or obtainable; (4) estimates the scope and substance of relevant variables; 
(5) projects these variables Into the future; (6) locates just where the 
needs are concentrated; and (7) allocates all this as is appropriate into 
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geographical units, or subdivides it by other critical variables. All 
the listed functions and activities are not a definitive procedure, rather 
they may be regarded as relevant subject matter headings. In sum, not 
only can the planning model be used to define the problem areas and set 
the planning goals, but it can also be used to suggest relevant develop­
ment strategies which are essential to achieve the development goals. 
The term "development strategies" is here used to refer to the gen­
eral methods and tactics of state-intervention. These development 
strategies must be (1) relevant to the problems, (2) appropriate in terms 
of normative sense, (3) feasible in terms of natural and human resources, 
skills, and technologies available, and most of all, (4) effective to 
achieve the development goals. 
However, a planning process does not always lead to a program. The 
outcome of thw process may also be a policy calling only for lavs embody= 
ing new provisions or regulations. Thus, at the fourth step of the plan­
ning process, policies should be formulated which are relevant to 
programming specifics (and planning activities are thereby legitimated), 
concerning the levels of the proposed Intervention, i.e., development 
strategies. 
At the fifth step, the development policies need to be translated from 
the general planning model Into specific programs and practices. Pro­
gramming refers to the process of the particular organizational, 
financial, and other procedural means required. "Programs are time-phased 
plans for allocating resources and for specifying the successive steps 
required to achieve stated objectives", and "they are means to clearly 
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defined ends ..." (Committee for Economic Development, 1966:26). 
The emphasis here Is on the development of means to translate the general 
principles of the planning model Into specific operations. 
Finally, planning activities may Include reporting and evaluation 
of the time-phased processes through feedback processes and follow-up 
research. Though planning Is a rational activity derived from calculation 
of empirical data, and guided by a conceptual model, neither a conceptual 
model nor collection of empirical data can be perfect at the Initial 
stage. Planning enterprise Is a developmental and continuous flow of 
activities, and thus, should be flexible enough to pose options and to 
permit alterations to meet unforseen contingencies. The basic planning 
processes of both fact-finding and evaluation must recur throughout the 
programming phases and operational phases. The whole point of reporting, 
evaluation, monitoring, and feedback is the self-correcting aspect of 
planning activities. In this regard, development of a comprehensive re­
porting system of time-series social statistics is required to make a 
development plan effective and efficient. The next section will discuss 
the utility of comprehensive "social indicators" with respect to the re­
porting system for the purposes of evaluation as well as fact-finding-
C. Social Indicators and Planning 
The development of a so-called "social indicators system" may serve 
to meet the requirements of formulating a substantive development planning 
model. In recent years, in relation to the idea of national development 
planning, the social Indicator movement has been very active in policy­
making agencies, international assistance agencies, and even within academia. 
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Although there Is little agreement on the definition of "social 
indicators" among agencies and scholars, perhaps the most publicized defi­
nition was given in "Toward a Social Report": "A social indicator, as the 
term is used here, may be defined to be a statistic of direct normative 
interest which facilitates concise, comprehensive and balanced Judgments 
about the condition of major aspects of a society" (United States Depart­
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, 1969:97). 
Criticizing this definition as being too restrictive In terms of the 
specification of "normative Interest" and of the confining notion of 
"iseasures of welfare", Sheldon and Freeman (1970:97) pointed out the 
attributes of social indicators shared among other scholars; (1) social 
Indicators are a time series that allow comparison over an extended period 
and (2) social indicators are statistics that can be disaggregated by 
other relevant characteristics. Later reviewing the previous definitions 
of social indicators. Land proposed that 
The term social indicators refer to social statistics that 
(1) are components in a social system model (Including social 
psychological, economic, demographic, and ecological) or of 
some particular segment or process thereof, (2) can be 
collected and analyzed at various times and accumulated into 
a time series, and (3) can be aggregated or disaggregated 
to levels appropriate to the specifications of the model. 
Social system model means conceptions of social processes. 
(Land, 1971:323) 
What Land scant by social statistic as a social indicator is "its informa­
tive value which derives from its empirically verified aexus in a con­
ceptualization of a social process" rather than "social statistics" that 
are collected for administrative purposes (Land, 197/1:323). 
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From the current trend of the social indicator movement it seems 
clear, out of the controversy on the definition of social indicators, that 
there is a common effort to develop social indicators in the form of 
quantified statistics and for such statistics to be derived from the social 
system model (nor necessarily a Parsonlan social system). In this regard, 
social indicators at this initial stage have some problems in terms of 
both theoretical paucity and difficulty of measurement. In the social 
development field most main goals and other social policy objects are 
not directly measurable In their totalities, and indicators commonly 
serve as a proxy or partial measure of these entitles. 
In terms of "development indicators", HcGranahan suggests two kinds. 
The first type is a direct and full measure of a particular factor or 
aspect of development, which is a recognized goal of development. Certain 
development goals like the reduction of unemplaymenC, an increase of per 
capita income, or a reduction in Infant mortality, can be stated quite 
adequately in specific quantitative terms. Another type of indicator is 
the indication of a "true goal" or some element of development which may 
not Itself be directly and fully measurable. For instance, "the true goal 
is not reduction of infant mortality but better health" (McGranahan, 1972: 
92). In this case, the Infant mortality index is a substitute or proxy 
Indicator for health, which may be used as an Item for diagnosis and 
evaluation; among other Items. 
What McGranahan emphasized above is mainly concerned with the statis­
tical measures of what Land called "output indicators" or goal indicators. 
Since development implies an Interdependent process, social indicators of 
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development have to be Identified as Indicators of goals — Intended con­
sequences — and of concomitants and Its Implications, but also Indicators 
of Input factors and conditions. To the extent that a social Indicator 
system Is stated In mathematical form, they may be Identified In three 
groups: (1) parameters or "sociological constants" governing the develop­
ment of the process, (2) Input Indicators, and (3) output Indicators. 
In the same manner, Land suggested: 
Given models of specific social Institutions of processes, 
we need an analysis of how sensitive the output variables 
are to variations In the input variables and the parameters 
of the system. This knowledge may facilitate decisions as 
to which variables or components of the structure of the 
Institution a particular government agenqr can or should 
manipulate. That Is, we need to know which Input variables 
and structural parameters government agencies can manipu­
late, how difficult (costly) such manipulations are, and 
how such manipulations will be transformed Into variables 
In the output variable. (Land, 1971:324-325) 
Indicators, however, will neither replace the pollcy=maksr's decisions 
or priorities nor become development planning Itself. Their function is 
to make decisions more efficient by providing a more comprehensive descrip­
tion of society, its changes and problems, constraints, and needs, in a 
more systematic way. Although there are controversies on the promise and 
potential of the social Indicators, Carlisle (1972:26-32) has described 
them according to their use as follows: First, "informative indicators", 
referring to operatlonalized system components and system goals which 
roughly correspond to Land's "input" and "output" indicators: They are 
Intended primarily to describe the social system and changes within it. 
To be categorized as Informative indicators, social statistics must be 
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subject to regular collection as a time-series (in the form of levels and 
rates) and the possibility of disaggregation. 
Secondly, "predictive indicators" which refer to these operationallzed 
system components and goals that fit into the theoretical models by iden­
tifying causal relationships among the system components and between input 
variables and output variables. Thirdly, 'problem-oriented indicators" 
which indicate operationallzed social problem areas which provide the 
basis for policy solutions and suggest social needs; and, fourthly, 
"program evaluation indicators" which represent operationallzed policy 
goals, which are used In the evaluation of the effectiveness of the de­
velopment program. 
As Carlisle pointed out, the above categorization Is purposive and 
any statistics in each category are not mutually exclusive. Considered 
from a social Indicator perspective, it seems highly advisable that actual 
development planning should incorporate the "predictive indicators system" 
and substantiate the planning model with "Information indicators". How­
ever, it must also be noted that the present state of the art for develop­
ing a comprehensive system of social indicators is still at its initial 
stage, and it will be sometime before it will be able to meet the require­
ments for comprehensive development planning. In relation to the compre­
hensiveness , we now turn to a general strategy for the formulation of a 
development plan. 
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D. The Strategy Proposed with Reference 
to the Framework of Planning Models 
A general framework of planning model has been presented in the 
second section of this chapter, and the final section will be devoted to 
proposing a general strategy in formulating development planning models 
with regard to the identification of social problems and development tasks. 
In this section, the importance of the proposed strategy will be discussed 
with reference to the framework of planning models. 
In the real world, planning is not always appropriate in such cases 
as: persisting tradition or preference, crisis, lack of capability, and 
the like. Nor is planning always possible even \men it is appropriate: 
the lack of power to implement, the absence of sufficient consensus, etc., 
may inhibit the enactment. Feasibility is also limited at times by the 
realities of resources, technique, and ability to project. Yet increased 
planning remains desirable and inevitable, especially in the underde­
veloped countries. 
Though the steps or stages of planning should not be conceived of as 
a linear or deductive process, some aspects of a planning framework in 
action can be outlined (as shown in Chart D): (1) preliminary explora­
tions, including efforts to identify problems, goals, and to define 
priorities; (2) the formulation of planning Casks and models, both follow­
ing upon and leading to reality assessments and inventories, value 
analysis, and choosing; (3) policy formulations on the basis of empirical 
exploration, as generalized guide to action in the areas of decisions 
about the levels of intervention to be proposed, and about the fiscal and 
"social price"; (4) programming, including a wide range of activities from 
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administrative structuring and manpower assignment to budgeting and time-
phasing, i.e., everything that is relevant to administration; and (5) a 
system of reporting and evaluation of the output and effects of the plan­
ning Implementation. In short, rational planning is concerned with an 
efficient relation of means to ends, as identified. In effect, the entire 
framework of planning is based on a constant feedback process. 
With respect to the above "context of planning" framework, the 
strategy to be proposed in the following section will be particularly con­
cerned about the first step of preliminary exploration, and the second 
step of the formulation of planning task. These two steps are considered 
to be an intellectual undertaking In the activities of planning process. 
From a theorist's point of view, these first two steps are most critical 
in formulating development plans because through them the direction of 
development, the goals of development; and the basic means to the goals are 
determined. Thus, these two steps in formulating planning are thought to 
require a valid understanding of the dynamics of development process. 
Development, as pointed out earlier, has been often confused with 
economic growth, but development must be viewed in a much broader perspec­
tive, i.e., (development = economic growth i social change, as defined by 
Committee for Economic Development, 1966). In other words, development 
must be understood in terms of both quantitative factors and qualitative 
factors. For development, quantities are in incremental growth but the 
qualities must be structurally changed. These quantities and qualities 
are not Isolated but closely interrelated in development process. In ef­
fect, qualitative factors represent noneconomlc factors, i.e., social. 
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political, cultural, and psychological. For this reason, development 
planning should be comprehensive, taking into account all the variables 
of both the economic and noneconomlc factors relevant to the problems and 
goals of development. In this regard, the necessity of a comprehensive 
social information system was proposed as one component of strategy in 
formulating development plans. 
Unlike the undeveloped original conditions of traditional societies, 
present underdevelopment is the product of the historical process of 
colonialism, and it is maintained or intensified by the market forces in 
the global capitalist system. Thus, both historical origins and the inter­
national context must be taken into account, especially in underdeveloped 
countries. At the same time, the goals and directions of development 
must be decided by the specific social valuations of the people, rather 
than by those of others, 
E. General Strategy in Formulating 
Development Planning Model 
In the Introduction of this study, it vas noted that national develop­
ment planning was prevalent among the Third World countries. In chapter 
two, the model formulated treated national development planning as a major 
Internal dynamic having direct consequences for current changes taking 
place in the Third World countries. The general characteristics of de­
velopment planning have been presented in the second section of this 
chapter. This section will illustrate how the model formulated relates 
to and can be used in the formulation of a development plan. 
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The strategy proposed here Is neither definitive nor specific to the 
development planning of any country. Rather, It Is meant to be suggestive 
of the type analysis that any country may profitably undertake In the 
formulation of comprehensive development plans. 
As Indicated In the statement of problem, this study was concerned 
with Identifying some of the causes of the failures (or Ineffectiveness) 
prevalent In the Implementation of national development plans of the Third 
World countries. Broadly speaking, the factors affecting the failures of 
development plans were Identified as: (1) the unfavorable conditions of 
the new states, and (2) the theoretical deficiencies of the models used 
for such development planning. 
This study proceeded with the formulation of an analytical model, 
that was used to discuss these two factors In relation to the unique cur­
rent changes occurring In the Third World. The model formulated Is 
characterized as "analytical" because It seeks to offer a framework for a 
valid analysis of both the major causes of underdevelopment and the problems 
Inhibiting development. The major analytical components of the model in­
clude: (1) factors concerning historical consequences; (2) the factors of 
externalities in the international context; (3) the internal dynamics of 
current change, i.e., national development planning; and (4) the social 
and demographic conditions of underdevelopment. This model was utilized 
as a heuristic device for the analysis ox général coûditiûûs of undar^ 
development of the Third World. 
From the analysis of the general conditions of underdevelopment with 
respect to each of the four components of the model, it was noted that 
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many of the Third World countries are having generally similar experiences 
(though the national specifics of individual countries may differ greatly). 
In suggesting a set of general strategies in formulating development plans 
for a specific individual country, brief consideration of the generalities, 
«hich many of the Third World countries are facing, may sensitize both 
policy-makers and social planners to the uniquenesses of a jpeclflc individ­
ual country, and assist them to take into account such uniquenesses in 
formulating development plans. The consideration of the similarities of 
underdevelopment may further serve to broaden our perspective on defining 
the objectives and tasks of comprehensive development planning for a 
specific individual country. 
In the first place, most of the Third World countries are newly in­
dependent countries, with the exception of those of Latin America. These 
new states are; in fact, however, the products of the historical process 
of colonialism. With traditional social structures and indigenous cultural 
backgrounds, these historical consequences of colonialism serve as initial 
conditions, as antecedent factors, that affect profoundly the patterns, 
processes, and outcomes of current changes occurring in the new states. 
These initial conditions, in most cases, are unfavorable for development 
change, i.e., for the Implementation of national development plans in the 
new states. 
The nation-building efforts of these new states are generally embedded 
in deficient incipient conditions: (1) many new states were established 
largely on the arbitrary territorial boundaries without regard to such 
criteria as ethnicity, language, cultural heritage, and economic function 
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of the territory. As a result, the various subpopulations have been poorly 
integrated among these nations and divisive forces are working against 
national unity. (2) Many of these new states are politically deficient 
in terms of the national consolidation necessary to pursue national policies 
effectively, partly because the colonial administrations neglected the 
higher education of the indigenous people and, at the same time, the 
colonial rulers restricted the opportunities for self-governing by the 
colonial peoples. (3) Under the colonial economic policies, the economies 
of these new states (which had been generally self sufficient in pre-
colonial period) were transformed into economic dependence upon the de­
veloped industrial countries. For effective development planning, it is 
recommended Chat planers and decision-makers take into account these 
historically derived deficiencies and social barriers to development that 
act as constraints. 
Secondly, in relation to the dependent relations of the new states 
with regard to the developed industrial countries, external factors operat­
ing in the realm of international relations influence profoundly the 
current efforts to bring about instigated social change in these countries. 
It is widely recognized that there has been a growing interdependence 
between nations. In terms of technological aspects, less developed coun­
tries are in the position to benefit from the technological advancement 
made by the more advanced countries- However, this is not true of political 
and economic relations. The nature of political and economic relations 
with developed countries is considered to be most critical to the national 
autonomy of the less developed countries. la the real world, the present 
230a 
political and economic relations may act as major external constraints to 
national development. 
More specifically, the relative trading position of the less de­
veloped countries has deteriorated because of such factors as shrinking 
exports of primary products (due to gradual substitution for industrial 
raw materials in the industrial countries), subsequent unfavorable trade 
terms, and discretionary tariffs in the raw material Importing countries, 
and the like. With the exception of a limited number of oil-producing 
countries, it has been observed by contemporary analysts that the poor 
countries in the Third World have sometimes been deprived because the 
international market mechanism in general works In favor of the rich 
Industrial countries. 
After the second World War, considerable amounts of foreign aid were 
given to the poor countries in the form ef "economic assistance"; "peace 
for food" (primarily for relief purpose in food-shortages), and "military 
aid". This was understood to be international cooperation for the purpose 
of developing underdeveloped countries. But the practices such as "tying 
aid" and increasing the amount of private foreign investment (as many 
critics of present foreign-aid programs point out), to the extent these 
practices exist, help the developed donor-countries more than the recipient 
countries. In effect, some foreign aid has been detrimental to the 
national development of the recipient countries. These inappropriate 
foreign aid programs, especially bilateral aid in the form of "tying aid" 
and private foreign Investments with high interest rates, function to 
cause the failure of economic development efforts in the recipient 
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countries. Thus, the valid assessment of the nature of existing political 
and economic relations In specific Individual countries needs to be 
taken Into account In formulating national development plans. 
Thirdly, development planning Itself Is regarded as a new dynamic 
of purposive change In the Third World. Development planning Is deliberate, 
conscious attempt to change society In desired directions. Thus, de­
velopment planning is a normative activity intended to achieve specific 
development objectives that are embodied in the social valuations of the 
people and the ideals of "modernizing elites". Based upon the perceived 
common characteristics of the Ideologies of nationalism among the new 
states, the two broad areas of "national autonomy" and "individual well-
being" are believed to be Important development objectives. In effect, 
the national objectives of individual countries differ and have to be 
articulated in terms of the unique situation^ of each country and specific 
valuations of the people. 
National development planning is instigated change guided by the 
agents of change. Thus, the role of the change agent is important in the 
implementation of national development planning. The success or failure 
of the national development planning is, in large degree, dependent upon 
the change agent's performance. In this study, the change agents refer 
to intellectual elites and public administrators. In reality, some ruling 
elites may inhibit development rather than promote it. In some countries, 
public administration is also characterized by lack of sufficiently trained 
personnel, inefficient administrative procedures, and rigid organizational 
hierarchy, and with a lack of Internal coordination and cooperation between 
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the personnel and the mass of people. Thus, It is Imperative for effective 
Implementation of planning that traditional or overly bureaucratic and/or 
Ineffective administrations be reformed in order to perform the new functions 
and tasks of development. 
Finally, many less developed countries appear to share common problems 
in political, economic, social, and demographic aspects. Politically, it 
has been stated that some of these countries are characterized by political 
corruption, political instabilities, and ineffective administration. 
Economically, they are low Income, agrarian countries, with low productiv­
ity, with high rates of unemployment or underemployment, with internal 
Income inequalities, and even food-shortages. Socially, a rigid social 
stratification system and growing social inequalities are seen as common 
social problems in the less developed countries. Traditional social in­
stitutions and the conservative attitudes of the masses of people are seen 
by some as social obstacles to development efforts. Demographlcally, most 
of these countries are experiencing rapid population growth, which operates 
to wipe out national economic growth and beccmies one of the most important 
social problems, especially in the densely populated, less developed 
countries. All these problems are, in effect, interrelated, which means 
that circularity exists between causes and effects. For these reasons, 
development planning needs to be comprehensive and based upon a broad 
perspective. 
In the real world, as a major point of departure, most development 
planning starts with some selective social problems relevant to the unique 
realities of a specific individual country. However, these social 
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problems may be tied to political issues. For valid development, the 
social needs and social problems need to be analyzed with concrete and 
objective empirical facts, transcending politics. Because the essential 
attribute of planning involves rationally, calculated, and anticipated 
action (or decision-making), the reliability of information systems is 
critical for effective development planning. 
With respect to the four components of the model formulated, hope­
fully, the »bove consideration of the common characteristics shared that 
exist among many of the less developed countries serves primarily to 
broaden the social planner's perspective on comprehensive development 
planning, at least partially sheds light on major causes of current under­
development and major constraints In development efforts In specific 
individual countries. In terms of a general process of development plan­
ning outlined in Chart D (on page 217), the analyses in this study are 
mainly concerned with defining development goals and formulating develop­
ment tasks, rather than the actual programming of tasks to be carried out. 
Thus, the model formulated may further serve to provide the social plan­
ners with the analytical framework necessary to generate the kinds of 
information required to set the development goals realistic and to make 
the development planning effective. 
For effective development planning for a specific individual country, 
first of all, the social planners need to clarify their development goals 
and priorities by considering the two kinds of information: (1) information 
about specific modernisation Ideals of the country «hich are embodied in 
the social valuations of the people, and (2) information of Important 
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social problems and major social concerns In the country. In effect, 
development goals may be seen as desired long-run achievements, more than 
just the solution of Immediate social problems. Thus, the objectives of 
the development planning need to be decided by a rational assessment of 
the Ideals and the social problems or needs at hand. The same can be said 
for selecting the appropriate means to achieve the goals. 
Secondly, for the formulation of comprehensive development planning 
In a specific Individual country, the social planners also need to Identify 
the major causes of underdevelopment, and the constraints on development 
efforts, by consideration of the four kinds of Information that are sug­
gested by the model: (1) information of the forces working in the inter­
national mechanism and of the nature of the country's own international 
relationships; (2) information from the country's own historical heritages 
and recent past experiences; (3) information about Internal social obstacles 
and inhibiting factors; and (4) information about the characteristics of 
the change agents, i.e.. the capabilities of existing public administra­
tion to implement the development planning. All these kinds of information 
are considered critical for identifying the major constraints for the de­
velopment and implementation of development plans. 
Information about international relations may be useful for defining 
external constraints which may be beyond the control of an individual, less 
developed country. Both information about historical heritages and infor­
mation about existing social obstacles may be used to identify corrective 
measures necessary in order to make the development planning effective. 
Finally, information concerning the characteristics of the change agents 
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and their skills, level of training» and orientations may help to make 
planning and the Implementation of plans efficient. 
As was emphasized earlier, the entire framework of planning. Including 
the defining of development goals and the formulation of development plan­
ning tasks, should be based upon a constant feedback process. Thus, 
development planning needs to be kept flexible, subject to reassessment, 
and subject to modification as the action is carried out. 
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VII. SUMMARY 
The current societal changes which are now taking place In the Third 
World countries were the central concern of this study. The patterns and 
processes of the recent changes In those countries were perceived as 
unique and different from those In the Western experience. One of the 
distinct social phenomena occurring in those countries seems to be the 
collectively organized efforts at national development planning. The pur­
pose of such national development planning is in general to accelerate 
growth of national economy and thereby to bring about Induced social 
change in desired directions. However, many countries have, in fact, not 
been so successful in achieving their national objectives. Several reasons 
are apparent. One of the reasons for the failure was conceived to be 
either deficient or Inadequate theories In the earlier stages of develop­
ment planning. 
Development may be viewed as a particular type of change — overall 
movement in a desired direction. There are several competing theoretical 
schools of thought concerning underdevelopment and societal development. 
Most long-term development planning, unlike annual fiscal planning, re­
quires some theoretical presuppositions. Because of the uniqueness of the 
current changes in the Third World countries, however, the existing major 
theoretical approaches tr» modernization are believed, neither to cor­
respond validly to the realities of the present underdevelopment, nor to 
explain adequately the uniqueness of the current changes which take place 
in the non-Westem underdeveloped countries. 
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In this regard, the main objective of the study was to formulate a 
generalized. Inclusive model which Identifies the major causes and related 
problems of underdevelopment In order to explain adequately the causes and 
mechanism of the unique changes In the Third World countries. The model 
was utilized as valid analytical framework in the study of the conditions 
of underdevelopment; and of the problems of development. Though it is 
primarily a conceptual scheme, an attempt was made not to formulate the 
model on the basis of any a priori theory; rather it was based largely 
on the observation of the empirical phenmnena common to the underdeveloped 
countries. 
From the observation of the current changes in the Third World, 
emphasis has been put on (1) exogenous change — emphasizing the external 
factors affecting changes taking place in the Third World, (2) purposive 
change in the light of emphasis on the role of naticnsl development plan­
ning, and (3) differences in the initial conditions of the new states as 
compared with those of the industrial Western countries when they began 
to industrialize. 
Based upon these viewpoints, an effort has been made to formulate an 
analytical model which is designed to identify major causes of underde­
velopment and the dynamics of the current change taking place in the Third 
World countries. This model includes four analytical components: (1) 
factors of the historical process of colonialism, (2) factors of exter­
nalities, (3) the internal dynamics of current change in the Third World 
national development planning, and (4) the internal social and demographic 
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conditions. Then, the general characteristics of underdevelopment were 
discussed with respect to each of the four components of the model. 
In chapter three, both the historical consequences of colonialism and 
the external constraints of the underdevelopment have been analyzed. In 
effect, most of the Third World countries are the products of the histori­
cal process of colonialism. These historical consequences became the 
initial conditions of national development planning for the new states. 
These initial conditions are considered to be unfavorable for national 
development. The external constraints were specifically selected In the 
areas of trade and foreign aid. Through the workings of the "free inter­
national market mechanism" in favor of developed Industrial countries, 
the trading position of raw-material exporting countries has been increas­
ingly deteriorated. In the case of foreign aid, public grants have been 
gradually replaced by private iir/sstiaent or coBsnerclal loan. The over­
seas private investments and commercial loans in bilateral aid have now 
become one of the major causes of the economic dependence of the recipient 
countries. 
In chapter four, the Internal dynamics of current change was dis­
cussed. The internal dynamics of change refers here to factors of nation­
alism and the agents of change. Nationalism in the new states is dif­
ferent from old nationalism. The new nationalism is the emotional reser­
voir for national development planning» The national objectives are 
thought to be embodied In the ideology of new nationalism. The role of 
the agent of change is critical in the implementation of national develop­
ment planning. In this study, the agent of change refers to the 
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"modernizing elites" and the public administrations. The role of elites 
Is to stimulate national development planning while the public administra­
tions formulate development programs and execute them. Thus, these agents 
of change are chiefly responsible for the performance of national develop­
ment planning efforts. 
The Internal conditions of underdevelopment has been analyzed In 
chapter five. The Internal conditions are composed of: (1) demographic 
conditions, (2) quality of life, and (3) social conditions. Including at­
titudes and institutions. Host of the underdeveloped countries are 
characterized by rapid population growth, which has become one of the most 
critical social problems in many countries. Due to rapid population 
growth and relative slow economic growth, poor health and low levels of 
education are common in many poor countries. Political corruption, social 
inequalities, and land tenure systems were also selected as important 
social conditions characteristic of underdevelopment. In fact, political 
corruption has been prevalent among many underdeveloped countries, con­
tributing to government Ineffectiveness and leading to social indiscipline 
and political instabilities. The exploitive land tenure system is another 
major source of social inequality in the underdeveloped countries. These 
social inequalities have become a major social problem in these countries. 
At the same time, all these social conditions are not only unfavorable 
but have also become major obstacles to development. 
Chapter six dealt with the general characteristics of development, 
development planning: and offered a general strategy for formulating valid 
national development plans. The components of general strategy proposed 
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Include: (1) an emphasis on the historical dimension, (2) on the inter­
national context, (3) on the normative aspect'of development, and (4) on 
the development of a system of social information. 
This study attempted to view underdevelopment from broad perspectives 
including the historical and international setting. Current underdevelop­
ment is largely the product of a particular historical process, it is 
determined externally, and it is internally conditioned with various 
obstacles. Developing underdeveloped societies requires conscious and 
deliberate development planning. However, internal planning alone is not 
enough to develop a society under the circumstances of current inter­
national relationships. Valid international cooperation between the de­
veloped and the less developed is a precondition for successful develop­
ment. 
The major purpose of this study was to offer an analytical model as 
a means to developing a relevant, substantive, development approach to 
specific Individual countries in which existing development approaches 
are not likely to work. Though the model was utilized to analyze general 
problems of underdevelopment in the Third World, the model must be 
sharpened more and be applied to specific individual countries for further 
verification. 
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X. APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES 
A. Data Collection 
This study is mainly a theoretical work rather than an empirical in­
vestigation which tests specific hypotheses of development studies through 
the use of statistical analysis. Recently, there have been quite a few 
quantitative analyses of cross-national comparative studies on the subject 
of development problems using statistics from secondary sources or from 
some primary observations (Russett, et al., 1963; Taylor, et al., 1972; 
Adelman and Morris, 1967; Harbison, et al., 1970). 
However, these aggregate statistics at a national level are only 
recently available, especially in the underdeveloped low-income countries. 
Their reliability is highly doubtful, considering the present state of the 
art in data collection of the regions, even if data are available. For 
comparative studies, many of the desirable variables are nonexistent not 
only in a time series in one country, but also cross-nationally in the less 
developed countries. 
The data, even when available, are aggregate statistic» which are 
assembled from the secondary sources, such as the United Nations Statistical 
Yearbook, UNESCO Yearbook, USAID Fact Books, other encyclopedias, etc., 
published during 1970 and 1973. (See the sources in the following). These 
aggregate statistics are mostly by-products of administrative work or esti­
mates other than enumerations of data. Thus» the reliability of the data 
as a whole is nothing more than rough guesses because of the estimates, the 
cases of under enumeration or over enumeration, differing years of avail­
ability in the tabulations, and differing criteria uaed in enumeration from 
countiry to country. 
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The time axis of the social economic variables compiled Is centered 
around the years, 1970. The number of variables used are very few because 
they are used for the purpose of highlighting national disparities In the 
comparison of the current International situations (though the original 
number of variables In the data matrix exceeds 200 variables). The number 
of cases are 109 countries. Including both developed and the Third World 
countries. The criteria for the selection of the statistical unit are: 
(1) availability and (2) politically Independent sovereign nation-state, 
except Hong Kong In Asia and two extremely large countries of Soviet Russia 
and the United States (see the following list of countries). In addition 
to the limited use of the coiiq>lled data, some readily available statistics 
from various publications are to be used, with permission from the pub­
lishers, merely for an illustrative purpose, rather than for verification 
of personal contentions. 
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' B. Country List 
Black Africa (29) 
Botswana 
Cameroon 
Central African 
i Republic 
Chad 
Congo (Brazzaville) 
Dahomey 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Ivory Coast 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Malagasy Republic 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Upper Volta 
Zaire 
Zambia 
North Africa & Middle East (13) 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Morocco 
Saudi Arabia 
Syria 
Tunisia 
Asia (17) 
Afghanistan 
Burma 
China, Rep. 
Cyprus 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Srilanka 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Vietnam, Rep. 
North & Central America (22) 
Argentina 
Barbados 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Hexieo 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
(Continued on next page) 
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North & Central America (Contd.) 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Europe & Oceania (28) 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
C zechoslovakla 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany, Rep. 
Germany, Dem. 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxemburg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Yugoslavia 
Australia 
New Zealand 
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